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Ved P. Nanda
It is with a profound sense of pride that the staff of the Denver Journal of
InternationalLaw and Policy dedicates this student issue of the Journal to its
founder and faculty adviser, Professor Ved P. Nanda. In addition to serving as
Vice Provost for Internationalization and John Evans University Professor at the
University of Denver, Professor Nanda also sits as Director of the International
Legal Studies Program and Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law at the
There is now even an endowed
University of Denver College of Law.
professorship in Professor Nanda's own name, established five years ago by Law
School alumni to honor his contribution to promoting world peace and respect for
human rights.
Professor Nanda has been an extremely valued member of the University of
Denver community for over thirty-five years. During that time, he has received a
great number of awards, including the Human Rights Award from the United
Nations Association, the Anti-Defamation League's Civil Rights Award, and two
honorary doctorates. He has authored, co-authored or edited over twenty books
and authored well over one hundred scholarly articles and book chapters.
Professor Nanda has taught as a visiting professor for numerous prestigious
academic institutions the world over-from Oxford, Paris and Dublin to Mexico
City, Capetown and Shimla/Dharamsala. Additionally, Professor Nanda has
served in leadership positions for such highly regarded institutions as the American
Society of International Law, the World Jurist Association, and the World
Association of Law Professors.
Professor Nanda's extensive personal, academic and career accomplishments
speak volumes of his dedication to his work for the international legal community
and for the betterment of society at large. Indeed, Professor Nanda embodies the
true spirit of the University of Denver College of Law. As a teacher, he shares his
tremendous knowledge and experience with his students enthusiastically and with
personal warmth. As a friend, Professor Nanda welcomes all with open arms and
an open heart. Certainly, Professor Nanda leads by example and makes the
Journalwhat it is, and has always been-a family in the truest sense of the word.
The staff of the Journal is honored to have had the opportunity to work with
such an esteemed individual as Professor Nanda. We thank you, Professor Nanda,
with this issue.

EVERYBODY WANTS TO GO TO HEAVEN, BUT
NOBODY WANTS TO DIE:
THE STORY OF THE TRANSATLANTIC COMMON AVIATION
AREA*
Stephen D. Rynerson"°
The Transatlantic Common Aviation Area (TCAA, also known as the
Common Transatlantic Aviation Area, CTAA, or simply the Common Aviation
Area, CAA)' is a revolutionary idea in the field of international aviation, seeking to
move beyond the framework that has dominated the industry for over half a
century. 2 Yet despite the significance of the TCAA in the realm of international
transportation law, it has been virtually ignored by the American legal
community. 3 The purpose of this article is to bring this important new
*Editor's Note: On February 8, 2003, shortly before this issue was sent to the publisher, the U.S.
Department of Defense activated the passenger aircraft component of Stage I of the Civil Reserve Air
Fleet (CRAF) for the second time in the program's history. See DOD Activates Commercial Airlift
Reserves for Troops, REGULATORY INTELLIGENCE DATA, Feb. 10, 2003. This consisted of forty-seven
aircraft, or approximately five percent of the CRAF's total capacity under current enrollment in the
program. See Defense Dept. Activates First Stage of Civil Reserve Fleet, AVIATION DAILY, Feb. 11,
2003, at 3. The author would like to state that this event does not materially affect the portion of his
article concerning the U.S. military's objections to the Transatlantic Common Aviation Area.
**Juris Doctor expected May 2003, University of Denver College of Law. B.S. Economics and B.A.
History, Regis University, 1997. The author would like to thank Dr. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Director
of the Institute of Air & Space Law, McGill University, for his encouragement and advice on this
project.
1. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Competition in the Air: European Union Regulation of Commercial
Aviation, 66 JAir L. & Com. 979, 1076 (2001) [hereinafter.Competitionin the Air]. "TCAA" appears
to have become the preferred abbreviation. See Vice President of the European Commission and
Commissioner for Transport and Energy Loyola de Palacio, Beyond Open Skies, Address to Aviation in
the 21st Century, Beyond Open Skies Conference (Dec. 6, 1999) (transcript available at
http://www.eurunion.org/news/speeches/1999/991206dp.htm) (using the term "TCAA" exclusively)
[hereinafter Beyond Open Skies].
2. See Beyond Open Skies, supra note 1.
3. Only five law review articles provide any discussion of the subject under any of its names.
See Paul V. Misfud et al., InternationalLegal Developments in Review: 1999 Public InternationalLaw,
Aviation andAerospace Law, 34 INT'L LAW. 625, 631-34 (2000); Competition in the Air, supra note 1,
at 1076-78; Eli A. Friedman, Comment, Airline Antitrust: Getting Past the Oligopoly Problem, 9 U.
MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 121, 136-37 (2001); Ulrich Schulte-Strathaus, Common Aviation Areas: The Next
Step Toward InternationalAir Liberalization, 16 Air & Space Law. 4 (2001); Yu-Chun Chang &
George Williams, Prospectsfor Changing Airline Ownership Rules, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 233 (2002).
One law review article discusses the prospects of a "Free Fly Zone" which would be similar to the
TCAA. See G. Porter Elliot, Antitrust at 35,000 Feet: The ExtraterritorialApplication of UnitedStates
and EuropeanCommunity Competition Law in the Air Transport Sector, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
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development the recognition it merits. Part I will explain the history of the
TCAA's development, from the Convention on International Civil Aviation of
1944 (Chicago Convention) through the European Court of Justice's 2002 decision
on the ability of E.U. Member States to set their own aviation policies. Part II will
examine what the TCAA might look like if it came to fruition. Finally, Part III
will identify obstacles to the establishment of the TCAA.
PART I: THE PAST IS PROLOGUE

The BilateralRegime in 15 Minutes or Less4
The legal structure of modem international aviation was established by the
Chicago Convention of 1944. 5 Created for the purpose of establishing a
multilateral framework for "openness, trade, and mutual co-operation," the
Chicago Convention instead gave rise to a system largely based on individual
national interests, 6 embodied in treaties, executive agreements, and other
documents collectively referred to as bilateral air services agreements, 7 bilateral air
transport agreements, 8 or, just simply, "bilaterals." 9 The conventional wisdom is
that the United States intended to push for a "laissez-faire, free market philosophy"
in international aviation as part of the Chicago Convention.10 However, it could be
argued that the path to restrictive bilaterals was set down from the very beginning,

ECON. 185, 227-31 (1997). Another article analyzes the E.U. Commission's claims in its suit against
the Member States over their bilateral air service agreements (see discussion infra), but does not
directly discuss the TCAA. See John Balfour, A Question of Competence: The Battle for Control of
European Aviation Agreements with the United States, 16 AIR & SPACE LAW. 7 (2001). The American
Bar Association has only mentioned the TCAA twice in its official publications, both times merely in
passing. See American Bar Association, Section of Public Utility, Communications and Transportation
Law, Report of the Aviation Committee, Spring 2000, at 5, at http://www.zsrlaw.coml
publications/articles/PDF/FJC0006.pdf; American Bar Association, Air and Space Law Forum Special
Committee on Cross-Border Investment and Right of Establishment in the International Airline
Industry, Cross-border Investment in International Airlines: Presenting the Issues, Oct. 19, 2000, at
http://www.abanet.org/formns/alrspace/prelimreport.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Crossborder Investment].
4. Numerous books and articles have been written which discuss the development of the bilateral
regime in the wake of the Chicago Convention. See, e.g., PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, LAW AND FOREIGN
POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AvIATION 7-76 (1987) [hereinafter LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY]; Ruwantissa
I.R. Abeyratne, Would Competition in Commercial Aviation Ever Fit Into the World Trade
Organization?, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 793 (1996); Romina Polley, Aviation Defense Strategies of
National Carriers, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 170 (2000); Friedman, supra note 3. The author's purpose
here is to briefly summarize the development for readers not otherwise familiar with the legacy of the
Chicago Convention.
5. See Polley, supra note 4, at 170-71.
6. See Beyond Open Skies, supra note 1.
7. See Abeyratne, supra note 4, at 794.
8. See Seth M. Warner, Comment, Liberalize Open Skies: Foreign Investment and Cabotage
Restrictions Keep Noncitizens in Second Class, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 277, 285 (1993).
9. See Competition in the Air, supra note 1, at 1070.
10. Warner, supra note 8, at 283. See also Adam L. Schless, Open Skies: Loosening the
Protectionist Grip on International CivilAviation, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 435, 438 (1994).
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when in his opening statement the U.S. representative to the International Civil
Aviation Conference, where the Chicago Convention was drafted," analogized
international aviation to railroading, 12 which was already being crippled
domestically by heavy regulation at the time of the conference.13
Regardless of whether the possibilities of a liberal multilateral regime were
defeated before drafting even began, the structure of the Chicago Convention
shows it clearly was not designed to easily facilitate such a system, as several
articles in the final document gave national governments broad powers to regulate
international air traffic that crossed their borders. 14 Yet the Chicago Convention
did not compel the formation of bilateral agreements, either. 15 The reasons for the
historical dominance of bilateral agreements are open to debate, but most
commentators suggest that this resulted from a combination of security concerns,16
a desire to ensure that benefits resulting from governmental negotiations would be
reaped primarily by the negotiating states, 17 and/or a desire to protect existing
national airlines. 8 Ultimately, the conjunction of the Chicago Convention
framework and national interests gave rise to a situation where "the mission of
every country with an airline capable and desirous of handling transnational
11. See Troy A. Rolf, Comment, InternationalAircraft Noise Certification, 65 J.AiR LAW &
COM. 383, 387 (2000).
12. See 1 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER I - DECEMBER 7, 1944 57 (1948).

13. See CLARENCE B. CARSON, THROTTLING THE RAILROADS 78-83 (1971). Aside from this
telling reference, the U.S. had prepared drafts for the Chicago Convention that would have limited
carrier capacity and also sought cabotage restrictions that would have had the effect of limiting foreign
access to the U.S. domestic air market. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Turbulence in the "Open Skies":
The Deregulationof InternationalAir Transport, 15 TRANsP. L.J. 305, 311 n.12 (1987) [hereinafter
Turbulence]. "Cabotage" is generally defined as "trade or transport in coastal waters or airspace or
between two points within a country." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 194 (1991). In air
transport it is defined as "the transportation of passengers, cargo, or mail by a foreign airline between
two points in the same nation-the foreign carriage of domestic traffic." Paul Stephen Dempsey, The
Disintegrationof the U.S. Airline Industry, 20 TRANSP. L.J. 9, 29 (1991) [hereinafter Disintegration].
14. See, e.g., Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, arts. 1,6, 7, 17, 18, 61
Stat 1180, 1182, 1185, available at http://www.iasl.mcgill.ca/airlaw/public/chicago1944a.pdf (last
visited July 8, 2002) [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. Article 1: "The contracting States recognize
that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory." Article 6:
"No scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a contracting State,
except with the special permission or other authorization of that State, and in accordance with the terms
of such permission or authorization." Article 7: "Each contracting State shall have the right to refuse
permission to the aircraft of other contracting states to take on in its territory passenger, mail and cargo
carried for remuneration or hire and destined for another point within its territory. Each contracting
State undertakes not to enter into any arrangements which specifically grant any such privilege on an
exclusive basis to any other State or an airline from any other State, and not to obtain any such
exclusive privilege from any other State." Article 17: "Aircraft have the nationality of the State in
which they are registered." Article 18: "An aircraft cannot be validly registered in more than one State,
but its registration may be changed from one State to another."
15. See Chris Thornton & Chris Lyle, Freedom's Paths, AIRLINE Bus., Mar. 2000, at 74
[hereinafter Freedom'sPaths].
16. See, e.g., Polley, supra note 4, at 193.
17. See, e.g., id
18. See, e.g., Elliot, supra note 3, at209-10.
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[was] to facilitate its airlines access to foreign markets, while

simultaneously protecting its own market from an influx of foreign carriers."'

9

Only a few traces of multilateralism emerged from the International Civil
Aviation Conference. 2 0 The first was the creation of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) by the Chicago Convention itself.2 ' The ICAO was
tasked with developing the "principles and techniques" of international air
transportation, 2 but it was also obligated to do such things as "[p]revent economic
waste caused by unreasonable competition" and to make sure "every contracting
State has a fair opportunity to operate international airlines., 23 Two sideagreements did more to promote a nascent multilateral framework, however, and
began the process of establishing the spectrum of aviation freedoms known
today.2 4 Of the fifty-two states that signed the Chicago Convention, thirty-two
signed the "Two Freedoms Agreement," 25 while a further twenty signed the "Five
Freedoms Agreement, ' , 26 which together came to define the basic premises of
modern international aviation.2 7
Yet only the "Two Freedoms Agreement"
attained the required number of signatories to enter into force, thus obligating
nations to separately negotiate agreements to gain additional international traffic
rights.28

19. See, e.g., Elliot, supra note 3, at 186 (footnotes omitted).
20. See Abeyratne, supra note 4, at 800-02.
21. Chicago Convention, art. 43, at 1192.
22. See id., art. 44, at 1192.
23. See id, art. 44(e), (f), at 1193.
24. See Abeyratne, supra note 4, at 801-02. There are now eight generally recognized freedoms.
They are as follows:
First Freedom: The right to overfly a territory.
Second Freedom: The right to land in another country for a non-commercial purpose (e.g., refueling).
Third Freedom: The right to load passengers, cargo and mail in the carrier's country of origin and
unload them in another country (e.g., a U.S. carrier loads passengers in New York and unloads them in
London).
Fourth Freedom: The right to load passengers, cargo and mail in another country and bring them back
to the country of origin (e.g., a U.S. carrier loads passengers in London and unloads them in New
York).
Fifth Freedom: The right to load passengers, cargo and mail in one country and then fly to another
country (e.g., a U.S. carrier flying from New York to Helsinki stops in Paris and loads passengers
bound for Helsinki).
Sixth Freedom: The right to load passengers, cargo and mail in another country and unload them in a
third, after a stopover in the country of origin (e.g., on a flight from London to Paris to Rome, a French
carrier loads passengers in London bound for Rome).
Seventh Freedom: The right to carry passengers, cargo or mail between two countries on a stand-alone
service, where the flight does not go via the carrier's country of origin (e.g., a German carrier operates a
route from London to Madrid).
Eighth Freedom: Cabotage, the right to carry passengers, cargo or mail within the borders of another
country (e.g., a Greek carrier operates a route from Copenhagen to Torshavn, Faeroe Islands).
Adapted from European Union Commission, Air Transport, The Eight Freedoms of Air Traffic, at
http://www.europa.eu.int/comni/transport/themes/air/english/at_3_en.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2001).
25. International Air Services Transit Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1693, 84 U.N.T.S. 389.
26. International Air Transport Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1701, 171 U.N.T.S. 387.
27. See Abeyratne, supranote 4, at 801-02.
28. See id. at 802; F. Allen Bliss, Rethinking Restrictions on Cabotage, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
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Soon after the Chicago Convention, the United States and the United
Kingdom entered into the first major bilateral in what was commonly termed the
Bermuda Agreement. 29 The Bermuda Agreement represented a compromise
between U.S. and British interests. 30 The key elements of the Bermuda Agreement
were its relatively liberal capacity restrictions 31 and its elaborate rate restrictions
that relied on the International Air Transport Association (IATA) 32 to impartially
34
establish fares. 3 3 Liberal Fifth Freedom rights were also granted to both parties.
The Bermuda Agreement (later known as Bermuda I) became the rough model for
most other bilaterals for over three decades.35 The late 1970s, however, saw the
first major cracks appear in the bilateral regime.36
Following a dispute about whether the United States was abusing Bermuda I's
loose capacity limits by authorizing too many carriers on U.S.-U.K. routes,37 the
United States and United Kingdom entered into the Bermuda II Agreement
(Bermuda II) in 1977. 3 ' Bermuda II was significantly more restrictive than its
predecessor: 39 limiting the number of carriers that could serve routes between the
two nations, 40 giving the parties' respective governments considerable control over
capacity, 4' and noticeably diminishing U.S. Fifth Freedom rights beyond the U.K.
market.42
L. REv. 382, 388-89 (1994).
29. Air Services Agreement, Feb. 11, 1946, U.S.-U.K., 60 Stat. 1499 [hereinafter Bermuda I]. It
is often now called the Bermuda I Agreement to distinguish it from the Bermuda II Agreement of 1977
(Agreement Concerning Air Services, July 23, 1977, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 5367, 1977 U.S.T. LEXIS
351 [hereinafter Bermuda II]).
30. See Elliot, supranote 3, at 210.
31. Bermuda I did not establish any numeric targets for capacity, but instead required that "the air
transport facilities available.., should bear a close relationship to the requirements of the public for
such transport," and that the parties provide "a fair and equal opportunity" for their respective carriers
to operate on any routes permitted by the agreement. Bermuda I, supra note 29, at 1515.
32. IATA was, and is, the worldwide trade group for air carriers. It was established in April 1945,
with an initial membership of 57 carriers. IATA, About Us, History, at http://www.iata.org/history.htm
(last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
33. See Bermuda I, Annex II, at 1504-06. The parties could block fares they considered
unreasonable. Id. at Annex II(e), (f), at 1505. IATA was permitted, under antitrust immunity granted
by the U.S. government, to establish fares for U.S.-based international aviation. See Turbulence, supra
note 13, at 347-48.
34. See Bermuda 1, Annex IV (a), (b), at 1510.
35. See Turbulence, supranote 13, at 316
36. See id. at 325. It should be noted that some commentators argue the bilateral regime was
doomed by the 1960s, when charter operations and a proliferation of airlines in the developing world
undermined IATA's rate-making authority. See Josd A. Gomez-lbanez & Ivor P. Morgan,
DeregulatingInternationalMarkets: The Examples ofAviation andOcean Shipping, 2 YALE J. ON REG.
107, 111-12 (1984).
37. See Angela Edwards, Note & Comment, Foreign Investment in the US. Airline Industry:
Friendor Foe?, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 595, 601-02 (1995).
38. See Bermuda II, supra note 29.
39. See Edwards, supra note 37, at 601-02.
40. See Bermuda II, art. 3, 1977 U.S.T. LEXIS 351, at 7-12.
41. See id.
at art. II and Annex 2, 1977 U.S.T. LEXIS at 23-27, 70-76.
42. Compare Bermuda 1, Annex Ill, at 1507-10 with Bermuda II, Annex 1, 1977 U.S.T. LEXIS at
52-70.
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Following the disappointment of Bermuda II, the United States launched an
aggressive campaign to liberalize international aviation, for the purpose of both
improving the market choices for consumers and to punish the United Kingdom by
dealing more directly with other European nations.43 The United States succeeded
in completing eleven new bilaterals between 1978 and 1980 with nations including
Belgium, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, and
Finland," which particularly resulted in gains for Belgian and Dutch carriers to the
detriment of U.K. carriers.45 Although the sheer number of bilaterals completed in
so short a span was impressive in and of itself, of more significance was that these
bilaterals were qualitatively different than the earlier Bermuda I-type. 46 Popularly
called "Open Skies" agreements, these bilaterals:
1.

Permitted flexible pricing;

2.

Banned capacity restrictions;

3.

Permitted multiple designations, i.e., different carriers operating the
same route;

4.

Gave access to secondary U.S. markets, e.g., Atlanta, Dallas, etc.;

5.

Granted new Fifth Freedom rights for U.S. carriers;

6.

Allowed charter operations under the rules of the charter's country of
origin; and

7.

Banned discriminatory and unfair methods of competition.

47

The final blow against the bilateral regime came in 1978 when the United
States menaced IATA with removal of its antitrust protection.48 While the
threatened action was never carried out, 49 IATA was sufficiently intimidated that
in 1979 it divided itself into a two-tiered structure: a trade association, to which all
member carriers belong, and a voluntary tariff coordinating body.50 Today,
somewhat less than forty percent of IATA's members participate in tariff
coordination.5 ' Yet at what seemed to be its moment of triumph, the United States
turned away from the aggressive path of liberalization, 52 although some suggested
that this was because there were no more victories to be won from reticence.53 The
43. See Turbulence, supranote 13, at 333-35.
44. See Edwards, supra note 37, at 605.
45. See Turbulence, supranote 13, at 334-36, 336 n.101.
46. See id. at 334-36, 338-39.
47. Seeid. at 338-39 nn. 108-11, 113.

48. See id. at 349-51.
49. See id. at 353-54.
50. See IATA, About Us, History, at http://www.iata.org/history3.htm (last visited Jan. 19,2002).

51. Compare id (noting "some 100" carriers engage in tariff coordination) with IATA,
Membership, at http://www.iata.org/membership (noting 272 members) (last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
52. See Turbulence, supranote 13, at 382.
53. A U.S. negotiator told Aviation Week & Space Technology that there were "very few new
routes to trade, so the negotiations tend to be focused on details of carrying out agreements .... We
can't just create a new Chicago-Zurich route." James K. Gordon, U.S. Negotiators Face Complex

2002

EVERYBODY WANTS TO GO TO HEAVEN

legacy of this liberalization drive, however, lived on as U.S. deregulation increased
the competitive pressure on trans-Atlantic routes, prompting the
European nations
54
to begin examining intra-European liberalization more closely.
As American liberalization efforts were tapering off, northern European
governments began to lead a gradual shift away from bilaterals calculated to
protect national air carriers from open competition toward a system more closely
resembling the U.S. Open Skies bilaterals of 1978-80. 55 The United Kingdom and
the Netherlands formed the vanguard of this movement, believing that consumers
and air carriers alike would benefit from a more laissez-faire market. 6 In June
1984, the United Kingdom completed a new bilateral with the Netherlands that
allowed carriers to serve any route between the two countries, set their own
capacities, frequencies, and schedules, and set fares subject only to disapproval by
the country of origin. 57 Hailed as a "bilateral revolution," the U.K.-Netherlands58
bilateral was accompanied by predictions that it "could have a domino effect.
This prognostication was proven partially correct when the United Kingdom
developed other, more limited, bilaterals soon thereafter with the Federal Republic
of Germany, France, Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland.59
In the spring of 1985, the United Kingdom completed a new bilateral with
Luxembourg, which liberalized route access, capacity controls and fare approval
procedures. 60 The agreement provided for unrestricted market entry and capacity,
while fares could ordinarily be rejected only by the agreement of both
governments, 61 although the country of origin could unilaterally reject a fare it
found predatory or excessive.62 This agreement became the United Kingdom's
desired model for subsequent bilaterals.63
Not all parties were happy with the United Kingdom's bilateral-mania, with
such aviation noteworthies as Lufthansa's deputy general manager for international
relations arguing the U.K.-Netherlands bilateral and others were harming separate
deregulation efforts by the European Economic Community. 64 British Airways'
general manager for pricing, while conceding that bilaterals were likely to persist,
Schedule of Bilateral Talks, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 11, 1985, at 43.
54. See Liberal Regulatory Environment Alters 1ATA's Fare Setting Role, AVIATION

WK. & SPACE

TECH., Nov. 11,1985, at 102.

55. See id.
56. See Michael Feazel, European Civil Aviation Leaders Commit to Increased Liberalization,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., June 24, 1985, at 36.
57. See Michael Feazel, British Dutch Aim at Deregulation,AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., June
25, 1984, at29.
58. Id.
59. See New Agreements Spur EuropeanLiberalization, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 12,
1984, at 71 [hereinafter New Agreements].
60. See STEPHEN WHEATCROFT & GEOFFREY LiPMAN, AIR TRANSPORT IN A COMPETrIVE EUROPEAN
MARKET: PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS, AND STRATEGIES 213 (1986).
61. See David A. Brown, Britain Urges DeregulationEffort in 1986, AVIATION WK.& SPACE TECH.,
Dec. 2, 1985, at 36.
62. See WHEATCROFT & LIPMAN, supra note 60, at 213.
63. See Brown, supra note 61.
64. See New Agreements, supra note 59.
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suggested, "The EEC is a benchmark. It forces people to think about these issues
and keep them in the public attention., 65 However, other airline officials argued
the advancements in bilaterals reduced the need for the European Economic
Community to involve itself in the matter.66
Despite the United Kingdom's initiatives, many carriers declined to lower
rates. 67 Furthermore, like the United States before it, the United Kingdom began to

find that it was running out of nations that were interested in entering into new
bilaterals. 68 By the late 1980s, the prospects for additional liberal bilaterals in
Europe appeared bleak. 69 However, those that had been completed offered a
glimpse of what services might result if a liberal multilateral agreement was
reached.70
If It's Tuesday, This Must be Brussels
By 1993, the Member States of the European Community (or Community) 71
had entered into roughly 800 separate bilaterals.72 January 1 of that year had seen
the implementation of the "Third Package" of aviation reforms by the European
Community, which largely replaced the bilaterals between the Member States,
making it possible for citizens or governments of Member States to establish
carriers anywhere in the European Community and fly between Community
airports under one set of regulations.73 Eager to parlay this new internal unity into
external leverage, the E.C. Commission (Commission) 74 began a campaign to take

65. See New Agreements, supra note 59.
66. See id
67. See LAw AND FOREIGN POLICY, supranote 4, at 103.
68. See WHEATCROFT & LIPMAN, supra note 60, at 68-69.
69. See LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 4, at 103-04.
70. See, e.g., Airline Observer, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 17, 1986, at 33 (noting that two
years after the U.K.-Netherlands bilateral was introduced the Amsterdam-London city-pair had become
Europe's most heavily trafficked route with 210 flights weekly by seven scheduled carriers).
71. The Member States at that time were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. See European Union,
The European Union at a Glance, at http://www.europa.eu.int/abc-en.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2002).
72. Bruce Barnard, EC Ministers Reject Pooling of Air Traffic Agreements, J. COM., Mar. 16,
1993, at 3B [hereinafter EC MinistersReject Pooling].
73. See Michael Niejahr & Giuseppe Abbamonte, LiberalizationPolicy and State Aid in the Air
Transport Sector, EC COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL. (European Community), Summer 1996, at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1996024en.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2002).
For a complete discussion of E.C. aviation reform, see generally,Competition in the Air, supranote 1.
74. The Commission "embodies and upholds the general interest of the [Community]. The
President and Members of the Commission are appointed by the Member States after they have been
approved by the European Parliament." European Union, Institutions of the European Union, at
http://www.europa.eu.int/inst-en.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2002). The Commission: (1)has the right to
initiate draft legislation and present legislative proposals to the European Parliament and Council; (2) is
responsible for implementing the legislation (directives, regulations, decisions), budget and programs
adopted by Parliament and the Council; (3) acts as guardian of the treaties and, together with the Court
of Justice, ensures that [Community] law is properly applied; and (4) represents the [Community] on
the international stage and negotiates intemational agreements, such as in trade. See id.
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over the negotiation of bilaterals on behalf of the Member States.75
At a meeting of the Member States' transport ministers in March 1993, the
Commission requested that the Member States pool their bilaterals and grant
negotiating powers for future bilaterals to the Commission based on its earlier
successful completion of a multilateral agreement with Sweden, Norway, and
Switzerland to bring their regulations into conformity with the Third Package.76
While at least one national representative suggested that joint negotiations would
be to the 77Member States' advantage, another claimed bilaterals were
"sacrosanct."
The transport ministers ultimately rejected the Commission's
proposal, stating that they would only confer negotiating authority if they agreed
that the Commission would achieve better results than state-to-state negotiations.78
The Commission denied claims that it would bring suit against the Member States
over the matter.79
Less than a year later, bilaterals were once again placed in the spotlight of
scrutiny by the newly-renamed European Union,80 this time via the Comitd des
Sages (Comitd) 8' in a report on international aviation. The Comitd observed that
most E.U.-based carriers relied on extra-European routes for half or more of their
activity.8 2 Consequently, bilaterals "have a substantial competitive impact" on the
intra-E.U. air transport market. 83 The Comitd argued that bilaterals "ignore the
new realities of the Single European Aviation Market" and should be replaced by a
multilateral regime under the European Union's control rather than the individual
Member States'. 84 A strategy of negotiating external aviation agreements in
common would "dispel concerns about discriminatory treatment," while creating
increased potential for reciprocity on market access.8 5 In the Comitd's opinion
there was no debate about whether a multilateral negotiating framework should be
established, only how. 86 The report concluded by recommending that the
Commission be given appropriate negotiating powers before June 30, 1995.87

75. See EC MinistersReject Pooling,supra note 72.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. The name change was effective January 1, 1994. See European Union, The History of the
European Union - 1993, at http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/history/1993/1993_en.htm (last visited Jan. 2 1,
2002).
81. Popularly called the "Committee of Wise Men" in English-language sources. See, e.g., Wise
Men: Bilaterals Ignore "New Realities" of Single Market, AVIATION DAILY, Feb. 17, 1994, at 7
[hereinafter Wise Men].
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id
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One Man Fightsfor the Future
The Commission's struggle for negotiating authority took a leap forward
when former British Labour Party leader"' Neil Kinnock became E.U. Transport
Commissioner in January 1995.89 Less than a month after taking office, Kinnock
was confronted with a report by the European Parliament accusing the
Commission of being "too timid" in the wake of the Comitd's findings and
90
engaging in activities that amounted to "little more than a consultation exercise."
Seemingly prompted by both the Parliament's harsh criticism and a sudden
renewal of interest by the United States in obtaining Open Skies bilaterals with
European nations, 91 in March 1995 the Commission issued what Aviation Daily
characterized as a "strong.. .waming." 92 Member States were not permitted to
negotiate individual bilaterals, particularly with the United States and they could
be brought before the European Court of Justice if they pursued such a course of
action.93
The United States protested its innocence, arguing, "We have been trying to
negotiate an open skies deal for a long time. We have been pushing for
negotiations in a multilateral forum with the E.U." 94 Meanwhile, six Member
States that had been approached by the United States for talks on Open Skies
bilaterals, 95 along with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, rejected a
proposal by Kinnock for granting the Commission the authority to negotiate a

88. See Joe Murphy, Anger at Euro-flag on Driving Licenses, MAIL ON SUNDAY (London), Jan.
15, 1995, at 15.
89. See Press Release, European Union, New Commission Portfolios Distributed and Working
Groups Set Up (Jan. 25, 1995), DN: IP/95/60,at http://www.europa.eu.int. It should also be noted that
in 1995 three new Member States were added to the European Union: Austria, Finland, and Sweden.
See European Union, The European Union at a Glance, at http://www.europa.eu.int/abc-en.htm (last
visited Jan. 21, 2002).
90. See Report To EuropeanParliamentCriticises 'Timid' Commission, AVIATION EUR., Feb. 16,
1995, at 1.
91. See EC Goal: All-Or-Nothing Bilaterals with US., AVIATION DAILY, Mar. 6, 1995, at 26
[hereinafter EC Goal]. U.S. Open Skies policy sprang back to life in 1992, with an announcement by
the Secretary of Transportation that the U.S. "will now offer to negotiate open skies agreements with all
European countries willing to permit U.S. carriers essentially free access to their markets." Defining
"Open Skies", Order Requesting Comments, 57 Fed. Reg. 19,323 (May 5, 1992). The U.S. completed
an Open Skies bilateral with the Netherlands almost immediately thereafter. See Warner, supra note 8,
at 300. This was followed by an announcement in 1994 that the U.S. intended to negotiate Open Skies
bilaterals with nine other European nations (three were non-E.U. Member States). See EC Goal,supra.
The Commission was probably particularly stung by a U.S. announcement in late February 1994 (i.e.,
after the Parliament's criticism of the Commission) that it would begin negotiations with Belgium, an
E.U. Member State. See id. U.S.-German bilateral negotiations, opened in October 1993, fell through.
Compare EC Goal, supra (noting that the United States was completing an Open Skies agreement with
Germany) with Caroline Southey, Kinnock Still Airborne Over Open Skies: Commissioner Ready for
Long Battle Over EU Airline Deals, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Mar. 24, 1995, at 2 (noting that
"Germany did not want to talk about open skies deals").
92. EC Goal, supranote 91.
93, See id.
94. See Southey, supranote 91.
95. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, and Sweden. Id.
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multilateral agreement.96 An unnamed aviation official told the Financial Times,
"Mr. Kinnock should have known he was going to be ignored by member states. If
he had been less gung-ho he would have stood a better chance of getting what he
wants. 97 An aide to Kinnock was equally blunt in rebuttal, "Doing something was
better than doing nothing ....
[The Commission's] job is to protect
the broader
98
interests of the [European Union]. That is just what he is doing.,
In anticipation of the next E.U. transport ministers' meeting in late June, 99
Kinnock stated that U.S. Open Skies negotiations "could put in peril the whole of
European deregulation."' lo Kinnock contrasted his "comprehensive, balanced
alternative" with U.S. efforts "to divide Europe in setting the ground rules for
civil-aviation relations."''
This was followed by a declaration that bilaterals were
"the most serious obstacle to competition,"' 102 while a senior aide to the
Commission stated that the Commission was "duty bound under European law to
carry out infringement proceedings" against Member States negotiating new
bilaterals.10 3 Another Commission official added, "I am very concerned at the
cumulative effect of [bilaterals] on the [European Union's] interests."'104 Yet most
of the Member States were not so pessimistic and the transport ministers asked the
Commission to refine its proposals, which had been hastily formulated in the wake
of the U.S. Open Skies offensive. 10 5 Meanwhile, the Commission began to quietly
advance possible legal action against the more recalcitrant Member States that
were already negotiating (or had even signed) Open Skies bilaterals with the
United States.'16
Thus the transport ministers were somewhat suspicious at their meeting the
following year, although Kinnock approached the matter more optimistically by
claiming "considerable progress" on the subject of shifting negotiating powers to
the Commission.' 07 Despite initial sharp opposition from France and Britain, 08 the
transport ministers did agree on a draft mandate for conferring negotiating powers
to the Commission, 109 but the Commission paid a high cost for obtaining them.
96. See Southey, supra note 91.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Julian Moxon, EC Sets Open-Skies Schedule, FLIGHT INT'L, June 14, 1995 [hereinafter
Open-Skies Schedule].
100. See Julian Moxon, US/EU Tensions Build Up Over Open Skies, FLIGHT INT'L, June 7, 1995

[hereinafter US/EU Tensions].
101. See id.
102. See Open-Skies Schedule, supra note 99.

103. See id.
104. Kinnock Pursues Air Deals to Thwart US Agreements, TRADE TRAVEL GAZETTE UK &
IRELAND, Apr. 5, 1995, at 16.

105. Julian Moxon, EC Moves Nearer to Open Skies, FLIGHT INT'L, June 28, 1995 [hereinafter EC
Moves Nearer].
106. See US/EU Tensions, supranote 100; EC Moves Nearer,supra note 105.
107. See France Rejects Traffic Rights as Issue in MultilateralTalks, AVIATION DAILY, Mar. 14,
1996, at 1.
108. See id.
109. Press Release, European Union, European Union Approves Commission Mandate to Negotiate
a Common Aviation Area with the United States (June 17, 1996), No. 35/96, at
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The Member States demanded that the Commission conduct negotiations in two
phases, the first phase would concern "soft issues," such as computer reservation
systems, slot allocation, l l0 ground handling, and air carrier ownership, while the
second phase would deal with "hard issues," such as traffic rights and pricing."'
The Commission would not be permitted to negotiate agreements on the "hard
' 2
issues" unless it could demonstrate "substantial results in the first phase.""1
Finally, the Member
States kept the right to negotiate their own bilaterals with
3
other nations."1
While the Commission declared the concessions represented a "true victory,"
the U.S. government said that it rejected limited negotiations, arguing that "soft"
and "hard" issues were "inextricably linked." ' 14 Yet even with U.S. criticism,
Kinnock felt enough had been obtained to be generous with the Member States,
announcing there would be "no roll-back on any bilateral agreement in existence or
under negotiation." '" 5 The Commission's complaint
against Member States who
' 6
had signed bilaterals was thus effectively "defused." "
However, by late 1997 the Commission's patience with the Member States
was growing short again as Member States continued to independently negotiate
bilaterals. 1' At the October E.U. transport ministers' meeting, Kinnock vowed
there would be a role for the Member States in Commission-led negotiations, yet
his aides suggested that legal action might be reinitiated against Member States
that had completed new bilaterals." 8 But despite what one commentator called
Kinnock's "nice guy/nasty guy routine," 119 the transport ministers would not be
swayed and again rejected granting the Commission full negotiating powers. 120
This led Kinnock to acknowledge that the Member States were "resistant" to
turning over negotiations to the Commission,
but he promised to return to the issue
12
at the next transport ministers' meeting. '
Frustrated by the continued intransigence of the Member States, in March
1998 the Commission announced that it would open legal proceedings against
seven Member States that had signed Open Skies bilaterals with the United States
http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/1996-2/pr35-96 (last visited Dec. 31,2001).
110. A "slot" is the right to take-off and land a single aircraft per day. PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY &
LAURENCE E. GESELL,. AIRLINE MANAGEMENT: STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 252 (1997)
[hereinafter AIRLINE MANAGEMENT].
11. See Commission's Multilateralism Mandate Comes in Phases, May be Too Late, AVIATION
DAILY, June 20, 1996, at 1.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See Chris Johnstone, Brussels Cajoles and Threatens in Bid for United EU Air Front, J. OF
CoM., Oct. 8, 1997, at 20A.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See European Union Denies Kinnock Authority to Negotiate 'Hard Issues' With U.S.,
AVIATION DAILY, Oct. 10, 1997, at 63.

121. See id.
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and against the United Kingdom, which, with the United States, had amended
Bermuda 11.122 In its press release, the Commission said that it was "not motivated
simply by the legal breach of E.U. rules," but it acted because the bilaterals "do not
safeguard the long-term interests of the European air transport industry."' 123 By
giving access to national markets on different terms, the Commission argued that
bilaterals "not only distort the competition between airlines but also between
airports."' 24 Despite the Commission's careful phrasing, its frustration with the
Member States was still apparent, "Member States are not only failing to comply
with E.U. law, but are also not co-operating to adopt, within a reasonable time, an
E.U. approach making it possible to remedy the legal infringements and ensure
A public statement by Kinnock's official
equivalent regulatory conditions ....
was
even
more
astonishingly
blunt, "The cozy negotiations are over
spokesperson
and the26gloves have now been taken off. If this does rattle some governments - so
'
be it.'
The Member States did not respond well to the Commission's threats, with
Britain and France declaring the following day that they would continue
negotiating with the United States regardless. 127 The German transport minister
characterized the threat as "unacceptable" and warned that it would "endanger
European jobs," while others called it "counterproductive."'' 28 Portugal and Italy
proceeded with their talks with the United States, 129 apparently unconcerned with
claims by "top EC officials" that such behavior was "a shortsighted policy based
on nationality."1 30 Yet Kinnock still offered that the Member States had a "final
chance" at the October 1998 transport ministers' meeting to give the Commission
full negotiating powers. 131
Ignoring the Commission's pleas and threats, the transport ministers once
more refused the Commission's request. 32 This prompted the Commission to step
up its actions against the Member States by reopening legal proceedings. 33 As
part of announcing the move, Kinnock conceded that the Member States had given

122. The Member States that had signed bilaterals were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Luxembourg, and Sweden. See Press Release, European Union, European Commission
Takes Legal Action Against EU Member States' "Open Skies" Agreements with the United States
(Mar. 11, 1998), No. 16/1998, at http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/1998-1/pr16-98 (last visited Dec.
31, 2001).
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See Chris Johnstone, Kinnock Challenges Open-Skies Pact,J. of Com., Mar. 12, 1998, at 12A.
127. See id.
128. See Kevin O'Toole, Open Skies Hostility, FLIGHT INT'L, Mar. 25, 1998, at 28.
129. See Lois Jones, Caught in the Loop, AIRLINE BUS., June 1998, at 24.
130. See Pierre Sparaco, European Deregulation Still Lacks Substance, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 9, 1998, at 53.
131. See Bruce Barnard, Virgin Set to Challenge US Carriers in US Skies, J. OF COM., Sept. 24,
1998, at I IA.
132. See Chris Kjelgaard, Commission Takes Eight EU Nations to Court Over US Bilaterals, AIR
TRANSP. INTELLIGENCE, Oct. 30, 1998.

133. See id.
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the Commission negotiating powers, "[b]ut its scope is not broad enough to make
meaningful negotiation possible and until that changes, the Commission... has no
option but to pursue legal action."'134 He continued to explain that the Commission
"sees no other option but to pursue the procedure... to the finish."' 135 But
Kinnock continued to hold out the possibility of reconciliation, stating that the
Commission was "willing and available to constructively build a common
approach as regards air transport relations...136 and hopes that substantial
progress... will be made in the coming months."'
The Member States were seemingly less than impressed with the
Commission's offer of cooperation, as the United Kingdom continued its
negotiations with the United States, albeit at a significantly reduced rate, 137 while
just weeks after the Commission renewed its legal action, Italy declared that it had
completed an Open Skies bilateral with the United States. 38 The Commission
responded by opening legal proceedings against the Netherlands over its bilateral
with the United States. 139 This was a shock to the Member States, as the
Commission had previously indicated the Netherlands/U.S. bilateral would not be
challenged since it predated the Third Package. 140 However, what would be
perhaps the greatest shock was yet to come.
On May 12, 1999, Kinnock gave a speech to the European Aviation Club
entitled European Air Transport Policy: All Our Tomorrows or "All Our
Yesterdays" Replayed?14 1 Kinnock admitted European air transportation was
"shaping up to the future," but he cautioned "that restructuring in [the] industry
will only be truly successful if it is accompanied and strengthened by an effective
and proactive external strategy."' 14 2 He then sharply criticized the Member States
for continuing to negotiate bilaterals, referring to the "magical attraction" of
bilaterals and stating, "Nostalgia, it seems, still has a big future. Oxymoronism
rules."' 143 Yet what at first appeared to have been little more than another
opportunity for Kinnock to go after his opponents quickly became something
more. 144 It was here that Kinnock explicitly developed the concept of the TCAA
(referred to as the Common Aviation Area in most of the speech), a plan that he

134.
135.
136.
137.

See Kjelgaard, supra note 132.
See id.
See id.
See John D. Morrocco, Open Skies Impasse Shifts Alliance Plans, AVIATION. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 9, 1998, at45.
138. See U.S., Italy Agree to Open Skies, Pending Alitalia-Northwest Immunity, AVIATION DAILY,
Nov. 13, 1998 at 275.
139. See Netherlands/USBilateralAgreement Focus of EC Proceedings,AIRLINE INDUSTRY INFO.,
Feb. 8, 1999.
140. See id.
141. Commissioner N eil Kinnock, European Air Transport Policy: All Our Tomorrows or "All Our
Yesterdays"
Replayed
(May
12,
1999)
(transcript
available
at
http:leuropa-eu.int/comm/transportlglobal/speeches/990512.htm) [hereinafter All Our Tomorrows].
The title is a reference to a line in Shakespeare's Macbeth. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See generally id.
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had first suggested shortly after assuming the office of Transport Commissioner
but which had lain dormant during the confrontations with the Member States. 45
The TCAA would not simply be an E.U.-wide bilateral, but would be qualitatively
different, embracing a number of issues usually not found in bilaterals, such as
consumer rights and environmental protections, as well as traditional matters like
traffic rights and code-sharing. 46 Ironically, once Kinnock had finally devised a
coherent, albeit sketchy, means of implementing the Commission's goals for
external aviation policy, the 47Commission was reorganized and Kinnock removed
as Transport Commissioner. 1
His Truth is Marching On...
The new Transport Commissioner, Loyola de Palacio, seemed less interested
in the subject of bilaterals and the TCAA, 48 with leadership on the subject of the
TCAA passing largely into the hands of the Association of European Airlines
(AEA) 149 and its members. 50 Thus, at a 1999 global aviation summit with 90
participating nations, although de Palacio presented the concept of the TCAA, it
was the officers of several European carriers who spoke most forcefully on its
behalf.15' The chairman of British Midland Airways expressed dismay that the
United States and United Kingdom, both long-time champions of deregulation,
were opposed to multilateral agreements.15 2 Lufthansa's CEO argued the TCAA
was "the only way to make some progress" on the liberalization of international
aviation. 5 3 The president of KLM announced that bilateralism was dead and the
air transport industry would be "like a movie industry doomed by its governments
to produce only silent movies" if the TCAA, or some other form of multilateral
145. See Simon Warburton, Kinnock Calls Again for Common TransatlanticPact, AIR TRANSp.
INTELLIGENCE, May 13, 1999.

146. See All Our Tomorrows, supra note 141.
147. See De Palacio is Proposed to Take Over As European Transport Commissioner, ATC
MARKET REP., July 22, 1999 at 8.

148. De Palacio's focus was centered on internal European air transportation issues, particularly air
traffic control

See New EU Transport Commissioner Pledges to Fightfor 'Single Sky', AVIATION

DAILY, Aug. 31, 1999, at 1. In a speech given on October 19, 2000, de Palacio restated, "IT]he
development of a Single Sky currently ranks amongst my over-riding priorities." See Commissioner
Loyola de Palacio, Europe's Future Aviation Policy, Address to the General Assembly of the European
Cockpit Association (Oct 19,2000), in WORLD AIRPORT WK., Oct. 31, 2000.
149. The AEA is composed of air carriers (scheduled, chartered, and cargo) registered in, licensed
by and with their principal place of business in an European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) state
and which have been engaged in passenger or cargo air transport operations for at least three years. See
AEA, Criteria for Membership, at http://www.aea.be/SpotlightAEA/AEAmbrship.htm (last visited
Jan. 23, 2002). The AEA has twenty-eight members, including all major E.U. carriers. See AEA, AEA
Member Airlines, at http://www.aea.be/CompLogos/companycontent.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
The ECAC includes all E.U. Member States. See ECAC, ECAC Member States, at httpJ/www.ecaceac.org/uklecac/ecac-memberstates.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
150. See James Ott, Aviation Summit Yields EU Planfor Open Market, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Dec. 13, 1999, at 43.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
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accord, was not adopted.

Despite these strong testimonials, the TCAA did not gain many supporters
among the assembled transport ministers and no reference to it was included in the
conference's final statement.' 55 Furthermore, while de Palacio suggested at the
conference that the European Union and United States could meet at six-month
intervals to prepare for full negotiations on the TCAA, 156 there has been little
action on the subject. 57 Thus de Palacio's goal of a TCAA conference by the
summer of 2002 was not met.158
The year 2000 was one in which the TCAA was much discussed by the
international aviation community, 59 but there was little progress on the subject, as
the United States continued to refuse negotiations until the Commission received a
full mandate from the Member States.' 60 Recognizing that something drastic had
to be done to advance the possibility of negotiations, the Commission pressed on
with its suit against the rebellious Member States.' 61 The day of confrontation was
May 8, 2001, on which the Commission presented its case against eight Member
States 62 before the European Court of Justice (Court of Justice). 163 A decision in
the case was predicted first by the end of July, 164 then by "November
or
66
December," 16 5 and, seemingly in moment of despair, "before spring."'
While a full decision was not anticipated until the summer of 2002,167 the
154. See Ott, supra note 150, at 43.
155. See Freedom'sPaths, supra note 15.
156. See Graeme Osbom & Karen Walker, Sans Frontiers?, AIRLINE Bus., Feb. 2000, at 34
[hereinafter Sans Frontiers].
157. See Colin Baker, French Push for TCAA, AIRLINE Bus., Dec. 2000, Briefing (noting only
"informal talks ... in recent months") [hereinafter French Push].
158. See Sans Frontiers,supra note 156.
159. See, e.g., Jeffery N. Shane, Foreign Ownership and Control of U.S. Airlines: Prospects for
Change, Remarks Before the 25th Annual FAA Aviation Forecast Conference (Mar. 7, 2000) (transcript
available at http://www.api.faa.gov/conference/procdoc2000/shane.pdf); AEA Secretary General KarlHeinz Neumeister, Old World, New World - Differing Perspectives and Changing Perspectives on the
Airline Industry, Address to the International Aviation Club Luncheon (Apr. 27, 2000) (transcript
available at http://www.iacwashington.org/neumeister42700.pdf); Graeme Osbom & Karen Walker,
Worlds Apart, AIRLINE Bus., July 2000, at 28 [hereinafter Worlds Apart].
160. See US, EU Open Aviation Market Would Require "Political Will, " EU Says, AVIATION
DAILY, May 12, 2000, at 3.
161. See Head of Air Transport Division, Directorate General for Energy and Transport, Frederik
Sorensen, Towards a Consensus View of the Future International Air Transport Regime, Panel
Discussion at 26th Annual FAA Commercial Aviation Forecast Conference (Mar. 13-14, 2001)
(transcript available at http://api.hq.faa.gov/conference/conference2OOl/proc2OOl/transcript.htm).
162. The Member States were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See Robin Pomeroy, Open Skies Hearing,NATIONAL POST, May 8,
2001, at C10.
163. See European Court Decision on Multilateral Mandate Expected by Year's End, WORLD
AIRLINE NEWS, June 1, 2001 [hereinafter EuropeanCourt Decision].
164. See Sorensen, supra note 161.
165. European CourtDecision, supra note 163.
166. US.-UK. Discussions Could Lead to Open Skies Agreement This Year, WORLD AIRLINE
NEWS, July 6, 2001 [hereinafter US-UK. Discussions].
167. See David Morrow, EC Yet to Determine Extent of Open Skies Overhaul, AIR TRANSP.
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Commission was rewarded with an opinion favoring its stance from the Advocate
General of the Court of Justice on January 31, 2002.68 The opinion addressed
matters in all eight cases, and dealt with a number of procedural questions in
addition to the central issue, 69 however, the analysis here
will focus only on the
170
substantive portion of the case as it relates to bilaterals.
The Commission leveled two complaints against the Member States, first that
the terms of seven Member States' bilaterals171 violated "the external competence"
of the European Union and its governing bodies; 172 and second that all eight
Member States' bilaterals infringed Article 52 of the E.C. Treaty. 73 Before
assessing the merits of the first complaint, the Advocate General examined the
grounds for finding that the European Union possessed external competence in the
matter.' 74 Although declining to find external competence under one theory, 17 the
Advocate General did find external competence under another, using a string of
earlier decisions that could be read to support such a finding. 176 The Advocate
General therefore concluded:
[T]he Member States may not under any circumstances conclude international
agreements, even if these are entirely consistent with the common rules, since any
steps taken outside the framework of the Community institutions would be
incompatible with the unity of the common market and the uniform application of

Community.... Not even the requirement to ensure the full and correct
application of Community law could justify unilateral action by Member
States .... If... the Community was unable.., to conclude such agreements
directly, it would then be necessary... for its institutions and the Member States
to cooperate with a view to enabling the latter to amend the existing agreements in

a manner consistent and in accordance with the Community's interest. 177

With this principle established, the Advocate General turned to the question
of whether the seven bilaterals were in violation of four particular E.U. regulations
INTELLIGENCE, Jan. 31, 2002 (noting that a final ruling "will follow in a few month's time").
168. See Kieran Daly, Court Strongly Supports EC Bilateral Case, AIR TRANSP. INTELLIGENCE,
Jan. 31, 2002.
169. See Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, Joined Cases C-466, 467, 468, 469, 471,472, 475,
& 476/98, Commission v. United Kingdom, at http://europa.eu.int (search for case C-466/98), Table of
Contents (last visited July 8, 2002) [hereinafter Opinion of Advocate General].
170. While the procedural aspects are essential to processing of the case, such matters as whether
the pre-litigation procedure was unduly prolonged (see id. at paras. 31-32) or if the Commission even
had the authority to bring the action (see id. at paras. 42-77) are tangential to the subject of the TCAA.
171. The United Kingdom's bilateral was excluded from this complaint Id. at para. 41.
172. See id. A violation of "external competence" occurs when a Member State enters into an
agreement that is within a subject area that is the exclusive domain of the European Union. See id. at
para. 20.
173. See id. at para. 118. It should be noted that the Opinion uses the original numbering of the
E.C. Treaty rather than the revised numbering. See id. at para. I (identifying the relevant original and
revised article numbers).
174. See id. at paras. 41-77.
175. See id. at para. 58.
176. See id. at paras. 63, 69-70.
177. See id. at paras. 71, 73, 74 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
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concerning aspects of aviation17 8 and whether the bilaterals distorted competition
in the internal E.U. aviation
market. 79 (Five bilaterals 180 were also examined in
181
light of a fifth regulation.)
The Commission's first argument was that the inclusion of Fifth Freedom
rights in the bilaterals violated regulations both on the licensing of air carriers
(Regulation No. 2407/92) and access to intra-E.U. routes (Regulation No. 2408/92)
by permitting U.S. carriers to operate on intra-E.U. routes without being licensed
as E.U. carriers. 8 2 The Advocate General rejected this theory, 8 3 noting:
[TIhere is nothing in Regulation No. 2408/92 from which it may be inferred that it
also aims to regulate (still less to prohibit) the granting of traffic rights within the
Community to non-Community carriers .... The right of Member States to grant
access to routes within the Community to non-Community carriers is therefore not
in any way curtailed by Regulation 2408/92, nor indeed by Regulation No.
194
2407/92 ....

The Advocate General then considered the Commission's argument that the
bilaterals distorted competition, undermining the European Union's internal
market. 18 5 The Commission's claim, however, failed to explain "in a precise and
detailed manner what the alleged discrimination and distortions of competition
might be.. . .," according to the Advocate General, and could be dismissed for
failure to carry the burden of proof.'8 6 Additionally, the Commission's legal
reasoning itself was faulty:
[11n the absence of Community legislation goveming relations in a given area with
third countries, the disparities which could hypothetically result from the
conclusion of different international agreements by Member States in that area
and the economic consequences that might ensue for the internal market do not in
themselves suffice
to preclude the right of Member States to enter into such
87
agreements.1

The third argument of the Commission was that provisions of the bilaterals
178. See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169, at paras. 81-104. The regulations
considered were Council Regulations 2407/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 1; 2408/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 8;
2409/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 15; and 2299/89, 1989 O.J. (L 220) 1. See id. at paras. 81, 89, 98. See also
Competition in the Air, supra note 1, at 1039-46, 1049-63, 1078-88 (discussing these and related
regulations in detail). For procedural reasons, a transitional agreement held by Germany between 1994
and 1996 was exempted from the case, but Germany's final agreement of 1996 was validly included in
the complaint See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169, at 39-40.
179. See id. at para. 85.
180. Those of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, and Sweden. Id. at para. 105.
181. Regulation No. 95/93, 1993 O.J. (L 14) 1. See id. See also Competition in the Air, supra note
1, at 1063-69 (discussing this regulation and related measures in detail).
182. See id. at para. 81.
183. See id. at para. 84.
184. See id. at para. 82.
185. See id. at para. 85.
186. See id. at para. 86.
187. See id. at para. 87.
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which permitted non-E.U. carriers to set fares on Fifth Freedom routes within the
European Union were in violation of the regulation concerning airfares on intraE.U. routes (Regulation No. 2409/92)188 The Advocate General agreed with the
Commission on this count,' 89 finding that "Regulation No. 2409/92 indirectly but
unequivocally excludes the right for non-Community carriers" to set fares below
existing levels. 190 Some Member States protested that they made changes to their
bilaterals so as to accommodate Regulation No. 2409/92,19' but the Advocate
General directed them to his earlier finding that Member States could not act
unilaterally, even to avoid conflict with E.U. regulations,
on matters that were
192
within the European Union's external competence.
The Commission's fourth argument was that the bilaterals were in violation of
an E.U.-established code of conduct for computer reservation systems (Regulation
No. 2299/89).' 9'
The regulation stipulated that the operators of computer
reservation systems in non-E.U. states were subject to the principle of reciprocity
for their treatment of computer reservation systems in Member States. 94 The
Member States protested again that the provisions of their bilaterals concerning
computer reservation systems had been drafted so as to avoid conflict with the
5
regulation. 19
The Advocate General rebutted this contention by pointing out that
Regulation No. 2299/89 gave the European Union external competence and that
"Member States no longer had power to assume international obligations in that
area, even international obligations consistent with those provisions."' 96 19Thus
the
7
Advocate General found in the Commission's favor on this point as well.
Finally, the Commission alleged that five of the disputed bilaterals affected
slot allocation at E.U. airports (a procedure ordinarily covered by Regulation No.
95/93) by promising "fair and equal conditions of competition" for non-E.U.
carriers, which the Commission argued typically included slot allocation
measures.' 98 The Advocate General, however, agreed with the Member States that
the Commission had failed to prove the fair and equal competition provision had
any application to slot allocation.'" Furthermore, in most instances the offending
provision in the bilaterals antedated the European Union's regulation of slot
allocation procedures, so E.U. oversight would not apply even if the provision
impinged on the European Union's external competence..2° The Advocate General

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169, at para. 89.
See id. at para. 97.
See id. at para. 91.
See id. at para. 95.
See id. at para 96 (citing para. 73).
See id. atp ara98.
See id.
See id. at paras. 99, 101.
See id. at para. 103.
See id. at para. 104.
See id.at para. 105.
See id. at para. 107.
See id.
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20 1
therefore found in the Member States' favor on this matter.

Before issuing his final recommendation on the Commission's first complaint,
the Advocate General also addressed the Member States' main defense: that their
bilaterals should be entirely exempted from E.U. oversight.20 2 The Member States
claimed the first paragraph of Article 234 of the E.C. Treaty offered such an
exemption by providing that "[t]he rights and obligations arising from agreements
concluded before the entry into force of this Treaty between ... Member States...
and one or more third countries..., shall not be affected by the provisions of this
Treaty., 20 3
The Advocate General rejected both this argument and the
Commission's inverse theory that even provisions of the bilaterals preceding
adoption of E.U. regulations should be invalidated. 204 He explained, "while it is
true that the amendments in question did not completely transform the old
agreements into new ones, it is also the case that if they were incompatible with
Community law they could not be justified by reference to the continuance of the
old agreements into which they incorporated., 20 5 Therefore, the Advocate General
concluded in regards to the first complaint that the Member States were in
violation of the European Union's external competence in regards to Regulations
Nos. 2409/92 and 2299/89, in conjunction with Article 5 of the E.C. Treaty.20 6
The Commission's second complaint was directed against all eight defendants
and accused them of violating Article 52 of the E.C. Treaty.20 7 Article 52 prohibits
Member States from imposing discriminatory regulations against establishment of
businesses in their territories by the nationals of any other Member State.20 8 The
Commission's theory was that the Member States' bilaterals were in conflict with
Article 52 because of their inclusion of a nationality clause, which permitted the
parties to the bilateral to designate the air carriers they would allow on the routes
encompassed by the bilateral and deny those traffic rights to air carriers owned by
the nationals of a third-party state. 20 9 Therefore, the nationality clause would be
discriminatory since it expressly allows parties to the bilateral to treat a carrier
from another Member State differently than a carrier from the contracting Member
State. 2'0 The defendant Member States parried by suggesting that if discrimination
201. See Opinion of Advocate General , supra note 169, at para. 108.
202. See id. at para. 109.
203. See id. (citing EC TREATY art. 234).
204. See id. at 111-12.
205. See id. at 112.
206. See id. at 117. That article of the E.C. Treaty reads:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to
ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action
taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the
Community's tasks. They shall abstain from any measures which could jeopardise the
attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.
EC TREATY, art. 5.
207. See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169, at para. 118.
208. See EC TREATY art. 52. The term "establishment" includes founding and operating
businesses. See id.
209. See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169, at para. 118.
210. See id. at para. 120.
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resulted it would be the fault of the non-Member State (in this instance the United
States). 2 1' This is because the nationality clause does not prevent the contracting
Member State from designating carriers from other Member States, it merely
allows the non-Member State to reject or limit the access of such carriers.21 2
The defendant Member States also argued that Article 52 would not be
applicable because the discriminatory activity would take place outside of the
European Union (i.e., on transatlantic routes).21 3 Furthermore, some defendants
suggested, Article 52 did not apply because of Article 84 of the E.C. Treaty.21 4 In
addition, Germany claimed that its bilateral had been amended to eliminate the
discriminatory effects of the nationality clause.21 5
The Advocate General stated that the Commission's interpretation of the
article was preferable, as it was evident that under the nationality clause the
defendant Member States were not according air carriers owned by other Member
States, or their nationals, the same treatment as carriers owned by the defendants
and the defendants' nationals.21 6 The defendant Member States could not blame
the United States, the Advocate
General found, as the discrimination was inherent
217
in the nationality clause itself.
The Advocate General dealt tersely with the other objections to the
Commission's claim made by the Member States. 21 8 He pointed out that the
discriminatory conduct concerned the right of establishment, which did occur
within the confines of the European Union, thus the fact that the flights were
primarily outside of E.U. territory was irrelevant. 2 9 The Advocate General was
similarly unimpressed with the defendant Member States' attempt to rely on
Article 84, pointing out that the Commission's claim was made under the
establishment provisions of the E.C. Treaty, not the transportation provisions.220
Finally, the Advocate General reviewed Germany's amended bilateral nationality
clause, concluded that it still permitted discrimination against air carriers owned or
controlled by the nationals of other Member States, and therefore found that the
Commission's claim against Germany could go forward as well. 221
Having found that the Commission's claim under Article 52 was valid, the
Advocate General turned to the defenses raised by the Member States.222 The first
defense offered was that the nationality clause would be permitted under Article 56
211. See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169, at para. 121.
212. See id.
213. See id. atpara. 122.
214. See id. at para. 122. Article 84 (2) specifically exempts sea and air transport from the general
provisions of Title IV (concerning transportation) of the E.C. Treaty, making them subject to it only
when the Council chooses so. See E.C. TREATY, art. 84 (2).
215. See Opinion of Advocate General, supranote 169, at para. 122.
216. See id. at para. 123.
217. See id.
218. See id. at paras. 124-26.
219. See id. at para. 124.
220. See id. at para. 125.
221. See id. at para. 126.
222. See id. at paras 127-140.
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of the E.C. Treaty, which allows Member States to retain laws and regulations that
have a discriminatory effect on foreign nationals for purposes of public policy,
security, or health.223 The Advocate General found this to be a weak argument,
pointing out that the bilaterals contained ample provisions for dealing with security
and other public policy concerns besides the nationality clause. 224 Additionally,
the nationality clause is not limited to use where there is an "actual threat to a
public-policy interest," but can be applied for protectionist purposes, which is not a
permissible act under Article 56 according to earlier Court of Justice decisions.225
However, even if this was not the case, the Advocate General believed that the
nationality clause would be in violation of Article 52, as "Article 56 cannot
[justify] derogating measures adopted by Member States where the protection of
the public interest.. . can be secured by less restrictive means. 226 The Advocate
General suggested that the nationality clause would be permissible if drafted so as
to give all E.U. carriers equal access but to still permit the United States to exclude
non-E.U. carriers. 227 However, as written, the nationality clause was not protected
by Article 56.228
The other defense offered by the Member States was that their bilaterals were
protected by the first paragraph of Article 234 of the E.C. Treaty, which allowed
Member States to retain agreements established prior to their accession to the
European Community or Union and that their Open Skies bilaterals were simply an
extension of earlier bilaterals with the United States. 229 The Advocate General first
considered the merits of this defense in regards to Belgium and Luxembourg,
concluding that it did not apply, as they completed basic bilaterals containing the
nationality clause after their accession to the European Community, so the question
of subsequent modification was not relevant. 230 Next, the Advocate General
examined the situation of Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Sweden, all of
which had in fact completed basic bilaterals with the United States prior to
becoming subject to the E.C. Treaty, and which had not amended their nationality

223. See Opinion of Advocate General , supra note 169, at para. 127. The first clause of Article 56
states, "The provisions of this Chapter and measures taken in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice the
applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation, or administrative action providing for special
treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security, or public health." EC
TREATY, art. 56 (1).
224. See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169, at para. 128.
225. See id.(citing Case 352/85, Bond van Adverteerders v. Netherlands, 1988 E.C.R. 2085, para34).
226. See id. at para. 129 (citing Case C-1 14/97, Commission v. Spain, 1998 E.C.R. 1-6717, para.
47).
227. See id.at para. 130. The Advocate General noted that the defendant Member States claimed
that they had proposed amendments of that sort to their bilaterals, but that the United States gave a "flat
refusal" to such changes. See id.
228. See id.
at para. 132.
229. See id.at para. 133. The first paragraph of Article 234 states "[t]he rights and obligations
arising from agreements concluded before 1 January 1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of
their accession, between one or more Member States on the one hand and one or more third countries
on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of this Treaty." EC TREATY, at art. 234.
230. See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169, at para. 134.
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clauses in subsequent Open Skies bilaterals. 23' The Advocate General agreed with
those five defendants that the nationality clauses in their bilaterals predated their
accession, but "while it is true that in the formal sense the clause was not amended
by [their Open Skies] agreements . . , it is also the case that, following their
conclusion, the content of the clause has none the less been profoundly altered. 232
The Advocate General found that the scope of the nationality clause was
extended as a byproduct of the amendments that created Open Skies bilaterals
between those defendant Member States and the United States.233 Open Skies
bilaterals gave rise to this situation by granting full Fifth Freedom rights to U.S.
carriers, thus "the parties implicitly agreed to extend the scope of the clause in
question, by modifying the rights and obligations flowing from it."'234 Therefore,
while the text of the nationality clause had remained unchanged, the Member
States had, in effect, amended it by permitting substantial increases in traffic on
affected routes and the nationality clause could not be saved by appealing to the
first paragraph of Article 234. 2
Finally, the Advocate General examined the situation of the United Kingdom,
which had signed Bermuda I with the United States prior to joining the European
Community, but had subsequently adopted Bermuda 11.236 Unlike the previous
Member States' bilaterals, which were created by amending earlier agreements, the
Advocate General found that when the United States and United Kingdom entered
into Bermuda II a new agreement was created.237 The Advocate General therefore
concluded, "By virtue of this new manifestation of intention, there is no doubt that
the clause in question was incorporated into Bermuda II: in other words, into an
agreement which was concluded after the Member State's accession to the
Community."238 With this established, the Advocate General thus found that none
of the nationality clauses in question enjoyed protection under the first paragraph
of Article 234.239
Before summarizing his findings and his conclusion, the Advocate General
240
The
also turned to an alternative complaint offered by the Commission.
that
the
first
in
the
event
the
Court
of
Justice
found
Commission asked that,
paragraph of Article 234 did, in fact, protect the nationality clauses of Austria,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Sweden, the Court of Justice consider whether
the nationality clauses infringed the second paragraph of Article 234.241 The
second paragraph of the article requires Member States to remove any

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169, at paras. 134-38.
id. at para. 136.
id. at para. 138.
id.
id.
id. at para. 139.
id.
id.
id. at para. 140.
id. at para. 141.
id. at para. 142.
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incompatibilities between a prior agreement and provisions of the E.C. Treaty."'
The Advocate General noted, "that the Court has recently given quite a strict
interpretation of that provision.... Member States have even [had] to go so far as
denouncing such agreements if the contracting third [-party] states do not intend to
renegotiate them. 243 While the defendant Member States claimed they asked the
United States to renegotiate the nationality clause, the Advocate General rejected
that as inadequate. 2 " Instead, "the Member States concerned must show that they
made every effort to remove the incompatibility; and it does not seem to me
that... they did so" as required by the second paragraph of Article 234.245
Therefore, in the cases of those five Member States, the Commission's alternative
complaint would also succeed.246
The Advocate General's final recommendation to the Court of Justice was to
find that all defendant Member States had violated Article 52 of the E.C. Treaty by
the inclusion of nationality clauses in their bilaterals. 247 The Advocate General
also determined that seven defendants (the United Kingdom excluded), should
further be found to have violated regulations concerning fare setting and computer
reservation systems by including certain provisions in their bilaterals. 248 Finally,
the Commission's alternative complaint should be upheld against five of the
defendant Member States.249
As this article was going to press, the Court of Justice found in favor of the
Commission. 250 The final text of the Court's decision is not available yet, but
preliminary reports 2indicate that the opinion follows the outline of the Advocate
General's Opinion. 51 Loyola de Palacio hailed the Court's ruling, saying,
"Today's judgment is a major step towards developing a new coherent and
dynamic European policy for international aviation .... From now on, it is clear
from the Court's ruling that we will all have to work together in Europe to identify
and pursue our objectives jointly. 25 2 The Commission observed that under the
242. See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169., at para. 142. The full text of the second
paragraph reads: "To the extent that such agreements are not compatible with this Treaty, the Member
State or States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established.
Member States shall, where necessary, assist each other to this end and shall, where appropriate, adopt a
common attitude." EC TREATY, art. 234.
243. See Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 169, at para. 143 (citing Joined Cases C-62/98
& C-84/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2000 E.C.R. 1-5171).
244. See id. at para. 144.
245. See id.
246. See id. at para. 145.
247. See id. at para. 150.
248. See id.
249. See id.
250. EU Court Rules Against "Open Skies" Accords With US, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 5,
2002 [hereinafter EU CourtRules Against "Open Skies "].
251. See Press Release, European Court of Justice, The Court of Justice Explains, by These
Judgments, the Distribution of Competence as Regards the Conclusion of International Air Transport
Agreements (Nov. 5, 2002), No. 89/02, available at http://curia.eu.int/en/cp/afflcp0289en.htm (last
visited Nov. 5, 2002).
252. Press Release, European Union, Open Sky Agreements: Commission Welcomes European
Court of Justice Ruling (Nov. 5, 2002), No. IP/02/1609, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/
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terms of the Court's ruling, "Member States may no longer make commitments to
other countries on [aviation] matters. Member States that conclude bilateral deals
risk creating conflicts in between their commitments at [the] international level and
their obligations under EC law." 253 To avoid these conflicts, the Commission
stated there was an "urgent need" for negotiations on the TCAA and promised to
issue a communication
in the near future that would further articulate its position
254
on the subject.
PART II: FACE OF THE FUTURE

With the Commission victorious in the Court of Justice, the question
becomes, what would the TCAA look like?
Birth of a Notion
Although not referred to as the TCAA, or any of its other commonly used
names, the first guide to what form the TCAA could take was delivered by the
Comitd in 1994.255 The Comitd offered eleven specific recommendations for a
"common external policy" on aviation to be adopted by the European Union's
Council of Ministers (Council). 256 The Comitd suggested that the Council should
develop a liberal aviation policy to "send a clear signal to non-European States and
air carriers that E.U. external aviation policy will be consistent and will encourage
reciprocal growth and expansion of services." 257 The system would be phased in
over several years, "but with a clearly defined timetable," and use the leverage of
the "whole European market" to its advantage. 25' The system would establish
uniform regulations for computer reservation systems and promote cooperation on
the use of competition laws.259 Carriers licensed by Member States would be
given "non-discriminatory opportunities" to engage in Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh
Freedom flights from any point in the European Union to extra-E.U.
destinations. 26 0 Limits on ownership, control, and investment by foreign nationals
would be lifted on a reciprocal basis. 261 A single authority would be established to
allocate traffic rights and carrier designations in a fair and transparent manner.262
The policy would make allowances for the limits of infrastructure and regional

comm/energytransport/mm-dg/newsletter/n1026-2002-11-08_en.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2002)
[hereinafter Open Sky Agreements].
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See Wise Men, supra note 81.
256. See Recommendations from the report by the Comitd des Sages for Air Transport to the
European Commission (Jan. 1994) [hereinafter Recommendations], in 2 EUROPEAN AIR LAW [E ] 1.3
- 1, 9-10 (Elmar Giemulla et al. eds., 1992 & Supp. June 1994).
257. See id. at 9.

258. See id.
259.
260.
261.
262.

See id. at 9-10.
See id. at 10.
See id.
See id.
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development, while permitting E.U.-based carriers "to restructure as global
competitors., 263 Finally, "all existing traffic rights," with non-Member States, i.e.,
bilaterals, should be preserved, at least to the extent they "benefit... all
Community carriers. 26
The Scottish Play
In his speech All Our Tomorrows or "All Our Yesterdays" Replayed?,
Kinnock did not reference the Comit's recommendations of five years earlier.265
However, traces of those earlier recommendations can be seen running through
Kinnock's account of what the TCAA would entail. The TCAA, in Kinnock's
view, "would not simply include the standard exchange of rights under
conventional 'open skies' deals.,, 266 The TCAA would include "essential issues
beyond traffic rights," for the purpose of "securing change at the core of the
restrictive bilateral system - the prevailing rules on ownership and control. 267
Regulatory matters concerning computer reservation systems, "code-sharing, slots
management and trading, state aid, bankruptcy protection, leasing, and dispute
Kinnock considered
settlement" would also be a part of the TCAA. 268
harmonization of competition laws to be a "major issue" in the TCAA because it

263. See Recommendations, supra note 256, at 10.
264. See id.
265. See generally All Our Tomorrows, supra note 141.
266. Id. Assuming that Kinnock was referring to the model Open Skies bilateral used by the U.S.,
a "conventional" Open Skies bilateral includes:
1. Open entry on all routes;
2. Unrestricted capacity and frequency on all routes;
3. Unrestricted route and traffic rights (includes the right to operate service between any point in the
U.S. and any point in the European country, including no restrictions as to intermediate and beyond
points, change of gauge, routing flexibility, coterminalization, or the right to carry Fifth Freedom
traffic);
4. Double-disapproval pricing in Third and Fourth Freedom markets and (1) in intra-E.U. markets: price
matching rights in third-country markets, (2) in extra-E.U. markets: price leadership in third-country
markets to the extent that the Third and Fourth Freedom carriers in those markets have it;
5. Liberal charter arrangement (the least restrictive charter regulations of the two governments would
apply, regardless of the origin of the flight);
6. Liberal cargo regime;
7. Conversion and remittance arrangement (carriers would be able to convert earnings and remit in hard
currency promptly and without restriction);
8. Open code-sharing opportunities;
9. Self-handling provisions (right of a carrier to perfonr/control its airport functions that support its
operations);
10. Procompetitive provisions on commercial opportunities, user charges, fair competition and
intermodal rights; and
11. Explicit commitment for nondiscriminatory operation of and access for computer reservation
systems.
See In the matter of defining "Open Skies", Department of Transportation, Order 92-8-13, August 5,
1992, availableat 1992 DOT Av. LEXIS 568, at 14-16.
267. See All Our Tomorrows, supra note 141.
268. See id.
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would create a situation that would facilitate industry consolidation. 269 Kinnock
concluded by arguing that transnational convergence of regulation on safety,
security, environmental matters, and customer service was necessary as well. 70
Perhaps the most significant difference apparent between the Comitd's
recommendations and Kinnock's proposal was Kinnock's complete omission of
any possibility for a remnant of the existing bilateral regime to survive in the
TCAA. 27 1

Diogenes Speaks
In September 1999, the AEA released a policy statement entitled Towards a
Transatlantic Common Aviation Area.272
Although the AEA is a private

organization, 273 its vision of the TCAA appears to have become the prevailing
one. 274 The AEA's policy statement is not cast as a comprehensive guide to the
establishment of the TCAA, noting that its establishment "need not and should not
be delayed until each and every detail of regulatory convergence has been
settled., 275 However, "it is essential to define the basic principles, the overall
276
structure, and the initial level of convergence that should apply at the outset."
Significantly, the AEA envisions the TCAA as simply an "essential first step"
towards a "new, modem regulatory framework for international air transport",277
that will be "suitable for gradual application worldwide. ' 278 To achieve this, "it
will be necessary to create a single set of aviation rules under which European and
U.S. air carriers would operate. 279

The AEA explained the goal of the TCAA as follows:
269. See All Our Tomorrows, supra note 141.
270. See id.
271. See generally id. This is understandable, however, given that Kinnock called the continuing
existence of bilaterals, "[Tihe continuation of narrow and short-term policy stances which prevent or
inhibit advances in the general and - crucially - the individual interest of Member States and the E.U.
aviation industry." See id.
272. AssOcIATION OF EUROPEAN AIRLINES, TOWARDS A TRANSATLANTIC COMMON AvIATION
AREA
(1999)
[hereinafter
TOWARDS
A
TCAA],
available
at
http://www.aviationtoday.comreportstaeapolicystatement.pdf.

273. See COMMuSSION
FOR

GREATER

ON AIR TRANSPORT, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE NEED
LIBERALIZATION
OF
INTERNATIONAL
AIR
TRANSPORT
(2000),
at

http://www.iccwbo.org/home/statements-rues/statements/2000/need-for-greater-]iberalization.asp
(last visited Jan. 25, 2002).
274. The Vice-President of Government and Legal Affairs for KLM characterized the AEA's
version of the TCAA as "the basis for negotiations" between the European Union and United States.
See FAA Predicts Golden Futurefor Aviation, But Offers Some Caveats, WORLD AIRLINE NEWS, Mar.
10, 2000. The AEA itself is more modest, however, noting in the policy statement itself, "The purpose
of the present paper is to clarify what the AEA airlines believe are key aspects and elements of the
TCAA ....The paper lays no claim to be complete or to have identified in each area the only or best
possible solution." TOWARDS A TCAA, supra note 272, at 16-17.
275. See TOWARDS A TCAA, supra note 272, at 1-2.
276. Id. at 2.
277. Id.at 1.
278. Id.at 3.
279. Id.at 4.
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The concept of a TCAA is intrinsically different from that underlying
conventional aviation bilaterals. The latter are based on independent action by
two sovereign authorities and the continuance of separate policies and separate
powers. The creation of a TCAA is of course itself the result of negotiation
between sovereign authorities; but the objective is gradually to reduce the
differences and to achieve unified policies and rules ....
Moreover, unlike a
conventional air agreement, the establishment of a TCAA is necessarily a dynamic
on-going process since regulatory standards continue to evolve over time .... In
particular, it is essential that the parties to the TCAA can agree and implement
changes in their own rules as required for convergence purposes. This means that
the agreement establishing the TCAA should be in the form of a treaty, so that it
would override national rules that are inconsistent with its provisions.
Four principal subjects for the TCAA to initially focus on were identified by
the AEA:
1. Rules governing market entry and access, pricing and selling/purchase of air
transport;
2. Rules governing airline ownership and the right of establishment;
3. Rules governing airline competitive behavior and co-operative arrangements;
and
4. Rules governing the use of leased aircraft.28 '
On the first subject, the AEA argued that all carriers of TCAA signatories
should have "unrestricted commercial opportunities" to fly to any point within the
TCAA.2 s2 In the absence of any countervailing "competition enforcement action,"
carriers would be given the right to choose their routes, set capacity, and set
fares.28 3 Discriminatory public procurements would be barred and air cargo
services would be fully liberalized, including in the fields of intermodal transport
and indirect services. 284 As for extra-TCAA routes, those would remain covered
by existing bilaterals between the individual TCAA signatories and the third-party
nation, however all TCAA carriers would enjoy access on the same terms of the
bilateral for flights originating in the TCAA signatory. 8 5 This avoids giving
carriers based in different signatories "dissimilar opportunities" in operations to
216
third-party nations.
With the second subject, ownership and establishment, the AEA confronted

280. TOWARDS A TCAA, supra note 272, at 5.
281. Id. at 6.
282. See id. at 7.
283. See id. at 8.
284. See id.
285. See id. This would be the case if, say, the United States and France were both TCAA
signatories and both had separate bilaterals with Japan, which was not a TCAA signatory. A U.S.
carrier flying from New York to Tokyo would operate subject to the U.S.-Japanese bilateral, as under
the current system. However, a U.S. carrier flying from Paris to Tokyo would operate subject to the
French-Japanese bilateral.
286. See ToWARDs A TCAA, supra note 272, at 8.
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"one of the core elements of the traditional international air transport regulatory
system., 287 The TCAA should "permit cross-border mergers, acquisitions, and
new entry. '288 Failure to grant such rights "would run counter to the basic
objectives of the TCAA," while their inclusion "would help to balance out natural
disparities in market opportunities" by permitting carriers to migrate to where
"sufficient opportunities are available." 289 While recognizing that there are
multiple possible bases for defining a TCAA carrier, the AEA recommended
defining them as carriers which "are majority owned/controlled by nationals of the
[signatories) or their respective governments.,, 290 The AEA conceded that thirdparty nations might object to such freedoms, however it was of the opinion that the
risk was minimal, particularly since the ICAO had come out in support of
liberalizing ownership/control requirements. 291 The TCAA should collectively
seek resolutions to objections by third parties on this subject, although if that fails
then the interests of carriers based
in the individual TCAA signatory involved in
292
the dispute would take priority.
The third subject, competition policy, presented "one of the most important,
and difficult, aspects of the TCAA. 293 The AEA observed that "the parameters
used and the procedures followed to determine anti-competitive behavior are of
major importance for the airline industry," because in a liberalized system "the
enforcement of competition standards becomes the principal means of regulatory
control. 294 Consequently, the AEA argued that the TCAA should produce
common standards in:
1. Basic criteria for granting antitrust exemptions;
2. The definition of "relevant market" for examining anticompetitive behavior;
3. The concept of "market power" versus "market share";
4. The concept of "predatory" behavior;
5. The issue of what "essential facilities" carriers would be obliged to share;
287. See TOWARDS A TCAA, supra note 272, at 8.
288. Id.
289. See id. at 8-9.
290. See id.
at 9.
291. See id.
at 9-10. The following year, the president of the ICAO reiterated his support for such
changes, "In my view, the evolution of ownership and control provisions on a global basis would be a
key economic regulatory development towards ensuring the safe, secure and orderly growth of civil
aviation.... It would bring our industry in line with others and produce substantial economic benefits."
See Worlds Apart, supra note 159.
292. See TOWARDS A TCAA, supra note 272, at 10.
293. See id. For more detailed examination of U.S. and E.U. antitrust and competition law, see
generally Brian Peck, Comment, ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust Laws and the US.-E. U
Dispute Over the Boeing and McDonnell DouglasMerger: From Comity to Conflict? An Argumentfor
a Binding InternationalAgreement on Antitrust Enforcement and Dispute Resolution, 35 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1163 (1998); Amy Ann Karpel, Comment, The European Commission's Decision on the
Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and the Need for Greater US.-E.U Cooperation in the Merger
Field,47 AM. U. L. REV. 1029 (1998).
294. See TOWARDS A TCAA, supra note 272, at 10.
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6. The treatment of carrier alliances; and
295
7. The nature of punishments and remedies that could be applied.

The AEA allowed that a convergence of policies on such matters "cannot be
achieved overnight," but "substantive discussions" between E.U. and U.S. officials
would be vital. 29 The AEA claimed the mere extension of existing competition
procedures could not be contemplated.297 Instead, it argued, "The very concept of
the TCAA and the major importance for the airline industry of harmonised
competition policy in such a common area mean that it is not enough for the E.U.
and the U.S. to agree simply to co-operate in the application of their two sets of
rules. 298
The AEA was of the opinion that the most important areas for
convergence of competition policies were those concerning strategic alliances, and
other restructuring arrangements, along with code sharing, franchising, and related
agreements. 29
On the final subject, the leasing of aircraft, the AEA considered the current
regulations of both the European Union and the United States to be "unduly
3 °
restrictive," making it all but impossible for a domestic carrier to "wet lease" 0
aircraft from foreign carriers. 30 1 The AEA argued, "Essentially, safety should be
the only legitimate concern with respect to the use of leased aircraft by TCAAbased airlines for operations within the TCAA. 3 °2 The only other restriction the
AEA would be willing to admit on this matter would be a reasonable limit to the
percentage of a TCAA carrier's fleet that could be wet-leased from third-party
carriers, to avoid having those carriers circumvent access restrictions to the TCAA
market.30 3
Having established what it considered to be the most important areas for
preliminary negotiations, the AEA proceeded to set out a rough sketch of the
institutional structures that would be necessary for the TCAA's operation.
Three principal "mechanisms" would be required, one for the adoption of common
regulations, one for the uniform application of those regulations, and one for
dispute resolution under those regulations. 0 5 The former two functions would be
combined into one body. 306 The AEA proposed that this body would be composed
of individuals nominated by the TCAA signatories, but empowered with "a degree
of independence," which would report to a joint committee of the signatories.30 7
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

See TowARDs A TCAA, supra note 272, at 11.
See id.
See id.
at 11-12.
See id. at 12.
See id.
A "wet lease" is a lease for an aircraft and a crew as a unit, as opposed to a "dry lease," which

is a lease for an aircraft only. See AIRLINE MANAGEMENT, supra note I 10, at 421.
301. See TOWARDS A TCAA, supra note 272, at 12.
302. Id. at 13.
303. See id.
304. See id. at 13-15.
305. See id. at 13.
306. See id.
307. See id. at 14.
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The new body would "ensure effective commonality in the application of the
agreed rules and a dynamic development of the TCAA by refining the common
rules and developing an authoritative body of precedents... and by working
out
30 8
detailed proposals for new rules and modifications of the existing ones.
The AEA noted that dispute resolution procedures in existing bilaterals leave
much to be desired.3° Indeed, because the procedures are so faulty, or even
nonexistent, the disputing nations often resort to unilateral measures, which can
lead to an escalating spiral of retaliation. 310 To avoid this, the AEA has proposed a
two-phase system of dispute resolution for the TCAA. 31 1 The first phase would
require parties to negotiate for a fixed period of time, with a mediator if necessary,
in an effort to reach a mutually acceptable solution. 1 2 In the event that the parties
were unable to reach a solution, the matter would move to phase two, which would
be a type of formal adjudication.3 13 The rulings of the adjudicatory body should be
binding on the parties, possibly through a mechanism similar to the WTO's, where,
if the bad actor does not pay compensation or otherwise comply 3with
the ruling,
14
the winning party is entitled to impose sanctions equal to its losses.
The AEA recognized, based on the different bilaterals and regulatory
environments existing among the potential signatories, there were several different
categories of transition that would be necessary to implement the TCAA. 1 5
However, the AEA declined to set out transition guidelines, arguing that it is the
transition qua transition that is important rather than procedural details.316 Indeed,
the AEA stated, "The modalities of transition should therefore essentially be left to
be negotiated by the E.U. Member States in question, without burdensome
preconditions other than some basic minimum requirements." 317 Regardless of the
"modalities," the duration of the transition should be held to a reasonable period
and the transition should be done on a reciprocal basis between the signatories to
prevent discrimination against carriers. 3'8 Finally, the AEA cautions that these
proposals are not "a set of independent entries on an 'Ala carte' list of proposals,"
but instead must be handled as a unified work.319
Interestingly, although de Palacio has used almost all of the AEA's proposals
308. See TOWARDS A TCAA, supra note 272, at 14.
309. See id. A recent example of this son of problem is a dispute between El Salvador and the
United States over alleged predatory pricing and "capacity dumping," i.e., excessive empty space on
flights, by Continental Airlines. The U.S.-EI Salvador bilateral has no provision for an enforcement
mechanism, nor does Salvadoran law. Consequently, El Salvador's major carrier, Grupo TACA, may
be forced to sue in U.S. courts under U.S. antitrust laws. See David Knibb, Play by the Rules, AiRLINE
Bus., Apr. 2000, at 72.
310. See TOWARDS A TCAA, supra note 272, at 15.
311. See id.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. See id.
315. See id. at 15-16.
316. See id. at l6.
317. Id.
318. See id.
319. See id. at 17.
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in her own speeches on the TCAA subsequent to the publication of the policy
statement, 320 the AEA rejected two of the Commission's main tactics in attempting
to establish the TCAA. The AEA argued that existing bilaterals and bilateral
negotiations "should remain unimpaired" during the transition to the TCAA and
that the Commission should halt its legal action against the Member States because
it is "inconsistent with the objective of creating a new framework for E.U.-U.S. air
services and detrimental to Community trade interests. 321 With the Commission's
case against the Member States having received a favorable opinion from the
Advocate General and now awaiting the Court of Justice's decision,322 it appears
unlikely that the Commission will adopt those recommendations.
PART III: THE TCAA AND THE DEADLY SINS

The inevitable question now arises, "Why hasn't the TCAA been adopted?"
Although the Commission has employed a veritable scorched earth policy against
the Member States, almost all of them support the TCAA, at least in principle. 32s
Only the United Kingdom and Ireland are flatly opposed to the TCAA,324 while
even France, long a holdout, has been warming to the idea.325 In a twist worthy 326
of
0. Henry, most opposition to the TCAA is now found in the United States,
although there are pockets of resistance remaining in Europe as well. 327 Once a
U.S. official could claim, "We have been pushing for negotiations in a multilateral
forum with the E.U.,, 328 Yet more recently a commentator has observed,
"International aviation policy has stalled as [the U.S. Department of
Transportation] and Congress let labor unions' knee-jerk opposition and
unimaginative airlines imprison them in a time warp. The U.S. long ago lost its
desire for big changes. 329 Upon hearing about the liberalization of foreign
ownership limits by New Zealand, one U.S. government official
lamented, "New
330
Zealand, like the Dutch, sings our song better than we do.

320. See, e.g., Beyond Open Skies, supranote 2.
321. See TOWARDS A TCAA, supra note 272, at cover letter.
322. See Dunn, supra note 254.
323. See Pomeroy, supra note 162, at CIO.
324. See id. The United Kingdom may be softening its position on the TCAA as well. Recently,
the head of international aviation policy for the U.K. Civil Aviation Authority stated, "The TCAA is the
only way of delivering full liberalisation on the North Atlantic." See Mark Pilling, Only a CallAway,
AIRLINE Bus., Mar. 2001, at 38.
325. See French Push, supra note 157.
326. See Joan M. Feldman, Holes in the Dike: Market Forces Dissatisfied with Star Alliance, AIR
TRANSPORT WORLD, Aug. 1, 2000, at 43 [hereinafter Holes in the Dike].
327. See, e.g., Assistant General Secretary, European Transport Workers' Federation, Brenda
O'Brien, International Air Services Agreements: The Concerns of Workers, Address to the French Civil
Aviation Authority (DGAC) Conference (Mar. 27, 2001), at http://www.itf.org.uk/ETF/e 14080 l.htm.
328. Southey, supra note 91.
329. Joan M. Feldman, Drip,Drip, Drip, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Mar. 1, 2001, at 42 [hereinafter
Drip].
330. See id.
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Sloth...
As indicated above, at least part of the responsibility for progress on the
TCAA grinding to a halt can be laid on the lack of excitement for the proposal on
the part of U.S. carriers. 331 An industry observer stated, "The [U.S.] carriers won't
derail an ownership/control change but they won't lead the charge. 332 Indeed,
U.S. carriers almost flaunt their apathy, with such industry figures as Will Ris, the
Vice-President of Government Affairs for American Airlines, openly remarking
that the carriers "don't spend a lot of time thinking" about the TCAA or related
matters, and that the emphasis is "gaming the current system. 333
Northwest Airlines' Vice-President of International and Regulatory Affairs,
David Mishkin, offered, "We are in favor of [the TCAA], but when it comes I'm
not so sure. 334 CEO of Continental, Gordon Bethune, has said that the United
States should liberalize its restrictions on ownership, but not to the extent
suggested by the AEA's proposal. 335 Delta Airlines is somewhat more supportive;
its general manager for finance and planning on Atlantic routes having stated that
' 36
there is "no need to keep things off the table. Let true competition exist.
However, he added that he did not see "foreign carriers flocking to take advantage
of cabotage rights. 337 Herb Kelleher, CEO of Southwest Airlines, offered a
similar mixed response to the possibility of cabotage, "I don't think it will ever
happen. It does not make any difference to Southwest one way or another ....
But if they want to do that, it's fine with me."'338 Among the major U.S. passenger
carriers, only United Airlines appears eager about the possibility, Shelley
Longmuir, its Senior Vice-President of International and Regulatory Affairs having
recently made the enthusiastic, if grim, statement that "[United] is ready to
compete. Our customers are demanding it. We want to339see progress because in
the coming world one will either acquire or be acquired.,
Cargo carriers, such as Federal Express, UPS and DHL, are more enthusiastic
about the idea of further liberalizing international aviation. 340 However, their
concern seems to be that the TCAA does not do enough to reduce barriers to
international aviation. 341 Federal Express' Vice-President for Regulatory Affairs
has complained that the TCAA as proposed is "too narrow" because of its failure
33 1.See Drip, supra note 329, at 42.
332. Holes in the Dike, supra note 326, at 43.
333. See id.
334. European CarriersFavor TCAA; Americans are More Cautious, AVIATION DAILY, May 16,
2000, at 5.
335. See Holes in the Dike, supra note 326, at 43.
336. See Colin Baker, US and UK Remain Apart on Open Skies, AIRLINE BUS., Dec. 2000, at 19.
337. See id.
338. See Kevin O'Toole & Karen Walker, The King of Low-Cost, AIRLINE Bus., June 1999, at 38.
339. See Senior Vice-President, International and Regulatory Affairs, Shelley Longmuir, Towards a
Consensus View of the Future International Air Transport Regime, Panel Discussion at 26th Annual
FAA Commercial Aviation Forecast Conference (Mar. 13-14, 2001) (transcript available at
http://api.hq.faa.gov/conference/conference200i/proc200l/transcript.htm).
340. See Cargo Will Drive Removal of Trade Barriers,AVIATION DAILY, May 15, 2000, at 6.
341. See id.
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to include adequate discussion of ground-handling and related issues.342 UPS has
indicated that it would want uniform noise and environmental regulations included
in the TCAA to ensure that traffic rights granted under the agreement would be
"fully usable." 343 Thus, while the major cargo carriers find the current345bilateral
34
regime overly restrictive, 4 they are not united on what should replace it.

Avarice...
Unlike the U.S. carriers, which "don't spend a lot of time thinking" about the
TCAA, 34 labor unions, both in the United States and European Union, have
considered the significance of the TCAA and similar measures.347 Duane Woerth,
President of the U.S.-based Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), has stated, "Can a
TCAA happen without labor support? Probably not., 348 Soon thereafter, an
ALPA spokesman added, in regards to the TCAA, "There has to be a system for
employees to have a regulatory framework for their working lives .... What
labour laws apply to [a wet-leased] aircraft and crew?

' 349

At the same event, the

General Secretary of the European Cockpit Association, Giancarlo Crivellaro,
commented that the TCAA should "not be left..,35 0entirely to market forces," and it
should have "a managing economic framework.
Yet labor unions do not appear to be irrevocably opposed to the general
concept of the TCAA, simply to the TCAA as proposed by the AEA. 35 1 As Brenda
O'Brien, Assistant General Secretary for the European Transport Workers'
Federation explained:
But how can International Air Services Agreements, such as the TCAA, guarantee
[the unions' interests]? In their current form, they simply do not. Architects of
such agreements might be well-advised to listen to those who work in the
industry: our checklist.., is utterly feasible and introduces necessary
safeguards
352
that ultimately benefit the industry, consumers, and employees.
Woerth

has

also

recently

commented,

"ALPA

does

not

object

to

342. See Cargo Will Drive Removal of Trade Barriers,supra note 340, at 6.
343. See id.
344. See Jo Pearse & Karen Walker, TransportMinisters From Around the World Joined Airline
and Industry Chiefs in Chicago in December to Discuss how to Shed the Bilateralism Legacy of the
Historic 1944 Chicago Convention and Also Move Beyond the Current Open Skies Regime to
Multilateralism,AIRLINE BUS., Jan. 2000, at 28.
345. See Holes in the Dike, supra note 326, at 43.
346. See id.
347. See Labor ParticipationKey to TCAA Development, Union Leaders Say, AVIATION DAILY,
May 15, 2000, at 2 [hereinafter Labor Participation].
348. Simon Warburton, ALPA Calls for More TCAA Scrutiny, AIR TRANSPORT INTELLIGENCE,
May 12, 2000.
349. Simon Warburton, Virgin Expresses Irritation at US Status Quo, AIR TRANSPORT
INTELLIGENCE, May 12, 2000.
350. See Labor Participation,supra note 347.
351. See O'Brien, supra note 327; US.-U.K. Discussions, supranote 165.
352. O'Brien, supra note 327.
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multilateralism. '353 However, he qualified this statement by noting that ALPA was
still opposed to cabotage, changes in foreign ownership requirements, and other
key elements of the AEA's version of the TCAA.354 Therefore, while not
absolutely barring the TCAA, it appears that union opposition will be a key
stumbling block in any effort to negotiate using the current proposal.355
And Wrath
Cabotage,356 and all but a scintilla of foreign ownership of U.S. carriers, are
prohibited under U.S. law,3 57 but are essential to any of the proposed versions of
the TCAA. 358 Although this has often been accounted for as protectionism for the
benefit of U.S. carriers; 359 that appears to be an inadequate explanation in light of
the apathetic view of the matter taken by most U.S. carriers. 36 0 In36fact, the greatest
obstacles to the TCAA are elements of the U.S. government itself. '
At an aviation symposium in 1999, the Assistant Deputy Undersecretary for
the Department of Defense darkly intoned, "As we explore airline ownership
issues, we must keep U.S. national security foremost in our minds. 362 This is
keeping in character with explicit U.S. national security policy since 1987, when a
directive on "national airlift policy" was issued, which concluded, "United States
aviation policy, both international and domestic, shall be designed to strengthen
the nation's airlift capability and where appropriate promote the global position of
the United States aviation industry. 363 The primary reason given for this position
is the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).3 4 Under the CRAF program, U.S. carriers
353. U.S.-UK Discussions, supra note 166.
354. See id.
355. See id. Early last year, a multilateral agreement between the United States, Brunei, Chile,
Singapore, and New Zealand was nearly sunk by provisions that were inserted at the behest of U.S.
labor unions. See Charles J. Simpson, Jr., Guest Editorial, AVNEWS LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN,
Feb. 2001, athttp://www.zsrlaw.comlpublications/articles/cjsOlO3.htm. Therefore, another of Woerth's
comments about the TCAA, to the effect that, "If you don't deal with labor's issues, your plan will be
dead on arrival," should not be viewed as an idle threat. See Labor Participation,supra note 347.
356. See 49 U.S.C. § 41703(c) (2001) (permitting cabotage only in the case of emergency, under 49
U.S.C. § 40109(g)).
357. To qualify as a domestic carrier, an airline must be owned, directly or indirectly, by a U.S.
citizen. See 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(2) (2001). A U.S. "citizen" is an individual person who is a citizen
of the United States, a partnership where all partners are citizens of the United States, or a corporation
chartered in the United States, in which at least seventy-five percent of the voting shares are controlled
by U.S. citizens, and the president and at least two-thirds of the board of directors and other managing
officers are U.S. citizens. See 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(15) (2001).
358. See generally Recommendations, supra note 256; All Our Tomorrows, supra note 141;
TOWARDS A TCAA, supra note 271.
359. See, e.g., Schless, supra note 10, at 456.
360. See Holes in the Dike, supra note 326, at 43.
361. See Karen Walker, US DOD Gives Red Light to Ownership Changes, AIRLINE Bus., June 1,
1999, at II [hereinafter Red Light].
362. See id.
363. See Nat'l Sec. Decision Directive No. 280 (June 24, 1987), at http://www.acq.osd.miU
log/tp/trans_progransldefensetrans-library/airpolicy/airpolicy.html (last visited July 8, 2002).
364. See id.
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voluntarily supply aircraft to the U.S. military to greatly increase its airlift
capacity. 365 The program has been used once in over fifty years and that was in a

situation where U.S. national security was not imminently jeopardized. 36
However, the Department of Defense insists that U.S. security interests would be
endangered if foreign citizens were allowed to own greater portions of U.S.
carriers because "[d]uring times of crisis we need to know without question there
is support. 367 Although some foreign carriers have attempted to assuage the U.S.
military's concerns by offering to make their own aircraft available for the CRAF
program, the Department of Defense has been dismissive of such proposals.368
The CRAF program is generally justified in terms of national security. 369 But
when the importance of the program is discussed in detail, the question appears to
be more one of cost to the U.S. military than security.370 Indeed, a U.S. Air Force
captain has even directly stated, "the value of the CRAF is the cost that the DOD
has avoided by relying on the capability of the commercial aviation industry to
maintain [the required transport capacity]." 37'
The cost of purchasing an
equivalent amount of air capacity would be fifty billion dollars and maintenance
costs of one to three billion dollars a year thereafter. 372 Yet this assumes the U.S.
military must replace the entire CRAF program capacity. 373 Given that during the

1990-91 Gulf War two-thirds of the aircraft in the CRAF program were deployed
at most, 374 and that the CRAF has not been activated since the attacks of

365. See Freedom's Paths, supra note 15, at 74. See also USAF Fact Sheet: Civil Reserve Air
Fleet, at http://www.af.mil/news/factsheets/CivilReserveAirFleet.htm
(last updated May 1999)
[hereinafter USAF Fact Sheet]. The CRAF program was authorized by section 101 of the Defense
Production Act of 1950, now 50 U.S.C. Appx. § 2071. See 10 U.S.C. § 9511(6) (2002).
366. See Cross-borderInvestment, supra note 3 (noting that the CRAF has only been deployed
once, for the 1990-91 Gulf War).
367. See RedLight, supra note 361, at 11.
368. See Foreign Ownership Issue Divides Panelists at Aviation Symposium, AVIATION DAILY,
May 5, 1999, at 212.
369. See, e.g., USAF Fact Sheet, supra note 365.
370. See, e.g., William G. PaImby, Enhancement of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet: An Alternative for
Bridging
the
Airlift
Gap,
7-8,
26,
53
(June
1995),
at
http://www.Maxwell.af.miVau/saas/studrsch/palmby.doc; Pamela S. Donovan, The Value of the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet: How Much Could the DOD Spend on Incentives?, 32-34, 41-48 (Sept. 1996) at
http://papers.maxwell.afmil/projects/ay1996/afit/donov_ps.pdf; Strategic Airlift and Sealift Imperatives
for the 21st Century: HearingBefore the Senate Armed Services Seapower Subcommittee, 107th Cong.
(statement of Gen. Charles T. Robertson, U.S.A.F. Commander-in-Chief United States Transportation
Command), available at 2001 WL 2007359 [hereinafter Robertson Testimony].
371. See Donovan, supra note 370, at 32.
372. See Robertson Testimony, supra note 370.
373. See id.
374. See Palmby, supra note 370, at 8, 53-54 (noting that the CRAF is activated in three stages,
totaling 80, 238, and 379 at each stage, and that during the Gulf War the third stage aircraft were not
activated.) It should also be noted that second stage cargo aircraft were not activated until after
hostilities began and the second stage passenger aircraft were only activated on March 23, 1991, for the
purpose of withdrawing U.S. troops after the conflict. See Donovan, supra note 370, at 18. Thus it
appears that little more than a fifth of the CRAF fleet was used during the build-up to the actual
conflict. Cf PaImby, supra note 370, at 8 (noting that the first stage consisted of 80 aircraft and the
maximum number of aircraft was 379).
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September 11, 200 1,37 this appears excessive. The U.S. military's position also
of denying it needed
does not consider the costs to the U.S. aviation industry
37 7
capital 376 and costs to consumers by limiting air service.
CONCLUSION

"Open Skies is not good enough 56 years after [the Chicago] Conference,"
declared Frederik Sorensen a few months prior to his retirement from his position
of0
And after years 38
as the head of the European Union's air transport section. 378 379
struggle, most of Europe seems to agree, both in government

and industry.

Yet the United States, once the champion of international liberalization,381 is now
"practically on the sidelines. 38 2 With the decision of the Court of Justice freshly
8
rendered, and the Commission yet to fully come to grips with its new authority,
it remains to be seen whether the TCAA will become the defining institution of a
new multilateral regime in aviation agreements. There is still the possibility that
prevail. 384
one of the other embryonic proposals for a multilateral system will
Regardless of the final outcome, it is evident that the notion of the TCAA or a
similar transatlantic multilateral has been decisive in shaping U.S.-E.U. aviation
relations over the past decade. Even if the TCAA is stillborn, the bilateral regime
will never be the same.

375. See Richard Thompson & Bloomberg News, FedEx Joins Effort to Help Military Keep
MaterialsFlowing, CoM. APPEAL (Memphis), Oct. 10, 2001, at C2. See also Mathew Schwartz, Let's
Make a Deal Amid a Season of Uncertainly, Consumers and Retailers Play the Discounting Game,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 28, 2001, at F6 (noting that activation was a "remote possibility"); John Hughes,
American, FedEx, 31 CarriersCommit Planesfor War, BLOOMBERO NEWS, Oct. 15, 2002 (noting that
even in the event of a second war with Iraq "only a fraction" or "none at all" of the CRAF would be
needed).
376. See Press Release, Continental Airlines, Continental Airlines Chairman Calls for Relaxed
Foreign Ownership Rules as Airline Industry Faces Global Consolidation (June 19, 2000), at
http://www.continental.com/press/press_2000-06-19-01 .asp.
377. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 136.
378. See Holes in the Dike, supra note 326, at 43.
379. See Pomeroy, supra note 162, at C 10.
380. See Ott, supranote 150.
381. See Drip, supranote 329, at 42.
382. See Holes in the Dike, supra note 326, at 43.
383. See Open Skies Agreements, supra note 252.
384. See, e.g., Abeyratne, supra note 4, at 832-856 (discussing GATS or the WTO as alternatives).

CONJOINED TWINS:
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PARENTS AND THE COURTS
OVER THE MEDICAL TREATMENT OF CHILDREN
Heather Tierney*
I. INTRODUCTION

The anomaly of conjoined twins fascinates and amazes people around the
world. Conjoined twins are the subject of television documentaries and a source of
curiosity and amazement.1 With advances in medical treatment more conjoined
twins survive birth.2 Parents of conjoined twins immediately face life and death
decisions concerning their new babies. The most difficult of these decisions is
whether or not to separate the twins. Medically, legally, and ethically the
occurrence and survival of conjoined twins is an interesting and controversial
topic. As Nancy Segal, an expert on twins and twinning, stated "[p]ublic debates
on the physical and psychological treatment of conjoined twins have engaged
physicians, families and reporters in triadic tangles3 over pregnancy termination,
surgical separation, and postoperative management.,
In August of 2000, the first legal case involving the surgical separation of

*B.A. DePauw University, 1997; J.D. University of Denver College of Law, 2002;
M.A. University of Denver, Graduate School of International Studies, 2002.
1. Conjoined twins were once known as Siamese twins.
See Conjoined Twins, at
www.twinstuff.com/conjoined.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2001). The most famous set of conjoined
twins, Eng and Chang Bunker, were born on May 10, 1811 and died within hours of each other on
January 17, 1864 at age 62. See id. The brothers were successful businessmen in North Carolina and
fathered at least twenty-one children between them. See id. The twins married sisters and traveled
around the world with Barnum's circus to earn money. See id. After their death doctors determined
that the twins could have been successfully separated because they were attached by only a five-inch
ligament near their breastbones. See id. See also KAY HUNTER, DUET FOR A LIFETIME (1964). See
also DARIN STRAUSS, CHANG AND ENG (2001).
2. "At one end of the spectrum is the case of two fully grown, fully equipped bodies with a minor
connection which is easy to remove, leaving two complete individuals who could survive into old age.
At the other end is one complete body with a number of extra parts which could be removed to leave
just one complete individual. Between these two extremes are a range of gradations including two
fairly complete bodies, which are so heavily fused that they cannot be separated but at a substantial risk;
and two, which can be separated with the inevitable consequence that one of them will die." Sally
Sheldon & Stephen Wilkinson, Conjoined Twins: The Legality and Ethics Of Sacrifice, 2 MED. L. REV.
149, 150 (1997).
3. See NANCY L. SEGAL, ENTWINED LIVES: TWINS AND WHAT THEY TELL US ABOUT HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 303 (2000).
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conjoined twins arrived in a British courtroom . The case involved a fundamental
dispute about medical care and the separation of conjoined twins which divided the
scientific, legal and religious sectors of society.5 The doctors believed the twins
should be separated giving the stronger, viable twin an opportunity to live. The
devoutly religious parents believed that the decision regarding whether the children
lived or died should be left in God's hands.6 In their view no one should
intentionally cause the death of another person.",
This comment explores how the courts in the United States might review a
conjoined twins case such as the one of Jodie and Mary. As a starting point, this
comment closely examines the facts and the judicial treatment by the Appeals
Court in Britain of Jodie and Mary's case. This analysis examines the opinions of
each Justice on the Court of Appeals as well as the Court's decision. The second
part analyzes how courts in the United States treat medical cases where children
either receive extraordinary medical treatment over the advice of their doctor. This
comment explores the well known case of Baby K, a baby born without brain
function in October, 1992. 7 This includes the judicial treatment by the trial court,
as well as the court of appeals. Lastly, this comment address cases where parents
refuse medical treatment for their minor children because of their religious beliefs.
This comment analyzes both the differences and the similarities in cases
where medical treatment is sought to save life and cases in which parents refuse
medical treatment on religious grounds. In addition to the case analysis, this
comment contemplates the effect of parent's constitutional rights under the free
exercise clause, the rights of children in terms of child abuse and neglect, the
parent's rights in terms of child abuse and neglect, as well as the state's right to
intervene.
II. JODIE AND MARY - BACKGROUND

Jodie and Mary were born on August 8, 2000.8 The children were born to

4. Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) No. 1, [2000] H.R.L.R. 721
(C.A.Civ.); In re A (Children)(Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation), [2001] Fam. 147 (C.A. Civ.); Re
A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2000] 4 All E.R. 961 (C.A. Civ.) [hereinafter
Conjoined Twins Case].
5. See John L. Allen Jr., Sophie's Choice Conjoined Twins Give Birth to Moral and Legal
Debate, at http://www.parkridgecenter.org.
6. See Lisa M. Hewitt, A (Children): Conjoined Twins and Their Medical Treatment, 3 J.L. &
FAM. STUD. 207, 209-210 (2001) (reviewing the decision by the Appeals Court).
7. See In the Matter of Baby "K", 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993) [hereinafter In the Matter
of Baby "K"].
8. These are fictional names given by the court. The girls' real names are Gracie and Rose. See
Law Decreed Fate of Jodie and Mary, THE GuARDIAN, Feb. 5, 2002. George J. Annas, Conjoined
Twins-The Limits of Law at the Limits of Life, 344 N. Eng. J. Med. 1104 (2001). The parents are
Kosovar refugees who now live on Gozo. See Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 727. The mother
discovered at four months that she was carrying conjoined twins. Id. (quoting from the parents
statement). In their homeland the termination of any pregnancy is illegal. See id. The doctors in Gozo
recommended St. Mary's Hospital in Manchester. Id. The government established links with the
British government, which allows patients to be treated by the National Health Service and be
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Michaelangelo and Rina Attard, devout Roman Catholics. 9 Jodie and Mary were
ischiopagus tetrapus conjoined twins. 10 Thus, each had their own arms and legs,
although they were joined at the pelvis and shared a linked spine." The girls had
their own internal organs, except for a shared bladder.' 2 Jodie's heart and lungs
performed all of the circulatory functions for both girls.' 3 A common, shared
artery enabled Jodie to circulate oxygenated blood for both of them. 14 The strain of
supporting both girls would result in the death of both twins within a matter of

reimbursed by their government. See id.
9. See Annas, supra note 8, at 1104.
10. Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 728. Ischiopagus twins are joined at the ischium and
tetrapus twins have four lower limbs. See id. The girls bodies are merged, with their legs emerging at
right angles from each side and their heads at opposite ends. See Judges Rule Conjoined Twins Can Be
Separated, Sept. 22, 2000 at http://www.cnn.comi2000/WORLD/europe/UK/09/22/britain.twins.03 (last
visited Apr. 26, 2001) [hereinafter Judges Rule]. Ischiopagus twins account for only 6% of all
conjoined twins. See Conjoined Twins at www.twinstuff.com/conjoined.htm (last visited Apr. 26,
2001) (describing the occurrence of conjoined twins and the different types of conjoined twins, as well
as a history on the most famous sets of conjoined twins). The most common form of conjoined twins
are thoraopagus which account for 35-40% of all cases. Id. Thorapagus twins share part of the chest
wall and sometimes share a heart. Id. Conjoined twins are extremely rare and are always identical,
same-sex twins, 70% being female.
Id.
See also Types of Conjoined Twins,
http://zygote.swathmore.edu/cleave4a.html (last modified Apr. 5, 1996). There are no documented
cases of conjoined triplets or quadruplets. See id. See also Conjoined Twins, infra note 10. However,
there are cases of conjoined twins in triplet and quadruplet sets. See SEGAL, supra note 3, at 296.
Furthermore, conjoined twins are less likely to occur in the United States or China than in India or
Africa. See How Are Conjoined Twins Formed? at http://www.conjoined-twins.i-p.com/how.html (last
visited Apr. 26, 2001); See also SEGAL, supra note 3, at 301 (reviewing a study regarding the
occurrence of conjoined twins in different parts of the world. The study also investigates the effect of
the environment). Conjoined twins occur as often as once in every 40,000 births but only once in every
200,000 live births. See How Are Conjoined Twins Formed, infra note 10. Seventy-five percent of
conjoined twins are still born or die within 24 hours. Id. They are the product of a single egg that, for
some unknown reason, failed to divide fully into separate twins during the first three weeks of
gestation. See Claudia Wallis, The Most Intimate Bond: Conjoinedfor Life, the Hensel Twins are a
Medical Mystery and a Lesson in Cooperation For Us All, TIME MAG., Mar. 25, 1996, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/arhchive/1996/dom/960325/medicine.html
(last visited Aug. 10,
2001). The mother of Jodie and Mary went into spontaneous labor at 42 weeks. See Judges Rule, infra
note 10. The parents wanted little intervention during delivery so the doctor delivered the children at
the last possible moment by Caesarean section. See id.
11. Annas, supra note 8, at 1104. See also Christopher Kaczor, The Tragic Case of Jodie and
Mary: Questions about Separating Conjoined Twins, http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/faculty/
ckaczor/articles/twins.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2001). Justice Ward described the twins from
photographs. "Jodie's head seems normal but Mary's is obviously enlarged, for she has a swelling at
the back of the head and neck, she is facially dysmorphic and blue because she is centrally cyanosed."
Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 729.
12. See Hewitt, supra note 6, at 208.
13. Kaczor, supra note 11. Mary grew at a normal rate while Jodie did not grow. See Hewitt,
supra note 6, at 208. The doctors suggested, "Mary is drawing nutrition from Jodie, and growing at her
expense." Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 732.
14. See Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4 at 726 (describing Mary's and Jodie's situation). The
separation of the twins would involve severing this artery, which would result in Mary's death. See id.
If the girls are not separated they could live as long as six months and perhaps longer. See id. Jodie's
heart will eventually fail leading to the death of both girls. See id.
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weeks.15 As the stronger twin, Jodie
could survive on her own if separated from
16
Mary but Mary would certainly die.
The parents believed that God, not doctors, should decide whether their
daughters lived or died.' 7 The parents declined St. Mary's Hospital's offer to
perform the operation to separate the girls.' 8 In their eyes, the twins were equal in
the eyes of their parents, so they would not sacrifice one to save the other.' 9 As a
result, the twins' doctors turned to the court to order the surgery over the
objections of the parents. 20
III. IN RE A (CHILDREN) - THE DECISION OF THE BRITISH APPEALS PANEL
In British courts, Lord Justices on an appeals panel customarily issue separate
opinions. 21 The Lord Justices agreed with the trial court judge's decision to
separate the girls. 22 The appeals panel justices did not agree with the Family
Division's justices legal reasoning, as well as each other's legal reasoning as to the
legality of the operation to separate the girls. 23 Interestingly, the Lord Justices
quoted Justice Scalia in Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health24 where the
15. See Kaczor, supra note II (doctors predicted this result). See also Daniel P. Sulmasy, Heart
and Soul: The Case of Conjoined Twins, http://www.americapress.org/articles/sulmasy.htm (last visited
Aug. 10, 2001) (stating that the doctors decision to separate the twins as the only medically proper
decision was hasty). The fact that the doctors do not have thousands of cases in which to compare this
case means they were not speaking from experience. Id. The author questions the assumptions by
doctors that both girls would die without the surgery. ld. Furthermore, the doctors also questioned the
probability of success of the surgery to separate the girls at 80%. Id. Also questioned is the decision
not to try a heart and lung transplant for Mary, although the author recognized that there is not enough
medical knowledge to determine if this was possible. Id.
16. Annas, supra note 8, at 1104. Approximately 200 surgical separations of conjoined twins
were attempted, approximately 90% of these after 1950. See SEGAL, supra note 3, at 306-307. Since
1950 three quarters of the surgeries have resulted in one or both of the twins surviving. Id.
17. See Judges Rule, supra note 10. Choosing to save Jodie at the cost of Mary's life would be
ending a life, directly conflicting with the parents' religious views. See The Separating of Conjoined
Twins: A Human Life has the Greatest Value, but its Loss May be Justified,
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/fuIll/321/7264/782 (last visited Aug. 10, 2001) [hereinafter The
Separation of Conjoined Twins].
18. See Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 726. As devout Roman Catholics, they believe,
"that it is God's will that their children are afflicted as they are and they must be left in God's hands."
Id.
19. Id.
20. See Hewitt, supra note 6, at 210. The parents entered an "originating summons" with the
High Court. Id.
21. See Annas, supra note, 8 at 1104.
22. Id. at 1104. The Justices commented on the personal difficulties each had in reaching a
decision. See The Separation of Conjoined Twins, supra note 17. The Justices made comments about
experiencing many sleepless nights agonizing over their decision. Id.
23. Annas, supra note 8, at 1104.
24. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). The court determined that it does not violate the Constitution to
implement the wishes of the appointed surrogate even if there is not clear and convincing evidence of a
patient's wish to have medical care withdrawn. Id. at 292. The predecessor to this case is the Quinlan
case. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). In the Quinlan case, Karen Quinlan suffered
from severe brain damage causing a permanent vegetative state. Her parents wanted her respirator
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United States (U.S.) Supreme Court Determined the
legality of a parent's decision
25
to end life sustaining treatment for their daughter.
According to the "welfare principle" the British court had the right to override
the decision of the parents if it is in the best interests of the child to do so. 26 This
principle puts the child's welfare above parental interest. 27 The judges decide if it
is in the child's best interest to have "an independent and objective judgment. 28
This differs from the U.S., where the only way to override a decision by the
parents is to convince a judge that it was a case of abuse or neglect. 29 The issue in
this case was whether the parents could refuse medical treatment for their
daughters. The Family Division court determined that the parents could refuse
medical treatment, but the doctor's request to operate on the girls was in their best
interest, therefore overriding the decision of the parents.30
The Family Division judge concluded "that separation was not a case of
killing Mary but one of passive euthanasia in which her food and hydration would
be withdrawn (by clamping off her blood supply from Jodie).,, 31 The parents and
the official solicitor, appointed
to represent Mary's interest, appealed the judgment
32
of the Family Division Court
A. Lord Justice Alan Ward
British Appeals Court Justice Ward addressed the court's ability to hear the
case. 33 The parents are entitled to consent or reject medical treatment on behalf of
a minor child if it is in the child's best interest. 34 The hospital has the right to ask
the court to overturn the parent's decision and give consent to the operation.3
The fundamental principal of medical law allows people the opportunity to
decide for themselves whether or not to receive medical treatment.36 This principal

disconnected. Id. at 37-39, 662-64. The Supreme Court of New Jersey allowed Quinlan's parents to
make the decision. Id. at 39, 664. The Court believed that this was the only way to ensure that
Quinlan's privacy rights under the Federal Constitution would be preserved. Id.
25. "The point at which life becomes 'worthless' and the point at which the means necessary to
preserve it become extraordinary or inappropriate are neither set forth in the constitution not known to
the nine Justices of this Court any better then they are known to nine people picked at random from the
Kansas City phone directory." 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990).
26. See The Separating of Conjoined Twins, supra note 17.
27. Id.
28. See George J. Annas, The Limits of Law at the Limits of Life: Lessons from Cannibalism,
Euthanasia, Abortion, and the Court-OrderedKilling of One Conjoined Twin to Save the Other, 33
CONN. L. REv. 1275, 1282 (2001).
29. Id.
30. See Conjoined Twins Case supra note 4, at 747.
31. See Annas, supra note 8, at 1104. See Conjoined Twins Case, supranote 4, at 748.
32. Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 736.
33. See Annas, supra note 8, at 1104.
34. See Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 751-752.

35. Id.
36. Id. at 748.

2002
is enforced regardless of the
minor children, a safeguard
decision if it is in the child's
determine whether to consent

CONJOINED TwiNs
unreasonableness of the decision. 37 In the case of
exists allowing the court to override the parents'
best interest. 38 The parents have a right and duty to
or withhold medical treatment.39

Family law dictated the test to determine whether the parents refusal can be
overridden. 40 The Courts paramount consideration is the welfare of the child.4'
Lord Justice Ward addressed Jodie's best interest first and agreed with Justice
Johnson in the Family Court that it was in Jodie's best interest to have the
operation.42 The operation would allow Jodie to have a normal life expectancy
with little risk of brain damage of death.43 He stated.. ."it seems to me impossible
to say that this operation does not offer infinitely greater benefit to Jodie than is
offered to her by letting her die if the operation is not performed."
45
Determining Mary's best interest was more difficult for Lord Justice Ward.
The critical distinction was whether the operation was viewed as a prolongation of
Mary's life or a termination of her life. 4 The important consideration in respect to
Mary was that her condition would never improve.47 There was no determination
as to whether or not she was in pain and that prolonging her life would be to her
disadvantage.4 8
In determining Mary's best interest, Lord Justice Ward recognized that there
was no best health interest. 49 He determined that, "the operation is not capable of
enduring any other improvement in her condition or preventing any deterioration
in her present state of health.",50 He concluded that Mary's life has value even if
she did not have the capacity to enjoy it. 5 ' The Lord Justice determined that the
operation was not in Mary's best interest because it would end her life
prematurely. 52 There was no advantage to her because the operation was in Jodie's
but not Mary's best interest.53 In cases considering the best interest of two
children, the court must first balance the matter relevant to each child.54 The

37. See Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 749.
38. Id. at 751. The parents did not contest the court's ability to review their decision. Id.
39. Id. at 752.
40. Id. The Court used best interests and welfare interchangeably.
41. Id. at 755.
42. Id. at 756.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 757.
47. Id. at 756.
48. Id. This was part of Justice Johnson's decision.
49. Id. at 757.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 761. Lord Justice Ward disagreed with Justice Johnson that Mary's life was worth
nothing to her. Id.
52. Id. at 764.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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wishes of the parents are considered in finding this balance. 5 5
The important distinction addressed by Lord Justice Ward is the withdrawl of
care or treatment verses the ending of a patient's life by lethal injection. 6 He
quoted Lord Goff, stating:
The distinction appears, therefore, to be useful in the present context in that it can
be invoked to explain how the discontinuance of life support can be differentiated
from ending a patient's life by lethal injection. But in that end the reason for that
difference is that, whereas law considers that discontinuance of life support may
be consistent with the doctor's duty to care for his patient, it does not, for reasons
of policy, consider that it forms anyTart
of his duty to five his patient a lethal
5
injection to put him out of his agony.
B. Lord Justice Brooke
Lord Justice Brooke agreed with Lord Justice Ward's determination that when
balancing the girls' interests against each other, Mary's interests should not
outweigh the interests of Jodie. 8 He determined that the issues involving criminal
law were the most difficult. The most important question was whether or not the
operation to separate the girls was lawful. 59 He looked at the legal definition of
murder, as well as the exceptions. 60 The Lord Justice focused on the words and
phrases important to this
case: "unlawfully," "kills," "any reasonable creature,"
61
and "with intent to kill.
Lord Justice Brooke analyzed the meaning of the word "kills. 62 He used the
case of Airedale NHS Trust v. Blanct 3 where the House of Lords made an
important distinction between a doctor's decision not to prolong a life through
treatment and a doctor's decision to end a life by administering a lethal drug.64
Withholding medical treatment is lawful in situations where the patient gave
consent and in some circumstances where the patient did not give consent. 65
Conversely, the doctor may not administer a drug to bring about death, even in
circumstances of extreme suffering. 66 A positive act can be categorized as

55. See Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 765.
56. Id. at 763.
57. Id at 762.
58. Id. at 779. Lord Justice Brooke agree with Lord Justice Ward's analysis in terms of family
law. Id. Lord Justice Brooke adopts Lord Justice Ward's description of the facts as well but considered
the literature before the court valuable in deciding the issues of the case.
59. Id. at 784.
60. Id. Lord Justice Brooke concluded that the exceptions were irrelevant in this case. Id.
61. Id.at 786.
62. Id. at 788.
63. [19931 A.C. 789.
64. Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 788-89. This is the decision the House of Lords faced
in the Airedale case.
65. Id. at 789 (discussing the Airedale case).
66. Id. The House of Lords called this form of killing euthanasia. Euthanasia is unlawful at
common law.
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murder.67
Lord Justice Ward discussed the defense of necessity and attempted to draw
an analogy to when "murder" may be necessary. 68 He relied on Sir James
Stephen's requirements for the application of the doctrine of necessity. 69 First, the
act is needed to avoid inevitable and irreparable evil.70 Second, the lawful killing
should be no more than is reasonably necessary for the purpose to be achieved.7'
Third, the evil inflicted must not be disproportionate to the evil avoided.72
In weighing the factors, Lord Justice Brooke turned to the case of Regina v.
Dudley & Stephens73 to demonstrate the doctrine of necessity. In Dudley, a four
member crew escaped their sinking yacht with only two tins of turnips.

74

After

eight days without food, Dudley and Stephens killed the youngest and weakest
crew member.75 The rest of the crew ate him to survive and four days later the
crew members were rescued.76 At their trial for murder, Dudley and Stephens
argued that they killed the other crew member out of necessity. 77 The Court's
opinion questions the doctrine of necessity and the Court determined that the
crew's actions were murder and that their actions could not be justified by
necessity, "[b]y what
necessity.78 Most importantly when applying the doctrine 7of
9
measure is the comparative value of lives to be measured.
Lord Justice Brooke determined that even though Mary's death would
constitute murder, Sir James Stephen's requirements for the application of the
doctrine of necessity justified the surgery.80 Lord Justice Brooke concluded that
Jodie's interest in life must outweigh Mary's conflicting interest.8'

67. See Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 789. In the Airedale case the House of Lords
determined that cutting off life prolonging treatment was not a positive act and therefore did not fall
under the law of murder.
68. Id. at 794.
69. Id. at 816.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
74. Id.
75. Id. Dudley and Stephens did not inform the other crew member, Brooks, of their plans. Id.
Dudley and Stephens choose the boy because they both had families. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 287. Lord Coleridge states, "Though law and morality are not the same, and many
things may be immoral which are not necessarily illegal, yet the absolute divorce of law from morality
would be of fatal consequence; and such divorce would follow if the temptation to murder in this case
were to be held by law an absolute defense of it." Id. He determined that it is not always necessary to
preserve life. Id. For example, lives are sacrificed in war. Id.
79. Id.
80. Conjoined Twins Case, supra, note 4, at 815.
81. Id. at 816. He also argued in the doctrine of sanctity of life and that the operation to separate
the girls would give the girl's bodies the integrity denied to them by nature. Id.
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C. Lord Justice Robert Walker

Lord Justice Robert Walker recognized two central questions in this case.
82
First, are these conjoined twins two persons or one in the eyes of the law?
Second, if they are two persons, was Mary born alive?13 This second question was
important because there is no criminal liability if she was not born alive.84 Lord
Justice Walker believed they should be regarded as two separate people.8 5 Mary
did not fall within the definition of a still-born child as defined by the Births and
Deaths Registration Act of 1965.86 The Lord Justice points out that the Children
Act 87 requires the Court to consider the best interests of each child.8 8 In cases
where the Court looks at the well being of two siblings, it must89balance the
interests of the children and achieve the "situation of least detriment.,
Lord Justice Walker considered the parents' opinion about the future of their
children. Their sincere religious beliefs though controversial, are unlike Jehovah's
Witnesses objections to blood transfusions because they are not contrary to
society's generally accepted views. 90 In addition, their views are supported by the
society in which they live. 91 Lord Justice Walker understood the doctor's assertion
that the surgery was the best way to save Jodie and that this must be respected,
even though the Justices or Court of Appeals could not determine the legality of
the operation.92
Lord Justice Walker agreed with the determination of Lord Justice Brooks
that the doctrine of necessity was important in this case, but found no helpful
parallel case.93 Ultimately, Lord Justice Walker found that the doctor's testimony
that the operation was in the best interest of both twins persuasive and agreed with
the decision
to allow the surgery. 94 The parents choose not to appeal the court's
95
decision.

82. Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 817.
83. Id. at 818.
84. Id.
85. Id. This was more than parasitic attachment. Id. The girls each had a brain and almost
complete bodies. Id.
86. Id. A child which has issued forth from its mother after the twenty-forth week of pregnancy
and which did not at any time after being completely expelled from its mother breathe or show any
signs of life. Id. Mary struggled to breathe. Id.
87. Children's Act, 1989, sec. 3 (Eng.).
88. Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 819.
89. Id. See In Re H 1 FLR 883 (1993). Cases that have involved the balancing of interests have
not been decisions as a matter of life or death. Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 819.
90. Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 821.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 835.
94. Id. at 836.
95. Id.
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D. Holding
Six weeks after the Court of Appeal's dismissal of the parents appeal the
hospital performed the operation separating Jodie and Mary.96 As expected, Mary
died during surgery. 97 Jodie needs extensive surgery in the99 next few years, but
98
could recover fully. She returned to Gozo with her parents.
IV. THE UNITED STATES: THE CASE OF BABY K

The case of Baby K presented a situation where the wishes of the doctors and
parents collided.1l ° As in the case of Jodie and Mary, the parents and doctors
disagreed about what should be done with their babies. On October 13, 1992,
Baby K was born by cesarean
section in Falls Church, Virginia.' 0 ' Baby K was
10 2
anencephalic.
as
diagnosed
Immediately after birth, Baby K was put on ventilation. The doctors urged
the mother to discontinue respiratory methods because there was no chance of
long-term survival for Baby K. 10 3 The physician treating Baby K sought advice
from the hospital ethics committee, as well as a subcommittee composed of a
family practitioner, a psychiatrist, and a minister.'1 4 The subcommittee decided
that a legal remedy would be sought if the impasse continued between the doctors

96. Annas, supranote 8 at 1106. The surgery took twenty hours. SeeSulmasy, supra note 15.
97. Annas, supranote 8, at 1106.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Baby K's real name was Stephanie Harrell. See Cindy Hylton Rushton, The Baby K Case:
Ethical Challengesof PreservingProfessionalIntegrity, 21 PEDIATRIC NURSING 367 (1995).
101. See George J. Annas, Asking the Courts to Set the Standard of Emergency Care-The Case of
Baby K, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1542 (1994) [hereinafter Asking the Courts].
102. Anencephaly is "the congenital absence of major portions of the brain, skull, and scalp
characterized by a large opening in the skull accompanied by the absence or severe disruption of the
cerebral hemispheres." See The Medical Task Force on Anencephaly, The Infant With Anencephaly,
322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 669 (1990). The infants are permanently unconscious and have some responses
to stimuli. See id. A low percentage of infants born with anencephaly survive more than a week after
birth. See id. Each year approximately 1,000 infants are born with this condition. See Carol J.
Castaneda, Baby K Now Stephanie Turns 2, USA TODAY, Oct. 13, 1994. She had a brain stem, which
functioned allowing her to have respiratory reflexes, minimal feeling reflexes and reflexive responses to
noxious stimuli. See Hylton Rushton, supra note 100, at 367. Baby K was diagnosed parentally, but
her mother would not agree to terminate the pregnancy despite the advice of her doctors. See Asking
the Courts, supra note 101, at 1542. She declined to have an abortion because of her devout Christian
beliefs. See Karen R. Long, Whose Life is it Anyway? Debate Rages on Baby K Kept Alive for Two
Years, Child Cannot See, Hear, Think or Feel, THE PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 9, 1994. The father of the
baby sided with the hospital and believed that care should be discontinued. See id. The parents were
unmarried and the father was less involved in the case. See id.
103. See ResuscitationRequired, CourtSays, BALT. EVENING SUN, Oct. 4, 1994. The baby did not
interact with her environment and was permanently unconscious. See Hylton Rushton, supra note 100,
at 367. She did not see, feel, hear, talk, think or feel pain. Id.
104. Asking the Courts, supra note 101, at 1562. The mother had a strong religious belief that all
life has value and should be preserved." See Life and Law in the Case of Baby K, THE VIRGINIANPILOT AND THE LEDGER-STAR, Oct. 6, 1994.
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and the mother.' 0 5 On November 30"', 1992 the hospital transferred Baby K to a
nursing home, but agreed that if respiratory difficulties reoccurred she would be
immediately returned to the hospital. 0 6 Baby K returned to the hospital in January
and two additional times after that. 0 7 Fairfax hospital took the case of Baby K to
federal court. The hospital requested the court to determine whether it could
discontinue life sustaining treatment in the event that Baby K arrived at the
emergency department in emergency distress. 108
The hospital sought a declaration that the refusal to provide life-supporting
medical care to Baby K would not transgress the Emergency Medical Treatment
and Active Labor Act' 0 9 (EMTALA), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,"" the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),'" the Child Abuse Amendments
of 1984, 12 and the Virginia Medical Malpractice Act." 3 The Court refused to
make any legal rulings concerning the rights or obligations of the hospital under
the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 and under the Virginia Medical Malpractice
Act. 114
Under EMTALA, the hospital wanted an exemption from the requirements of
the statute when the treatment is deemed by hospital physicians to be "futile" or
,,inhumane.,iIs According to the court, the exceptions the hospital sought under
EMTALA did not apply in the case of Baby K.116 The federal court determined
that the treatment of acute symptoms of respiratory difficulty by the use of a
mechanical ventilator is not "futile" or "inhumane."" 17 The court reasoned that this
was similar to refusing an AIDS or cancer patient medical treatment after an
accident on the grounds that because they will die anyway the care would be
"futile."1 i18

"The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against an 'otherwise
qualified' handicapped individual, solely by reason of his or her handicap, under

105. Life and Law in the Case of Baby K, supra note 104. The father ofBaby K was only distantly
involved.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See In the Matter of Baby "K,"supra note 7,at 1022. See also Hylton Rushton, supra note
100, at 367. See also Asking the Courts, supra note 101, at 1542.
109. In the Matter of Baby "K", supra note 7, at 1022; Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd [hereinafter EMTALA].
110. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. The Act required that participating hospitals
provide stabilizing medical treatment to any person who comes to an emergency department in an
"emergency medical condition" when treatment is requested on that person's behalf. See EMTALA,
supra note 109.
111. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
112. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 5102 etseq.
113. Virginia Medical Malpractice Act, VA. CODE § 8.01-581.1 et seq.
114. In the Matter of Baby "K", supranote 7, at 1031.
115. Id. at 1027.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." ' 19 Baby K falls
within the definition of a "handicapped" and "disabled" person and she was
initially denied treatment over the objections of her mother because
of her
12
handicap. 120 The withholding of ventilator treatment is against the Act.
The court then turned to the ADA. The ADA "prohibits discrimination
against disabled individuals by 'public accommodations.""1 22 Under the ADA.
Anencephaly is a disability and public accommodations include heath care
providers. 23 It differs from the Rehabilitation Act in that, "the ADA does not
require an individual to be 'otherwise qualified' to receive benefits.' ' 124 The Court
determined that "the ADA does not permit the denial of ventilator services that
would keep alive an anencephalic baby when those life-saving services would
be
125
otherwise be provided to a baby without disabilities at the parent's request."'
In addition to these statutes, the court looked last at the constitutional and
common law issues surrounding the case. Various issues arose because Baby K's
father and guardian ad litem opposed the continuation of medical treatment and
wanted to override the wishes of the baby's mother. 12 6 The Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause protects a parent's constitutional right to "bring up
children."' 127 In addition, decisions made for children based on a parent's free
exercise of religion are guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 28 Furthering parental rights, parents retain the medical authority to
seek medical care for minor children (even if it impinges on the child's liberty
interest) absent a finding of abuse or neglect.' 29 The court recognized a
presumption that the parents act in the best interests of their child because the
"natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children."' 30
The court pointed to the hospital's failure to provide clear and convincing
evidence that the mother's decision should not be respected because it constituted
severe abuse and neglect. 3' Accordingly, the court denied the hospital's request
for a declaratory judgment that they would not violate the EMTALA, the
Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA. 32 In addition, according to EMTALA and the
Rehabilitation Act, the hospital was required to provide ventilator treatment to

119. In the Matter of Baby "K", supranote 7, at1027.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1028.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1029.
126. Id. at 1030. The guardian atlitem was appointed on the hospitals motion. Id. at 1026.
127. Id. See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
128. Id. See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
129. Id. See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603-04.
130. See Parham, supra note 129, at 602.
131. In the Matter of Baby "K," supra note 7, at 1031. The clear and convincing standard was
upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Cruzan. Cruzan, supra note 24, at 284.
132. See In the Matter of Baby "K," supra note 7, at 1026.
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Baby K. 33
'
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed he judgment of the District
Court and noted that EMTALA, "gives rise to a duty on the part of the hospital to
provide respiratory support to Baby K when she is presented at the Hospital in
respiratory distress and treatment is requested for her."' 3 4 The court refused to
address the hospital's obligations under the other federal statutes and the laws of
35
Virginia because there was a duty to render treatment under EMTALA1
Furthermore, the Court determined "[iut is beyond the limits of our judicial
function to address the moral and ethical propriety36 of providing emergency
stabilizing medical treatment to anencephalic infants." 1
The Court of Appeals specifically addressed the hospital's four arguments,
agreeing with the District Courts analysis of the applicable statutes. 37 First, the
hospital argued that EMTALA required that the hospital provide Baby K the care
that other anenecephalic infants received. 138 The court disagreed and determined
that the Act required the hospital to provide stabilizing treatment regardless of the
condition of the patient. 39 Second, the hospital argued that the Act did not require
medical treatment outside the prevailing standard of care.' 40 The Court disagreed
and determined that the hospital was required to stabilize the child. 14 ' Third, the
Court disagreed with the hospital that it was not required to administer
"inappropriate" care.' 42 Lastly, the hospital argued that EMTALA only applied to
patients who were transferred from the hospital in an unstable condition. 43 The
44
court refused to address the moral and ethical treatment of anencephalic infants.'
On October 3, 1994, the Supreme Court declined to hear the case.145
A. Refusal of Medical Treatment
The U.S. courts differentiate between medical treatment for life-threatening
and non life-threatening situations. A court ordered medical treatment for a child
46
when the parent's religious beliefs forbade them to seek life-saving treatment.
When the illness is not life-threatening, courts differ as to whether treatment will
be ordered over the parent's objections. 147 A parent's refusal of life-saving
133. See In the Matter of Baby "K," supra note 7, at 1026.
134. In the Matter of Baby "K," 16 F.3d 590, 592 (4th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Baby "K"].
135. Id. at n.2.
136. Id. at 598.
137. Id. at 595.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 596.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 597.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 598.
145. Baby "K" v. Ms. H., 513 U.S. 825 (1994) (denying the petitioners writ of certiorari).
146. See Laura M. Plastine, "In God We Trust": When Parents Refuse Medical Treatmentfor their
Children Based Upon their Sincere Religious Beliefs, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L. J.123, 141-42 (1993).
147. Id. at 145.
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medical treatment for a child because of sincere religious beliefs will be overridden
to ensure that a child receives medical treatment.148 In order to override the wish
of the parents, the state must prove that the life-threatening condition can be
addressed by available medical treatment. 49 Courts generally find that the parents
violated child endangerment and neglect statutes and that the state's interest in
saving the child's life is most important. 50
1. United States Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the federal district court in
Jehovah's Witnesses in Washington v. King County Hospital15 without opinion.
In this case, the hospital gave the minor children of Jehovah's Witnesses blood
transfusions pursuant to court orders. 52 The parents brought suit against the
hospital and the doctors seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the behalf of
all Jehovah's Witnesses residing in the state of Washington. 53 The parents argued
that the practice of making their children wards of the state so that they receive
medical care violated their First Amendment rights under the Free Exercise Clause
and their right of religious freedom of association, as well as other guaranteed
Constitutional rights.'14
The Court applied the holding in Prince, stating that claims of religious
liberty do not outweigh public interest. 55 The Court said, "[a]s stated in Prince,
the right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the child to ill
health or death."' 1 56 The court also stated, "[p]arents may be free to become
martyrs themselves.
But it does not follow they are free, in identical
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached 1the
57 age
of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves."'
The Court held, In the Interest ofD.L.E. 58 that "where a minor suffers from a
life-threatening medical condition due to a failure to comply with a program of
medical treatment on religious grounds,.. .permits a finding of dependence and
neglect and does not violate the constitutional provisions protecting the free
exercise of religion."' 159 In this case, the adoptive mother of D.L.E. belonged to the
General Assembly and Church of the First Born and refused medical care for her
148. See People ex. rel. D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982). See also Plastine, supra note 146, at
141-42.
149. See People ex.rel. D.L.E., supra note 148, at 271-273.
150. Plastine, supranote 146, at 142-44.
151. Jehovah's Witnesses in Washington v. King County Hospital, 278 F. Supp. 488 (N.D. Wash.
1967), aft'd,390 U.S. 598 (1968) [hereinafter Jehovah's Witnesses].
152. Id. at 498. The court had authority pursuant to provision of the Juvenile Court Law of the
State of Washington. Id. at 499.
153. Id. at 500.
154. Id.
155. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1943) [hereinafter Prince].
156. Jehovah's Witnesses, supra note 151, at 504 (quoting Prince, supra note 155, at 166).
157. Jehovah's Witnesses, supra note 151, at 504 (quoting Prince, supra note 155, at 170).
158. People ex. rel. D.L.E., supra note 148.
159. Id. at 276.
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son because of her belief that prayer and assistance by church elders would
improve his condition.' 60 D.L.E. experienced a series of epileptic seizures as a
result of brain damage at birth. 16 1 Doctors ordered D.L.E to take Dilantin which
would control his seizures. 62 The doctors determined this was a life-threatening
situation because
without the medication, D.L.E. was in danger of choking during
163
seizure.
a
D.L.E. and his mother challenged the finding that he was a dependent and
neglected child. 164 The Court rejected their claim of a violation of the
constitutional right to Free Exercise of Religion. 16 5 The Court relied on Prince to
hold that a parent's religious beliefs are not without limitations. 166 The Court also
cited Prince where the Supreme Court determined that, "[t]he right to practice
religion freely does not include
the right or liberty to expose the community or the
167
child to ill health or death."'
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in part
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .,,16
In Prince, the Court balanced the rights
of a parent under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment against the
interest of the state in protecting the health and welfare of its children.' 69 Not only
did Prince claim a freedom of religion right, but also a claim to a parental right
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 70 The Court
determined that neither the rights of parenthood nor the rights of religion are
beyond limitation. 17' The Court also rejected Princes' claim of freedom of religion
of her child. 172 There still exists an interest in the welfare and well-being of a child
even if she is exercising her First Amendment freedom of religion right. 73
' The
state has the power to limit parental freedom and authority when it effects the
welfare of the child, even if it includes a matter of religious conviction. 74
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

People ex. rel. D.L.E., supra note 148, at 272.
Id.
Id. at 272. Dilantin is an anti-convulsant medication.
Id.
Id. at 272.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 275-76.
Id. at 276 (referring to Prince, supra note 155).
168. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
169. See Prince, supra note 155. This was an appeal of a conviction for violating Massachusetts
statute regarding child labor laws. Id. at ?. The defendant appealed on the grounds that she was
exercising her religious convictions in accordance with the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. Id. The fact of the case are that Sarah Prince, aunt and at the time of the commitment of
the offenses, the custodian of the nine year old girl, are Jehovah's Witnesses. Id. at 161. The child
violated a statute which prohibited the sale by children of magazines or newspapers in any street or
public place. Id. at 160-61.
170. Id. at 164. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
17 1. Prince, supra note 155, at 166.
172. Id. The Court compared this to a claim by a parent that a child will not be vaccinated on
religious grounds. Id. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
173. See Prince, supranote 155.
174. Id. at 167.
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2. Application to Mary and Jodie

The case of Baby K presents a case very similar to that of Mary. In both
cases neither child had long term prospects for survival.1 75 As noted, Baby K was
76
born without brain function and would likely not live to see her first birthday. 77
Mary's brain did not fully develop and her condition was unlikely to improve.'
Mary's lungs did not function and she had an enlarged heart that did not receive
any blood flow.' 78 On the other hand, the situation of Jodie is comparable to the
cases in which a parent refuses medical treatment because of religious beliefs.
Jodie could be saved with medical treatment. Her parents' religious beliefs
presented two problems. First, they did not believe in killing one child to save the
other. Second, they wanted as little medical treatment as possible, as the girl's fate
should rest in God's hands. 179
In the case of Jodie and Mary, the courts may determine that the right of the
parents to religious freedom may be outweighed by the concern for the welfare of
both children. 8 ° In Mary's case, the concern may be that she be allowed to die
with dignity and not "cause" the death of her sister. 18 ' For Jodie, it is the belief
18 2
that she be allowed to live as the twin with the best chance for survival.
Furthermore, Prince recognizes that when state action impinges on religious
freedom it is appropriate when "shown to be necessary for or conducive to the
child's protection against some clear and present danger."' 18 3 The state could argue
for action because Mary and Jodie face a clear and present danger, namely death.
The Court makes one last important distinction in the Prince case: "Parents
may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free...
to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal
discretion when they can make that choice for themselves."' 84 Jodie and Mary are
not old enough to make a decision about their medical treatment but this does not
mean their parents are free to make them martyrs. 85 It may186be helpful to try to
determine what Jodie and Mary may want if they could speak.
In the cases of Baby K and Jodie, the parents were asked to choose between
medical treatment and their religious beliefs.1 8 7 For most people it is too difficult
"to imagine being confronted with the choice of either complying with the law or
complying with deeply held religious beliefs, with the life of a child hanging in the
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See In the Matter of Baby "K," supra note 7; see Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 817.
See In the Matter of Baby "K," supra note 7.
See Conjoined Twins Case, supra note 4, at 817.
See id.
See id. at 726.

180. See id.
181. See id.
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. Id. at 170.

185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id.; In the Matter of Baby "K", supra note 7.
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balance."1 88 The cases of Baby K and Jodie and Mary can be distinguished. In the
case of Baby K, the mother wanted medical treatment to be continued even though
the doctor deemed it to be futile, as the baby would not recover. The mother
believed that her daughter's life had value and that if it was God's will to perform
a miracle, he would.'8 9 God should decide the moment of death, not the doctors. 90
The mother believed in medical treatment to keep her daughter alive. The parents
of Jodie and Mary wanted as little medical intervention as possible because they
believed that it was God's will that their children were bom conjoined. The central
difference between the two concerns the use or withholding of medical treatment.
V. CONCLUSION

The medical and legal ethics of conjoined twins present an interesting and
controversial debate. On one hand parents should be free to make difficult medical
decisions for their minor children without question by the courts. On the other
hand, if a child can be saved with medical attention, the child should have the
opportunity to receive treatment. The entire situation is complicated by issues of
religion, cost, uncertain outcomes and inherent differences. I fully sympathize
with the parent's difficult decisions. No parent wants to make this difficult
"Sophie's Choice"' 191 type of decision where if one child is not chosen to live then
both die. The situation of Jodie and Mary differs from "Sophie's Choice," in that
the parents had no choice for Mary. With or without medical intervention, Mary
would die. Jodie would die if she was not separated from Mary. The ultimate
choice here is the decision to save one child.
While these decisions are usually left to the parents, there may be situations
where the court can advise doctors about the legality of other options. However,
courts should not make decisions regarding medical care. This should be done by
families and doctors.
One such example of parents' actions without court intervention is the
Lakeburg Twins. 192 Amy and Angela Lakeburg were born on June 29, 1993, at

Loyola University's Chicago Medical Center. 93 The twins shared a six-chamber
heart and a liver, but had separate brains, lungs, kidneys and gastrointestinal
tracts.'94 Congestive heart failure was a major concern because one heart was
supporting both bodies. 195 Neither twin would survive conjoined, but there was a
one percent chance of survival beyond infancy for one twin.196 The twins
188. Plastine, supra note 146, at 124.
189. See In the Matter of Baby "K," supra note 7.
190. Baby "K," supra note 134.
191. See WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE'S CHOICE (1976).
192. See David C. Thomasnia, et. al, The Ethics of Caringfor Conjoined Twins. The Lakeburg
Twins, 26 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 4 (1996).
193. Thomasma, et. al, supra note 192. The parents did not have insurance. See Charles J.
Dougherty, A Life-and-Death Decision: The Lakeburg Twins, 74 HEALTH PROGRESS 16 (1993).
194. Id. SEGAL, supra note 3, at 307.
195. Thomasma et. al., supra note 192, at 5.
196. See Dougherty, supra note 193, at 16. The total bill was at least $500,000. Id.
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presented a major ethical dilemma. Should one twin be sacrificed for another even
if there was little chance either twin would survive? The physicians recommended
against the surgery because of the poor chance for survival and poor quality of
life. 19 7 The mother thought that she "could not live with herself if she did not at
least try to save one life."' 198 In this case, one twin was sacrificed for the other
twin. The doctors choose Angela for life and Amy for death. 199

197. SEGAL, supra note 3, at 308.
198. Thomasma et. al, supra note 192, at 5.
199. Id.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD:
A POSTMODERN FEMINIST RESPONSE TO THE MAILORDER BRIDE INDUSTRY
Kate O'Rourke*
I. INTRODUCTION
There are, of course, attractions for men other than the escape from feminist
values to the traditional, family orientated [sic] females. We all know [P]hilippine
women make perfect wives. In the [Pihilippines wives are very loyal house
wives, As [sic] a mail bride they make excellent mailorder brides for [Almerican
[sic] men ... And the Filipina believes that men must have regular sexual activity.
It is the nature of the beast. It is very unusual for a Filipina wife not to make
herself available for her husband whenever requested: "It's just a natural part of
marriage." She is there, among other things, to be a provider of quality sex.
Headaches are fairly rare!'

The above enticement is just one example of the hundreds of Internet sites
currently facilitating the "mail-order bride" industry.2 The industry has boomed in
recent years, with an estimated 2,700 matchmaking agencies worldwide, 500 of
which can be found in the United States. While much of the recent boom can be
attributed to the Internet, the industry in its modem form emerged as early as the
1970's when one American-based entrepreneur decided to expand his Asian import
business. 4 Although proponents and those who profit from the industry describe
the services provided through these agencies as akin to "pen-pal clubs," the

* Juris Doctor expected May, 2003, University of Denver College of Law. B.A. History/English,
University of Notre Dame, 1998. The author wishes to than Professor Sheila Hyatt for her insight and
encouragement throughout the writing of this article.
1. Homepage of www.hyman.ca, a website featuring access to Filipina "mail-order brides," as
well as pictures of deflowered hymens (last visited May 29, 2002).
2. A search for "mail-order bride" at www.google.com, on May 29, 2002, produced 55,500 hits.
41 of the first 50 hits were links to introduction agencies, or informational sites on the mail-order bride
process. Additionally, one informational site contains links to a total of 270 Intemet sites promoting
mail-order bride services. See www.aarens.com (last visited May 29, 2002).
3. See Linda Kelly, MarriageFor Sale: The Mail-Order Bride Industry and the Changing Value
of Marriage,5J. GENDER RACE& JUST. 175, 177 (Fall 2001).
4. See Christine S.Y. Chun, The Mail-OrderBride Industry: The Perpetuationof Transnational
Economic Inequalities and Stereotypes, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1155, 1160 (Winter 1996)("The
modem mail-order bride industry began with entrepreneurs like John Broussard, an importer of Oriental
bowls and vases, who in 1974 decided to diversify his practice by marketing foreign women").
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industry has faced heavy criticism, described by one author as "rel[ying] on
stereotypes and transnational economic inequalities to support a profit-making
commercial market[,] .. nurtur[ing] structures of subordination based on race,
sex, and class within countries, among nations, and between individuals. 5
This paper will analyze the industry, including its current legal framework,
through the lens of postmodern feminist legal theory. Part II provides a broad
overview of the emergence of the mail-order bride industry, including the factors
that perpetuate its existence, the interplay between feminism and international law,
and the legal responses to the industry, focusing on the United States and the
Philippines. Part III will analyze the postmodern feminist response to the industry
as a social phenomenon and to the deficiencies in its legal framework. Finally,
Part IV concludes that a more comprehensive approach to the industry is required,
one that allows for an integrated, multilateral response to both supply and demand
and that recognizes both the beneficial and harmful causes and effects of the
industry.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

A. The Mail-OrderBride Industry

1. How It Works
While opponents of the industry tend to characterize the process by which
women in developing nations end up marrying Western men through the services
of an agency as comparable to prostitution,6 and defenders of the industry
characterize the service as facilitating "pen-pal clubs," 7 the reality lies somewhere
in between these two poles (at least as far as the superficial processes and
operations are concerned). 8
The bridal agencies initiate the process, primarily utilizing newspaper and
magazine advertisements to recruit potential brides. 9 Agencies have focused their
recruitment efforts heavily in Asia, and the Philippines in particular, with a shift
toward Russia and other Eastern block countries in the years following the fall of

5. Chun supra note 4,at 1156.
6. See Donna R. Lee, Mail Fantasy: Global Sexual Exploitation in the Mail-Order Bride
Industry and Proposed Legal Solutions, 5 AsIAN L.J. 139, 154 (May 1998) (discussing the industry as
"a form of prostitution legitimized by the private institution of marriage.").
7. See Lee supra note 6 id. at 142.
8. There is significant evidence that some of the agencies claiming to provide simple
matchmaking services are actually fronts for the international sex trade, and lure unsuspecting women
from developing nations into lives as sex slaves in the Western world. See, e.g., Susan W. Tiefenbrun,
Sex Sells But Drugs Don't Talk: Trafficking of Women Sex Workers, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 199, 21011 (2001). However, for the purposes of this paper, I will limit my analysis to those agencies providing
"legitimate" mail-order bride services.
9. See Chun, supra note 4, at 1161.
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the Soviet Union.' 0 One report estimates "that between 100,000 and 150,000
women from a variety of countries (including the United States, Canada, Europe
and Australia) annually advertise themselves as available for marriage.""
Throughout the recruitment process, agencies weed out those women not deemed
attractive enough to land a potential husband.' 2 The agencies, after screening and
selecting the women, generally assign them a number and include their full-body3
photographs or headshots in either printed magazines or online catalogs.'
Additionally, women are required to provide personal information, ranging from
their physical measurements, to personal interests (frequently cooking), breast size,
and underwear preference. 14
Having stocked their magazine brochures or online catalogs with available
women, usually focusing on a particular part of the world, the agencies next direct
their energies toward attracting potential customers. Agencies provide varying
degrees of service, but typical features include providing the mailing addresses and
phone numbers of the women, additional biographical information, visa and
immigration consultation, and even letter-writing on behalf of the male client.' 5 In
addition to the initial screening process, some agencies provide their male clients
with further evaluation tools, ranging from private investigators to clinical
psychologists.16 Of course, these services are provided in exchange for fees, with
agencies offering both A la carte and package deals on the services
many of the
7
available. 1
The most profitable service provided by the agency is the guided tour, usually
purchased by a client after he has conducted correspondence with a number of
women in a given country.'" The agency's package tour generally includes airfare
and hotel, marriage contracts and paperwork, low-cost wedding arrangements, and
social parties, some with female-to-male ratios approaching 2,000 available
women for every twelve male customers.' 9 At the end of the day, the men using
agencies to find a foreign wife may end up spending anywhere between $3,000 and
$10,000.20

10. See Robert J. Scholes, The "Mail Order Bride" Industry and ItsImpact on US. Immigration,
at 2, Appendix A, in INTERNATIONAL MATCHMAKING ORGANIZATIONS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (a
study conducted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in response to a Congressional request
under Section 652 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
[hereinafter
IIRIRA]),
available at
http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/repsstudies/
mobrept_full.pdt\ (last visited July 22, 2001).
11. Id.
12. See Chun, supra note 4, at 1162.
13. See id at 1163.
14. See Lee, supra note 6, at 144.
15. See Lee, supra note 6,at 147.
16. See Chun, supra note 4, at 1183-84.
17. See Lee, supra note 6, at 147.
18. See id.
at 148.
19. See id.;
see also Kelly, supra note 3, at 178.
20. See Chun, supra note 4, at 1167.
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2. Who Uses the Service?
Descriptions of the men who seek wives through the mail-order bride services
vary little from source to source. One survey of American men, conducted in
1998, produced the following data: a median age of 37, where ninety-four percent
were white; fifty percent had two or more years of college, while less than one
percent lacked high school diplomas; fifty-seven percent had been married at least
once before; and seventy-five percent hoped to father children through the mailorder marriage. 2' Additionally, the men surveyed were, for the most part,
politically and ideologically conservative and financially successful.22 The
primary motivation for seeking a foreign wife tends to be a sense of frustration and
dissatisfaction with the "liberated" Western woman, who is far too aggressive,
selfish, and focused on her own career, combined with a belief that a foreign
woman, particularly one from a less developed nation, will be more loyal and
devoted to her husband's needs.23 This underlying expectation builds the potential
for a major disappointment in the "delivered product," as the women who use these
services may have completely different expectations of their Western marriage.24
The women who enlist through these agencies do so for a variety of factors.
First, many women seek escape from the developing world, where job and
educational opportunities are limited for men and virtually non-existent for
women.2 5 Additionally, the factor most often cited by the women themselves is an
attraction to the "American Man. ' 26 Many of these women are raised in nations
where violence toward women goes unchallenged, and has even been tacitly
condoned by the State.27 Women in both Russia and the Philippines have
expressed dissatisfaction with the men from their own countries, along with 28a
belief that American men will treat their wives better and will be more faithful.
Notably, many of the foreign women have based their opinions of Western men on
the fantasy-like images created through books and movies, and may therefore be
disappointed by the reality they face upon arrival in the United States, or some
other Western nation.29

21. See Scholes, supra note 10, at 4.
22. See id.
23. See id; see Chun, supra note 4, at 1176-77; see Lee, supra note 6, at 145.
24. See notes 25 to 29 and accompanying discussion, infra.
25. See Scholes, supra note 10, at 3.
26. See id.
27. See Tifany E. Markee, A Callfor Cultural Understanding in the Creation, Interpretation and
Application of Law: Is the United States Meeting the Needs of Russian Immigrant "Mail-Order
Brides?", 31 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 277,281 (2001).
28. See Markee supra note 27.; see Chun, supra note 4, at 1175-76.
29. See Chun, supra note 4, at 1175.
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3. Mail-Order Bride Industry: A Perpetual Motion Machine
a. Economic Factors
The underlying force driving the entire industry is global economic
inequality. Both the wealth of the consumer's country and the poverty of the
bride's country are necessary elements to the equation. The wealthy male of the
developed nation has both the power and the financial ability to "buy" a wife,
while the potential bride has an incentive to leave her impoverished nation for the
higher standard of living available in a developed nation.30
The primary "supply" countries for the mail-order bride industry, particularly
the Philippines, have been plagued by economic and political instability, thereby
creating high levels of poverty and unemployment. 3 1 These economic woes have
created a "push" on the Filipinas, who see foreign marriage as a very real solution
to their plight.32 Agencies have responded to, and nurtured, this desire for escape
by setting up shop in the impoverished nations. The nation itself then comes to
rely on this micro-economic escape route - completing the cycle and ensuring its
success for years to come. In fact, the Philippine government has had a longstanding tradition of encouraging the exportation of its women as Overseas
Contract Workers (OCW's) in order to boost its domestic economy.33 It is this
interdependency of economic factors that makes the industry such a difficult beast
for any single country to tame.
b. Racial and Sexual Stereotypes
Economic factors alone did not create the mail-order bride industry. The
intersection of racial and sexual subordination plays a significant role in shaping
and perpetuating the industry. Particularly in the Philippines, the historical
"military sexual colonialism" has permeated the relationship between the
American male and the Filipina, establishing the notion of the Asian woman as
sexually available to the American man.34 The Philippine's legacy as a sexual
colony remains despite the passing of the Vietnam War era, when roughly 10,000
American soldiers daily sought entertainment in the Philippines.35 Indeed, the sex
industry persists at the former locations of U.S. military bases, although mostly
civilian tourists use the services today.36
The notion of the Asian woman as sexually available to the white American

See Chun, supra note 4, at 1170.
See id. at 1173; see Lee, supra note 6, at 143.
See Lee, supra note 6, at 141.
See INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S RIGHTS ACTION WATCH, COUNTRY REPORT ON THE
PHILIPPINES [IWRAW REPORT] at 6, available at http://www.igc.org/iwraw/publications/countries/
philippines.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
34. See Lee, supra note 6, at 143.
35. See IWRAW REPORT, supra note 33, at 3-4.
36. See id. at 4.
30.
31.
32.
33.
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man did not emerge solely overseas. Asian women have been imported into
America both as "picture brides" 3 7 and as prostitutes since the 1800's.38 The focus
on the intersection of race and sexuality in the American psyche, as well as the
notion that Asian women are inherently sexual, was evident even then as
prostitution laws specifically targeted the Asian prostitutes over those of other
ethnicities.39
B. Governmental & InternationalResponses to the Industry

1. International Law: The United Nations and The Plight of Women

a. Feminism and International Law

Historically, feminist legal theorists, particularly those writing in North
America, paid little attention to the arena of international law in their scholarship.4
According to one article, if patriarchy, and its inherent male referent, has formed
the basis for all political structures of the Western world, then its role in the
international legal community is exponentially greater:
Our approach requires looking behind the abstract entities of states to the actual
impact of rules on women within states. We argue that both the structures of
international lawmaking and the content of the rules of international law privilege
marginalized.
men; if women's interests are acknowledged at
4 1 all, they are

International law is a thoroughly gendered system.

The international community has its own structure of subordination, where
the capitalist, developed countries of the Western world create the institutions, and
spell out the rules, which govern the global community - particularly the

37. The "picture bride" is in some ways the precursor to the modem mail-order bride industry.
The tradition differs greatly, however, in that such relationships were almost universally arranged by
the families in the couple's homeland. See Chun, supranote 4, at 1157-58.
38. See id.
at 1178.
39. Chun, supranote 4, at 1178,.; see also, Lee, supra note 6.
40. See generally, Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelly Wright, FeministApproaches
to InternationalLaw, 85 AMER. J. INT'L. L. 613 (Oct. 1991). Much of this section is based upon the
discussion and analysis conducted by Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright as to the scarcity of feminist
criticism of international law. However, the arena of international law has transformed greatly in the
decade since their article, with a great deal more attention being paid by the intemational legal
community to the plight of women throughout the world. Accordingly, much more feminist scholarship
has emerged to correspond with this new attention. In addition to the several articles regarding the
mail-order bride industry and the trafficking of women cited in this article, see generally, e.g., Meri
Melissi Hartley-Blecic, The Invisible Woman: The Taliban's Oppression of Women in Afghanistan, 7
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 553 (Spring 2001); Adrien Katherine Wing, Polygamyfrom Southern Africa
to Black Britanniato Black America; GlobalCriticalRace Feminism as Legal Reform for the TwentyFirst Century, II J. CONTEMP.LEGAL ISSUES 811 (2001).
41. Charlesworth, supranote 40, at 614-15.
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developing nations of the world.42
In this way, the subordinate status of
developing nations has been analogized to the position of women, as "[b]oth
groups are said to encounter the paternalist attitude that they must be 43
properly
trained to fit into the world of developed countries and men, respectively.
Notably, within the developing nations, the oppressive nature of patriarchy
can be even more extreme than in Western nations, particularly in nations where
fundamentalist regimes retain political, religious and cultural power. 44 For the
women living in the developing nations, from which most mail-order brides
emerge, the dilemma of being a woman directly intersects with the dilemma of
living in the developing world; their needs are ignored by their own State and by
the international community. Moreover, Western feminists, whose specific needs
rarely overlap with those of Developing world women, tend to oversimplify, or
completely ignore, the unique plight of women in developing nations.45 It is within
this triple-bind that the mail-order bride industry must be analyzed.
In recent decades, the United Nations has played a pivotal role in addressing
the situation of women, both within their respective nations and within a global
context. Since its inception, the UN has officially recognized the importance of
women's rights; Article 8 of the UN Charter explicitly allowed for the participation
of women in the organization.46
Moreover, in recent decades the UN has
spearheaded efforts to evaluate and improve the various problems facing women
worldwide. The following discussion highlights two such efforts.
b. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW)
The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) represented the first comprehensive treaty on women's
rights.47 Based on a conviction "that the full and complete development of a
country, the welfare of the world and the cause of peace requires the maximum
participation of women on equal terms with men in all fields, 48 the Convention
defines "discrimination against women" as:
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise
by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,

42. Charlesworth, supranote 40, at 616.
43. Id. at618.
44. See generally Purva Desphande, The Role of Women in Two Islamic Fundamentalist
Countries: Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, 22 WOMEN'S RTS. L.REP. 193 (Spring 2001).

45. See Charlesworth, supra note 40, at 619.
46. See UN CHARTER, art. 8.

47. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
[hereinafter CEDAW], availableat htip://untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyEvent200l/l .htm.
48. See id. at Preamble.
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49
social, cultural, civil or any other field.

CEDAW, in pursuing an end to this discrimination, urges parties to refrain
from discriminatory practices, adopt affirmative measures providing legal
protection for women, and "take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to
modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which
constitute discrimination against women." 50 CEDAW seeks to ensure equal
educational opportunities, 5 ' equal access to health care, 52 and freedom of
reproductive choices for women.53
While CEDAW is admirable in its goals, it lacks concrete guidance as to what
kinds of cultural practices might be construed as discriminatory. Additionally, the
allowance of reservations renders the document virtually worthless, as it is those
countries with the most overt oppressive practices that use reservations to limit
their liability. With approximately one hundred reservations, made by over 40 of
the 105 parties to the original convention, nations have been able to limit their
54
obligations in order to reflect their existing religious and cultural practices.
Typical reservations have concerned inheritance and property rights, nationality55
laws, and laws limiting economic opportunities and freedom of movement.
Moreover, Article 6 of the convention ordered parties "to suppress all forms of
in women," but failed to define
traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution
56
precisely what activities constitute "trafficking."
c. Protocol on Trafficking in Persons
In November of 2000, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (hereinafter Protocol
on Trafficking) was established.57 The purpose of the Protocol on Trafficking was
twofold: first, it sought to prevent, investigate and prosecute those guilty of
trafficking; second, it sought to protect victims of trafficking.5 8 The Protocol also
created the first common international definition of "trafficking in persons,"
defining it as:
the recruitment, transportation, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the

49. See CEDAW, supra note 47, at art. 1.
50. See id. at art. 2.
51. See id. atart. 10.
52. Id. at art. 12.
53. See id. at art. 16.
54. See Charlesworth, supra note 40, at 633.
55. See id.
56. See CEDAW, supra note 47, at art. 6.
57. See Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
[hereinafter Protocol on Trafficking], available at http://untreaty.un.org/EnglishfTreatyEvent200l/
17.htm.
58. See id. at art. 2(a-b).
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threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving
or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of the person having
control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall
include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms
of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to
slavery, servitude
or the removal of organs... The consent of a victim.., shall
59
be irrelevant.
The Protocol on Trafficking calls for an integration of States' efforts to track
and investigate the trafficking industry 6 and for international cooperation in
protecting and, where necessary, repatriating victims. 6 1 This definition may well
apply to certain segments within the mail-order bride industry, as the power
dynamic and vulnerability of many of the women involved has been demonstrated
above. 2 Additionally, the efforts to integrate information exchange and training
and to ensure cooperation in placing victims' interests as a top priority may present
the most comprehensive possible approach to the transnational aspect of the mailorder bride industry, at least in its most exploitative forms.
2.United States Immigration Law

a. Early Efforts: Consumer Protectionism
Congress was slow to respond to the emerging mail-order bride industry; its
first substantive efforts came only in the 1980's in response to concerns of
marriage fraud.63 Until the passage of the 1986 Immigration Fraud Amendments
(IMFA), the spouse of a United States citizen achieved permanent residency status
with little delay or investigation. 64 However, one particular incident illustrated the
emerging fears that the American male was falling prey to the industry. Professor
Lisa Ikemoto's article, Male Fraud, describes a scam whereby one man, Chris
Barnes, created a fictional single Asian female, "Velma," who sought
correspondence and a possible relationship with an American man. 6 5 The scam
conned some 400 men into sending a total of $280,000, and resulted in
correspondence with over 8,500 interested men."
The reaction of both Congress and the Immigration and Nationalization
Service (INS) was a desire to protect men from falling prey not only to these

59.
60.
61.
62.
operated
agencies
63.
64.
65.
66.

See Protocol on Trafficking, supra note 57, at art. 3(a-b).
See id. at art. 9-10.
See id. at art.6-8.
However, the definition also includes a requirement that the trafficking be controlled and
by organized crime, thereby preventing its application to the majority of the mail-order bride
operating today. See id. at art. 4.
See Lisa C. Ikemoto, Male Fraud,3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 511, 534-35 (Spring 2000).
See Scholes, supra note 10, at 10.
See Ikemoto, supranote 63, at 514.
See id. at 511-12.
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scams, but also to the greedy foreign woman who does not actually wish to be a
wife, but will leave her new American husband immediately upon achieving
permanent residency status.67 Notably, neither Congress nor the INS seemed
particularly concerned about the commodification of the women through the
industry, or about the potential for abuse faced by foreign women in a strange land;
in their 68
view, "the 'purchaser' who has been abandoned by his 'purchase' is the
victim.
The IMFA responded to these concerns by making the green card process
much more complicated and drawn out. Upon marrying a foreign person, the
American citizen had to petition for "conditional resident status" for his or her
spouse.69 Following the subsequent two-year waiting period, during which the
couple must remain married, the couple could jointly petition for an adjustment of
status from conditional to permanent. 70 The INS then conducted an7 investigation
into the legitimacy of the marriage before granting permanent status. '
The most problematic part of this process in the mail-order bride context is
that it further increased the power disparity within the couple: the foreign bride not
only became financially and culturally dependent upon her spouse, but also found
that her legal status was within his complete control. She was able to petition for a
change in her status only with his cooperation, and any effort on her part to revoke
the marriage subjected her to the dangerous prospect of becoming an illegal
resident.
Noting these problems, and the high incidence of domestic violence within
such marriages, Congress passed a subsequent amendment in 1990 that allowed for
a waiver of the spouse's cooperation if the immigrant spouse was able to allege
and prove by sufficient evidence that she had suffered battery and extreme cruelty
within her marriage.72 These additional requirements placed an unrealistic burden
on a foreign wife in an abusive relationship. For the most part, such women lack
the financial independence and access to legal advice and information necessary to
satisfy such requirements.73 Additionally, the very act of seeking immigration
relief, thereby threatening the American man's domination, can be a potentially
deadly decision for a battered immigrant wife.
b. Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)
Recognizing the continuing dangers facing battered foreign wives, President

67. See Ikemoto, supra note 63, at 534-35.
68. Patricia Cain, Privileges and Stereotypes: A Commentary, 3 J.GENDER RACE & JUST. 659,
666 (Spring 2000).
69. See 8 U.S.C.1186(a) (1986), Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 at Section 2,
amending Section 216 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
70. See Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 at 1186(c)-(d).
71. See id.
72. See 8 U.S.C. 1186(c)(4) (1990), Immigration Act of 1990 at Section 701, amending the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 216(c)(4).
73. See Chun, supra note 4, at 1197-98.
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Clinton signed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in 1994. 74 Although
75
the act allows an immigrant spouse to file for adjustment of status independently,
the spouse must still demonstrate affirmatively her good moral character,76 her
good faith upon entering into the marriage,77 that she has been a victim of abuse or
extreme cruelty while with her husband, 78 and that extreme hardship would result
if she were to be deported. 79 Additionally, the requirement that the couple be
married at the time of the application, and the suspicion raised by a VAWA
application filed too quickly, further disadvantaged the petitioner.80
The numbers tell the story of VAWA's initial failure. Of the 1,000 wives
seeking immigration relief under VAWA in 1996, only 27 were granted relief.8' A
s2
year later, only 178 of the 2,500 applicants obtained relief through VAWA.
VAWA did little in its initial years to relieve the burden placed upon the battered
foreign wife seeking to avoid deportation. Ultimately, however, after the
publication of interim VAWA regulations in 1996, relief came. s 3 In fact, between
the release of the interim regulations and July of 2000, the INS approved over
6,500 of the 11,000 plus VAWA self-petitions it received. 4 Congress recognized
this glimmer of potential, and aimed to improve and expand the relief to the
thousands of remaining applicants unable to avail themselves of VAWA's
protection when it passed the Victims Protection Act of 2000,85 discussed below.
c. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)
Between the passage of VAWA and its subsequent expansion in 2000,
Congress for the first time expressly acknowledged the existence of the mail-order
bride industry.
The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) represents the first law to specifically address the
industry and its presence in the United States. 6 The law made the following
significant recognitions regarding the industry:
1. There is a substantial "mail-order bride" business in the United States.
With approximately 200 companies in the United States, an estimated
2,000 to 3,500 men in the United States find wives through mail-order
74. See 8 U.S.C. 1154 (1994), 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
75. See id. at 1154(a)(1)(C)(iii).
76. See id.

77. See id. at 1154(a)(1)(C)(1).
78. See id.
79. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act at 1154(a)(1)(C)(I1).
80. See Markee, supra note 27, at 290-91.

81. See id. at291.
82. See id.
83. See House Subcommittee Considers Measure to Enhance VA WA Protectionsfor Immigrants,
77 No. 28 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1009, 1011 (July 24,2000).

84. See id.
85. See Trafficking Victims Protection act of 2000, 106 Pub. L. 386, Enacted H.R. 3244
[hereinafter Victims Protection Act].
86. See Chun, supranote 4, at 1201.
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bride catalogs each year...
2.

The companies engaged in the mail-order bride business earn substantial
profits.

3.

Although many of these mail-order marriages work out, in many other
cases, anecdotal evidence suggests that mail-order brides find
themselves in abusive relationships. There is also evidence to suggest
that a substantial number of mail-order marriages are fraudulent under
United States Law.

4.

Many mail-order brides come to the United States unaware or ignorant
of United States immigration law. Mail-order brides who are battered
often think that if they flee an abusive marriage, they will be deported.
Often the citizen spouse threatens to have them deported if they report
the abuse.

5.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service estimates that the rate of
marriage fraud between foreign nationals and United States citizens or
aliens lawfully admitted for residence is 8 percent. It is unclear what
percentage 87 of these marriage fraud cases originate as mail-order
marriages.

Despite these significant findings, the actual response included in the IIRIA
was fairly limited. Rather than restricting or seriously regulating the agencies,
Congress merely required that bridal agencies provide the foreign women with
access to information regarding the legal implications of a mail-order marriage
"including information regarding conditional permanent status and the battered
spouse waiver under such status, permanent resident status, marriage fraud
penalties, [and] the unregulated nature of the business engaged in by such
organizations. 8 Failure to comply with these requirements may result in a fine of
up to $20,000 per violation for the agency. 89 The act's other key provision
directed the Attorney General and the INS to conduct a study of the mail-order
bride industry and its presence in the United States. 9°
IIRIRA, although significant in its recognition of the extensiveness of the
mail-order bride industry, did little to improve the situation for foreign brides
arriving in America. In fact, IIRIRA tacitly condones the nature of the industry by
not only failing to regulate it, but by merely requiring agencies to inform the
women of its unregulated nature. 9'

87. See 8 U.S.C. 1375(a), Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
[hereinafter IIRIRA].
88. See IIRIRA at (b)(l).
89. See id.
at (b)(2)(A).

90. See id. at (c)-(d). The report, supra note 10, was released in 1998.
91. See Chun, supra note 4, at 1202.
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d. Victims Protection Act (VAWA 2000)
The most recent legislative effort at improving the situation of a battered
foreign woman appeared in October 2000, in the Battered Immigrant Women
Protection Act of 2000 (Title V of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000).92 The law included the following significant findings:
[Tihe goal of the immigration protections for battered immigrants included in the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 was to remove immigration laws as a
barrier that kept battered immigrant women and children locked in abusive
relationships.. [T]here are several groups of battered immigrant women and
children who do not have access to the immigration protections of the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 which means that their abusers are virtually immune
from prosecution because their victims can be deported as a result of action by
their abusers and the Immigration and Naturalization Service cannot
offer them
93
protection no matter how compelling their case under existing law.
Based on these findings, Congress sought to expand VAWA's protection by
removing barriers to criminal prosecution for such abusers 94 and by improving
access to immigration protections for battered immigrant women. 95 First,
Congress eased requirements for a battered immigrant woman seeking to selfpetition for legal status. Such women can apply for VAWA relief even the
marriage was never legally valid, if she was never beaten while in the United
96
States, and even if her husband had died, been deported, or divorced her.
Additionally, Congress eliminated the "extreme hardship" showing requirement
for the self-petitioning battered immigrant woman. 97 The removal of this
requirement for self-petitioners should have a dramatic effect, as this has typically
been the most difficult requirement to satisfy. 98 Frequently, immigration judges, in
their discretion, have found that the hardship demonstrated relates only to the
typical hardships associated with deportation, rather than any special or extreme
hardship particular to deportation for a battered immigrant woman. 99
Unfortunately, for those battered immigrant women that seek cancellation or
suspension of deportation, but against whom deportation proceedings have already
begun, the "extreme hardship" showing must still be satisfied.'00

92. See Victims Protection Act, supra note 85.
93. See id. at Sec. 1502(a).
94. See id. at Sec. 1502(b)(1).
95. See id. at Sec. 1503.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See Sarah Ignatius and Elisabeth S. Stickney, Immigration Law and the Family, § 4:61.
99. See Ignatius and Elisabeth S. Stickney supra note 98..
100. See Victims Protection Act, supra note 85, at Sec. 1504(a), 8 U.S.C. 1229(b)(2). For a good
discussion of the significance of the extreme hardship requirement, see generally Leila Rothwell,
VA WA 2000's Retention of the "Extreme Hardship" Standardfor Battered Women in Cancellation of
Removal Cases: Not Your Typical Deportation Case, 23 U. HAw. L. REv. 555 (Spring 2001). For
advice on how to satisfy the "extreme hardship" requirement, see Ignatius & Stickney, supra note 98, at
§ 12:32.
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Despite these expanded protections, significant problems for the battered
immigrant spouse persist. Evidentiary requirements are still hazy, allowing for
significant discretion on the part of the immigration judge. They still place
0
affirmative burdens on the battered wife before relief will become available.' '
The precarious nature of filing for VAWA relief remains, as the battered woman
must choose between remaining in the abusive relationship or risking denial of
relief from the government, as well as retaliatory violence from the husband if she
seeks government relief.'0 2 Ultimately, mail-order brides in America face
significant cultural and legal obstacles:
Overall, the VAWA law exemplifies a system-wide indifference to the cultural
nuances of domestic violence, and places the bride at the mercy of a new
dominator, the government. It forces a battered woman to leave before she may
be logistically and emotionally prepared, and places her in a position in which she
must be rid of her mate before she can knock at the government's door. Certainly,
the act of leaving is a threat to the batterer, one that 'reflects his loss of power and
separation assault a very real danger, one
control over his spouse,' thus making
03
that is known and documented.'
3. The Philippines: Futile Efforts to Tame the Industry

a. Economic Conditions
The Philippines is the perfect supply country for the mail-order bride industry
14
due largely to its political and economic instability. 0 With a population of nearly
83 million people, forty-one percent living below the poverty line, the economy
continues to struggle.' 0 5 Consequently, the Philippine economy has relied upon the
export of its people, with 4.2 million overseas workers sending home their earnings
as of 1997.1°6 In 1994, sixty percent of overseas contract workers were women, an

understandable statistic considering a report that "women workers in the
Philippines earn only thirty percent of what male workers earn for similar
work."'10 7 Despite the government's traditional role in encouraging such
migration, 'O in recent years the government has taken a new approach to the
situation. The June 1995 Republic Act 8042 makes the protection of overseas
101. See Markee, supra note 27, at 293.
102. See id.at 293-94.
103. See id.at 294.

104. For a general discussion on the political and economic status, as well as the situation of the sex

trade, of the Philippines as of January 1997, see IWRAW REPORT, supra note 33.
105. See CIA WORLD FACTBOOK COUNTRY REPORT [hereinafter CIA REPORT], available at
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rp.html (last visited July 22, 2002).
106. See IWRAW REPORT, supra note 33.
107. See id.
108. See Sean Parlan, Mail-Order Brides, in PACIFIC RIM MAGAZINE ONLINE, available at
www.langara.bc.ca/prm/2001/mailorderbrides.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2002). See also IWRAW
REPORT, supra note 33, discussing a govemment-endorsed career manual highlighting the minimal
requirements for becoming an overseas performing artist.
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workers a priority, and explicitly rejects the promotion of overseas workers as a
means of supporting the Philippine economy. 10 9 Despite these efforts, economic
instability persists and large numbers of Filipinos, particularly women, continue to
emigrate in search of work.
b. Legal Response to the Mail-Order Bride Industry
In addition to discouraging the migration of Philippine workers, the
Philippine government has actively sought to eradicate the mail-order bride
industry. In 1990, the Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 6955, which
declared unlawful the mail-order bride industry and similar practices.11 This Act
represented the government's intent "to protect Filipino women from being
exploited in utter disregard of human dignity in their pursuit of economic
upliftment."'
The government followed this legislation with several other acts
intended to improve conditions for Filipinas, including acts that expanded the
existing definition of rape, 12 established crisis centers for rape victims," 3 declared
sexual harassment in the workplace unlawful," 4 and, in 1999, passed several acts
aimed at defining, preventing, and punishing acts of domestic violence against
women. 115

Despite the Filipino government's efforts to improve conditions for Filipinas
at home and to outlaw the mail-order bride industry from within, Filipinas continue
to marry foreigners through these matchmaking agencies in huge numbers - as
many as 2,000 annually according to one recent report. 1 6 A significant obstacle to
enforcing the ban on the mail-order bride industry is the fact that many of the most
prominent agencies are actually based outside the Philippines, particularly in the
United States." 7 Recently, government officials, including Philippine Senate
Majority Leader Loren Legarda, have called for action against any firms with
partners or agents based in the Philippines. "l 8 Senator Legarda has also called for
amendments to strengthen the Anti-Mail-Order Bride Law, perhaps by designating

109. See IWRAW REPORT, supra note 33.
110. See Republic Act No. 6955 [RA. 6955], available at http://www.preda.org/resolution/
repact.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
111. Id. at Sec. 1.
112. See Republic Act No. 8353, The Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
113. See Republic Act No. 8505, Rape Victim Assistance and Protection Act of 1998.
114. See Republic Act No. 7322, 1992.
115. See Senate Bill No. 292, An Act Defining Domestic Violence, Providing Penalties therefore
[sic] and providing for protection orders, Senate Bill No. 527 - An Act to provide a comprehensive
program against wife cruelty, increasing penalties for offenders thereof and for other purposes, and
Senate Bill No. 1458 - An Act defining the crime of abuse of women in intimate relationships,
prescribing penalties therefore, providing for protective measures for victims and for other purposes,
availableat http://www.philwomen.net/senate/news.htm (last visited July 22, 2002).
116. See 2,000 Pinays sign up with mail-order-bride agenciesyearly, MANILA TIMES, Jan. 14,
2002, available at http://www.manilatimes.net/national2002/jan/14/top_stories/20020114top6.html

(last visited July 22, 2002).
117. See MANILA TIMES supra note 116.
118. See id.
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an agency dedicated to the execution of the law."19 The failure of the Philippine
government's outright ban on the industry to slow the outflow of mail-order brides
from the country affirmatively demonstrates the need for multilateral cooperation
in order to truly address the situation.
III. POSTMODERN FEMINST RESPONSE TO THE MAIL-ORDER BRIDE INDUSTRY
In determining what the potential postmodern response would be to the mailorder bride industry, it is first necessary to understand the premises and ideals upon
which postmodern feminism is based. Accordingly, the following analysis will
provide a general overview of postmodern feminism, including a discussion of the
postmodem responses to prostitution and marriage, by way of example, before
moving on to the postmodern critique of the mail-order bride industry.
A. The Postmodernfeminist Agenda
The postmodem feminist approach is largely deconstructive - it focuses on
picking apart commonly held notions to uncover the underlying forces that shape
our understanding of who we are and of what surrounds us.' 20 The postmodem
feminist views the individual as "formed within systems of social relations, and...
gender hierarchy [as] reproduc[ing] itself through the identities and desires formed
within these systems."'' 2 A postmodem approach rejects essentialism - an
approach toward women that treats all women as suffering from, or enjoying, the
same basic condition - in favor of a more diverse understanding of the various
factors determining an individual woman's identity. 122 Key factors in shaping an
identity include not only gender, but race, class, age and local/national culture as
well.123

The primary objective of postmodern feminist theory is a broader, more
complex understanding of gender identity and the forces that create the individual.
Although the postmodern approach has been criticized for its focus on theoretical
debate, as opposed to concrete, legal and political objectives, 124 some recent

119. See MANILA TMEs supra note 116.
120. See generally Mary Joe Frug, A PostmodernFeminist Legal Manifesto (An UnfinishedDrafi),
105 HARv. L. REV. 1045 (March 1992).
121. Maxine Eichner, On Postmodern feminist Legal Theory, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.REv. I, 6
(Winter 2001).
122. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender Law, 1 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1 (1994).
See also Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REV. 829, 877 (February 1990)
(noting that the postmodem critique "rejects essentialist thinking as it insists that the subject, including
the female subject, has no core identity but rather is constituted through multiple structures and
discourses that in various ways overlap, intersect, and contradict each other." Id.)
123. See generally Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581 (February 1990).
124. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 687 (2000). MacKinnon specifically asks, "What is postmodemism's project? How linear, how
teleological, how serious. To whom and what is it accountable? I say it is accountable to academic
hierarchy. Who else can afford this theory?" Id. at 710. But see Mary Ellen Gale, Calling in the Girl
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scholarship has set forth a revised postmodem agenda that seeks to put the theory
into practice. Maxine Eichner has proposed a more aggressive approach based on
four crucial propositions. First, Eichner reiterates the postmodern premise that
power relations are reproduced through social relations. Second, Eichner proposes
an agenda that seeks "more fluid notions of gender identity that are less closely
linked to a particular sex."' 125 Third, Eichner cautions against embracing all
differences among women, but instead urges that differences be examined to
26
uncover any power imbalances or oppression that may be producing them.1
Finally, Eichner sets forth her most concrete objective: that of material equality, a
condition necessary for the true valuation of differences. 127 Based upon these
propositions, Eichner seeks to uncover and eliminate material and cultural
inequalities through both legal and social action. 128
1. Postmodern Feminism & Prostitution
The postmodern approach to prostitution has significantly opened up the
The approach has transformed the
feminist debate regarding prostitution.
prostitution debate from its traditional "women as autonomous beings freely
choosing a profession" versus "women as perpetual victim of economic and sexual
exploitation" dichotomy to one recognizing the broad spectrum of factors that have
prompted women to become prostitutes, including both free agency and
victimization. 129 Moreover, Shannon Bell has stressed the value of understanding
and incorporating the various experiences of the prostitute into the feminist
discourse in order to broaden our understanding of women's experience and
ourselves. 130
Additionally, Mary Joe Frug shifted the debate's focus onto the role of the
law in sexualizing the female body, noting the impact of criminalization not only
on prostitutes themselves, but on all women: "This sexualization of the female
body explains an experience many women have: an insistent concern that this
outfit, this pose, this gesture may send the wrong signal - a fear of looking like a

Scouts: Feminist Legal Theory and Police Misconduct, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 691 (2001)
(acknowledging the philosophy's shortcomings, but still noting its potential to contribute to the feminist
project: "Because of its emphasis on particularity and discontinuity, postmodem legal feminism does
not readily translate into a coherent strategy for legal change, but it offers support for litigation and
legislation that further equality and self-determination based on the complexity and variety of women's
lives.").
125. Eichner, supra note 121, at 6.
126. See id. at 7.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. For a general overview of the various feminist approaches to the issue, see Sylvia A. Law,
Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization,73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 523, 534-42 (2000). Law concludes:
"fundamentally, feminists disagree about whether a woman can ever authentically consent to
commercial sex, and whether it would exist in ajust society." Id. at 542.
130. See generally SHANNON BELL, REWRITING THE PROSTITUTE BODY: PROSTITUTE
PERSPECTIVES, IN READING, WRITING AND REWRITING THE PROSTITUTE BODY (1994).
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whore."' 13 1 Frug placed this sexualization in its context - a legal system that
legalizes other forms of sex, particularly the sex that takes place within
marriage. 132 The combination of marriage laws and the criminalization of
prostitution results, for Frug, in the "matemalization" of the female body. 33 For
postmodem feminists, prostitution presents an opportunity to uncover the interplay
between gender identity, sexuality and the law.
2. Postmodern Feminism & Marriage
Like prostitution, marriage has presented postmodern feminists with an
occasion to question the social constructs that define who we are and how we live.
The postmodern approach questions the static definition of marriage, as it has
existed within our society for centuries, as limited to a heterosexual couple.
Additionally, Fran Olsen has questioned the notion of the public/private
distinction, arguing that what has typically been described as non-intervention is
actually just a different form of State intervention within the family. 134 Olsen
notes that what many have viewed as non-intervention, the State's historic refusal
to intervene in domestic violence, or to enforce contracts between family members,
has really been a particular form of State intervention, where its chosen course has
produced very real results for and within families. 1 35 Olsen's argument is most
illuminating in the context of marriage, where virtually every aspect of it, indeed,
the very right to participate in it and reap the legal and economic benefits it offers,
is dictated by the State. Finally, Frug's depiction of the State as regulating,
sexualizing and maternalizing the female body through laws that incentivize
marriage, for both physical safety and economic security, adds weight to Olsen's
argument. 136
The postmodern response to the social construct of marriage is to open up the
definition, or reject it entirely.137 In other words, the postmodern feminists seek a
broader understanding of what constitutes family; one that allows for relationships
beyond the simple man/woman couple.

131. See Frug, supra note 120, at 1052-53.
132. See id. at 1055.
133. See id.
134. See Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
835 (1985).
135. See id.
136. See Frug, supra note 120, at 1055.
137. See, e.g., Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern
Marriage Law, 89 CALIF. L. REv. 1749 (Oct. 2001)(proposing a "postmodem marriage law.. .that is,
marriage law that explicitly contemplates varied, changing, contextualized forms of marriage." Id.at
1482).

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 30:4

B. Postmodernfeminism & The Mail-Order BrideIndustry
1. The Industry as a Social Phenomenon
Postmodern feminists would treat the mail-order bride industry as yet another
opportunity to learn from the multiplicity of women's experiences, and the social,
cultural, economic and political forces that shape them. For the postmodern
feminist, any response to the industry must necessarily acknowledge the interplay
of these variables. Additionally, the postmodern feminist must exercise great
caution in balancing its anti-essentialist approach against the pitfalls of cultural
relativism, which might result in a 38legitimization of harmful practices simply for
the sake of respecting "difference."'1
Ultimately, the postmodern feminist must strive to avoid a condescending
approach toward the women who become mail-order brides so as to avoid the
perpetuation of the "victim subject" view of women living in the developing
world. 39 As one scholar has noted, such an approach reflects not only gender
essentialism, but also cultural essentialism:
Women in the Third World are portrayed as victims of their culture, which
reinforces stereotyped and racist representations of that culture and privileges the
culture of the West. In the end, the focus on the victim subject reinforces the
depiction of women in the Developing world as perpetually marginalized and
underprivileged, and has serious implications for the strategies subsequently
adopted to remedy the harms that women experience. It encourages some
feminists in the international arena to propose strategies which are reminiscent of
imperial interventions in the lives of the native subject and which represent the
"Eastern" woman as a victim of a "backward" and "uncivilized" culture. 140
This approach ultimately provokes "protectionist, and even conservative"
responses from other States that do little to further the condition of women in such
developing nations.141 Postmodern feminists must then develop a response to the
mail-order bride industry that avoids such a Western, paternalistic attitude toward
developing nations, while still acknowledging the dangers to women inherent in
the practice.
Maxine Eichner's postmodern feminist legal agenda presents one framework
for imagining such an approach. First, her agenda would acknowledge the variety
of factors that create the individual mail-order bride and the corresponding level of

138. See Tracey E. Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 Harv. Women's
L.J. 89 (Spring 1996). Higgins notes and attempts to reconcile this conflict between "increased
awareness universally of the importance of cultural and economic rights for women... and... increased
respect for cultural difference based on an awareness of the partiality of perspective, a skepticism of
universal claims of authenticity." Id.
139. See generally Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrectingthe "Native"
FeministLegal Politics, 15 Harv. Hum Rts. J. I (Spring 2002).
Subject in International/Post-Colonial
140. See id. at 6.
141. See id.
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resistance that would be necessary to overcome such factors. Second, Eichner's
goal of more fluid gender identities would, if realized, free many of the mail-order
brides from the currently culturally-dictated mandate to become a wife, thereby deconstraining the decision process. Third, postmodem feminists would have to
distinguish between the positive and negative differences associated with women.
For example, this approach would reject any notion that women are somehow
inherently submissive, inferior to men, or incapable of rational decision-making.
Finally, and most importantly with respect to the mail-order bride dilemma,
Eichner's approach focuses on achieving material equality as a necessary precondition for cultural equality. In other words, before the women who become
mail-order brides can be considered as possessing cultural equality, they must have
the same economic opportunities and resources as the men around them. In this
way, a Filipina doctor cannot be considered equal, despite the fact that she is welleducated and in a highly esteemed profession, until her wage earning capacity
matches that of her male counterparts. Taking this requirement a step further, the
Filipina must also achieve comparable economic opportunity vis-A-vis the
American male she intends to marry, before such a decision can be said to produce
a couple of "equals." Maxine Eichner's agenda translates postmodem feminist
theory into a concrete legal and political project, creating a more results-oriented,
and therefore more satisfying, doctrine with which to tackle difficult issues facing
women today.
2. The Currently Deficient Legal Response to the Industry
For the postmodern feminist, the reasons for choosing (or being forced into) a
mail-order marriage are as numerous as the mail-order brides themselves.
Accordingly, no single legal solution could respond to the needs, or respect the
desires, of the thousands of women who marry through these agencies each year.
Instead, a multi-tiered approach that sought to remove the negative forces
propelling an otherwise unwilling woman into marriage with a foreign man, while
at the same time maintaining the freedom for a woman to choose such a marriage
under legitimate circumstances, would be required.
Fran Olsen's critique of State intervention is particularly relevant in the
context of the mail-order bride industry. After all, the industry, and the fears and
concerns it has engendered within the American legal establishment, have helped
to shape modem immigration law as well as modem legal reforms seeking to
protect all women from violence in American society. 142 Yet, even as Congress
has recognized the industry, it has explicitly refused to "regulate" the industry,
only requiring agencies to disclose their unregulated nature to the women whom
they recruit. 43 Ironically, as Olsen might point out, this explicit refusal to
intervene constitutes a most devastating form of State intervention for the women
who become abused within mail-order marriages.
Certainly, the State's
reinforcement and affirmation of the power disparities within such marriages have
142. See discussion infra Part 1iB, Section 2.
143. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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only harmed women in this context. 1 44 Moreover, Congress's refusal to regulate or
eliminate the industry within its primary demand country has directly thwarted the
efforts of45the Philippine government, a primary supply country, to eradicate the
industry.'
A more overt and comprehensive response to the industry and its dangers is
necessary. The postmodem feminists present the most appropriate approach to the
mail-order bride phenomenon. In recognizing the wide range of factors that go
into the individual woman's decision, as well as the wide range of conditions that
underlie the industry, the postmodem approach allows for a more diverse and
complete response to the needs of all the women involved. In seeking to fully
understand both the institution of marriage, and the cultural factors that cause
women of the developing world to seek not only a husband, but a Western
husband, the postmodern feminists can acknowledge the potential for victimization
while simultaneously recognizing the ability, and the legal right, of all women to
make decisions regarding their marital status, their economic situation, and their
nationality.
Under Maxine Eichner's approach, postmodem feminism requires material
equality as an underlying premise to a just mail-order marriage. 146 Until such time
as material equality can be achieved, however, the industry must be regulated and
monitored. Such regulations should level the specific inequalities of the mail-order
marriage. For instance, access to information must be addressed. Currently, a man
seeking a bride frequently has access to her personal, physical and even
psychological information, whereas his bride may know nothing more than that
which the prospective husband chooses to reveal, leaving her unaware of any
criminal record, serial history of mail-order brides, or serious psychological
disorders. 47 Additionally, the immigration challenges addressed above must be
continually examined and improved, so that the newly arrived bride in a Western
nation has the right to independently achieve legal status, and has an adequate
knowledge of and ability to exercise that right.
Rather than universally condemn or praise the decision to become a mailorder bride, the postmodem feminist response would acknowledge the
phenomenon and provide the necessary political and legal support to protect the
women involved. Accordingly, the postmodern feminist approach is the most
appropriate response to the mail-order bride industry in the new millennium.

144. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 6, at 153 (detailing a retired U.S. Army sergeant's conviction for the
murder of his fourth wife, a mail-order bride, his conviction for the murder of his second wife, and the
mysterious circumstances surrounding the death of his third wife, also a mail-order bride). This is only
one example of dangers faced by mail-order brides. Notably, Congress itself has acknowledged the
extensive anecdotal evidence of such dangers. See 8 U.S.C. 1375a (1996).
145. See discussion infra Part IliB, Section 3.
146. See supra note 120 and accompanying discussion.
147. See supra note 16 and accompanying discussion.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Currently, no approach responds to the multiple factors underlying the mail
order bride industry, or incorporates the cultural practices and economic forces
within both supply and demand countries. As demonstrated above, the supply
countries simply cannot end the industry from the inside out, as the Internet has
148
made the mail-order bride business easy to facilitate from virtually any country.
The demand countries must regulate the industry, as well as the individual
consumers, in order to protect the mail-order brides as they arrive in a new land.
At the end of the day, because no single nation can adequately respond to the
industry on its own, only the concerted efforts of both the supply and demand
countries, along with a heightened level of cooperation within the international
community, will be enough to respond to the industry.
Some form of positive multilateral State intervention is necessary in order to
protect and inform such women both before and after they make the decision to
marry a virtually unknown Western male through an introduction agency. But
who should determine the form and nature of such intervention? Modem notions
of democracy and republicanism tell us that any State legislation or other action
should be informed and consented to by those most affected. This becomes a
daunting task where, as in the case of the mail-order bride industry, those most
affected by such legislation generally lack the political opportunity to voice their
wants and needs. Therefore, any multilateral response must, through dialogue and
examination, strive to effectively and meaningfully represent the voice of the
impoverished women of the developing world.
Ultimately, the response must be multifaceted not only in its international
cooperation, but also in its theoretical approach to the industry. Because the
cultural, economic, racial and sexual factors present a complex interplay, any
response must be correspondingly complex in its solutions. The postmodern
approach, which acknowledges the interplay of these factors, is the most
appropriate. The material inequalities between countries, and between men and
women within and without national borders, must be eliminated if gender, racial
and economic power disparities are to be eradicated. Until these inequalities can
be leveled, the mail-order bride industry must be heavily regulated and monitored
in order to protect the lives of those seeking to escape the triple-bind of being a
woman in a developing world country.

148. See supra notes 110-119 and accompanying text.

PROSECUTING AL QAEDA:
AMERICA'S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY INTERESTS ARE
BEST SERVED BY TRYING TERRORISTS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
Anton L. Janik,Jr.*
The basic proposition here is that somebody who comes into the United States of
America illegally, who conducts a terrorist operation killing thousands of innocent
Americans, men, women, and children, is not a lawful combatant. They don't
deserve to be treated as a prisoner of war. They don't deserve the same guarantees
and safeguards that would be used for an American citizen going through the
normal judicial process... [T]hey will have a fair trial, but it'll be under the
procedures of a military tribunal and rules and regulations to be established in
connection with that... We think [it] guarantees that we'll have the kind of
treatment of these individuals that we believe they deserve. '

"Bush [has] undermined the anti-terroristcoalition, ceding to nations overseas the
high moral and legal ground long held by US. justice. And on what leg does the
to death after a military trial
US now stand when China sentences an American
2
devoid of counsel chosen by the defendant?"
INTRODUCTION

In this paper, the competing reasons for prosecuting foreign terrorists under
tribunals, be they domestic, foreign, international, military, or a combination of the
above, are explored. A focus is specifically given to the efforts being taken against
the al Qaeda militants detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.3 U.S. foreign policy
and international human rights concerns are juxtaposed against the public desire
•Juris Doctor expected May 2003, University of Denver College of Law. Bachelor of Arts (Russian),
Middlebury College, 1995.
1.Vice President Dick Cheney, Remarks at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Nov. 14, 2001),
availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20011114-1.html.
2. William Satire, Editorial, A Rush to Bogus Justice: The Bush Administration'sSecret Military
Tribunals Will Backfire in the Battle Against Terrorism, PIrr. POST-GAZETTE,Nov. 27,2001, at A 1l.
3. According to President Bush, al Qaeda militants are responsible for the September I 1 attacks
on the U.S. See George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People
(Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.htm

("Who attacked our country? The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely
affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda. They are the same murderers indicted for bombing
American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and responsible for bombing the USS Cole.").
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for retribution in the wake of the September 1 th attacks, and the question of
whether the U.S. is better served by prosecuting foreign terrorists under
international tribunals is discussed.
Section I provides an introduction to military tribunal terminology and
procedure. Section II describes the history of the international military tribunal as
created in 1945, the use of foreign national tribunals, the International Court of
Justice, and the rise of the International Criminal Court. Section III discusses both
the history of domestic military tribunals and President Bush's military tribunals4
plan. Section IV discusses the arguments for and against applying either
international legal or U.S. constitutional protections to al Qaeda. Section V
addresses whether America's foreign policy interests are best served by
prosecuting al Qaeda members in U.S. military tribunals or under an international
tribunal. The conclusion follows in Section VI.

I. AN INTRODUCTION TO MILITARY TRIBUNAL TERMINOLOGY AND PROCEDURE
In its most traditional form, a military tribunal is a war-time judicial
proceeding "used to try violations of the laws of war."' According to the Bush
Administration, the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center complex,
the Pentagon, and on Flight 93, grounded in Pennsylvania, constitute "acts of
war," 6 and attacks on innocent persons, a violation of the laws of war. The Bush
Administration has determined that the culprits of those attacks
are a "collection of
'7
loosely-associated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda.
President Bush, under both his power and authority as the Commander-InChief of the military as provided by Article II of the U.S. Constitution, and under
Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, has the power to convene
military tribunals. 8 Under U.S. law, the Supreme Court permits the use of military
tribunals against non-citizens unless, under the Geneva Convention, those

4. Much ado was made about the naming of these proceedings. Under President Bush's Military
Order, see infra note 109, they were originally termed "military tribunals." Upon the Department of
Justice's release of the procedural rules, the name was changed to "Military Commissions." See Order
No. 1, infra note 125. This paper will refer to historical military tribunals, as well as the proceedings
established following the mandate set forth in President Bush's Military Order, as "military tribunals."
5. See DEP'T OF DEFENSE, Fact Sheet: Department of Defense Order on Military Commissions,
availableat http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321 fact.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2002).
See also Tribunals Break Sharply From Civilian Courts, at http://www.cnn.comt2OOlILAWl12/06/
inv.tribunals.explainer/index.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2002).
6. See Remarks by the President In Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team,
availableat http:/lwww.whitehouse.govlnewslreleasesl200l/09/20010912-4.html (last vistited Feb. 18,
2002) ("The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were
more than acts of terror. They were acts of war."); George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of
Congress and the American People, supra note 3 ("On September the 1 th, enemies of freedom
committed an act of war against our country."). See also Keith Johnson and Carlta Vitzthum,
EuropeansMake Case Against Use of Military Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28,2001, at A12.
7. George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (Sept. 20,
2001), supra note 3.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 109-114.
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defendants are considered "prisoners of war." 9 However, the Supreme Court does
not restrict military tribunals to use against non-citizens: in Ex parte Milligan, the
Supreme Court held that U.S. citizens may be tried by military tribunals, but only
if civilian courts are "not open."'0
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United
Nations requires that military tribunals be fundamentally fair." Among the Civil
and Political Rights Covenant's requirements, a military tribunal must ensure a
"fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal
established by law,"' 2 and provide the defendant with the presumption of
innocence.13 The defendant must be informed "promptly and in detail in a language
which he understands. .. the nature and cause of the charge against him."'14 The
provisions require that the defendant have counsel chosen by him, 15 be able to face
and challenge his accuser, 16 have the right to remain silent,1 7 and have the right to
appeal.' 8 President Bush's military tribunal plan, discussed in section III, below,
substantially meets those criteria.' 9

9. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 n.14 (1950) ("We are not holding that these
prisoners have no right which the military authorities are bound to respect. The United States, by the
Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, concluded with forty-six other countries, including
the German Reich, an agreement upon the treatment to be accorded captives. These prisoners claim to
be and are entitled to its protection. It is, however, the obvious scheme of the Agreement that
responsibility for observance and enforcement of these rights is upon political and military authorities.
Rights of alien enemies are vindicated under it only through protests and intervention of protecting
powers as the rights of our citizens against foreign governments are vindicated only by Presidential
intervention."); see id. at 785 ("[T]he Constitution does not confer a right of personal security or an
immunity from military trial and punishment upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile service of a
government at war with the United States.... the Military Commission is a lawful tribunal to adjudge
enemy offenses against the laws of war.").
10. See Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 125-27 (1866) ("If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the
courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on
the theatre of active military operations, where war really prevail, there is a necessity to furnish a
substitute for the civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society; and as
no power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by marital rule until the laws can have their free
course." Id. at 127.). See also Tribunals Break Sharply From Civilian Courts, at http://www.cnn.
com/2001/LAW/12/06/inv.tribunals.explaner/index.htnlm (last visited Jan. 13, 2002).
11. See InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, art. 14, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter "Civil and Political Rights
Covenant"]; Universal Declarationof Human Rights, at art. IX,G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doe. A/810
at 71 (1948) ("Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against
him."). See also TribunalsBreak Sharplyfrom Civilian Courts, supra note 10.
12. See Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 11, at art. 14(1).
13. See id. at art. 14(2).
14. See id. at art. 14(3)(a).
15. See id. at art. 14(3)(d).
16. See id. at art. 14(3)(e).
17. See id. at art. 14(3)(g).
18. See id. at art. 14(5).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 109-142.
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II. FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL USAGE

A. A BriefHistory of Foreignand InternationalMilitary Tribunal Usage
Military tribunals have an extensive history, having occurred over a span of
time that ranges at least 2500 years.20 With such an extensive history, one may
wonder just what the attraction is. Perhaps the answer is that, historically, the
military provided the only means to conduct such a proceeding. However, as
discussed below, military tribunals offer one very attractive benefit: the ability to
publicly bring an adversary war power's leaders to justice.
Quite often, that
2
application ofjustice involves employing the death penalty. '
The first known use of a military tribunal occurred in 405 B.C., after the
destruction of the Athenian fleet at Aegospotamos.22 According to the ancient
historian Xenophon, the Lacedaemonian admiral Lysander called a meeting of his
allies to determine the fate of the vanquished Athenians.23 The Athenians were
accused of several war crimes, and were summarily executed.24
A more modem use of the military tribunal was seen during the Middle Ages.
These tribunals were distinguished from earlier ones because here, trials were
actually held. In 1474, Sir Peter of Hagenbach, made Governor of Breisach by the
conquering Duke Charles of Burgundy, was captured and tried for war crimes he
committed in the town of Breisach.25 Hagenbach argued that he was not to blame;
he merely acted under the orders of his commanding officer. Hagenbach's
"superior orders" defense fell upon deaf ears: he was sentenced to death and
executed.26
One popular nineteenth century example occurred when Napoleon Bonaparte,
after his escape from exile in Elba, returned to France leading an army.27 He was
subsequently captured and tried. Under the terms of the prior Congress of Vienna's
Declaration of March 13, 1815, Napoleon had been declared an outlaw and subject
to any actions that the Allied powers deemed appropriate.2 8 Placed in custody of
the British Government, Napoleon was again exiled, this time to St. Helena.29
While not an example employing execution, this does provide precedent for the
applicability of a military tribunal's use to try an adversary's most senior leader.

20.
21.
22.
23.

See
See
See
See

infra text accompanying note 22.
infra text accompanying notes 24-26.
ROBERT K. WOETZEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (1962).
id.
24. Id. See also PLUTARCH, LivEs OF THE NOBLE GRECIANS AND ROMANS I (John Dryden, trans.)
(1992).
25. See WOETZEL, supra note 22, at 19-20.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 23.
28. See id.
29. See id.
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B. The Rise ofForeign andInternationalMilitary Tribunals
The use of international military tribunals has its genus in the various peace
treaties signed in 1919, at the end of World War I. Article 227 of the Treaty of
Versailles provided for a special tribunal composed of judges from the U.S., Great
Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, to try William II, the former German Emperor,
for offenses "against international morality and the sanctity of treaties. ' 30 Under
that Treaty's Article 228, provisions were included for military tribunals of
German individuals accused of "having committed acts in violation of the laws and
customs of war.",3' The Treaty of Saint-Germain-En-Laye 32 provided similarly for
the Austrians, the Treaty of Neuilly-Sur-Seine 33 for the Bulgarians, the Treaty of
Trianon 34 for the Hungarians, and the Treaty of Sevres 35 for the Turks. Pursuant to
the Treaty of Versailles, the Allied powers submitted a list of 896 individuals to be
handed over for trial.36 Concerns over a renewed war between Germany and the
Allies, or a civil war in Germany, however, led to the abandonment of the
requirement that Germany surrender those accused for trial.37
In 1945, following the end of World War II, international military tribunals
again arose, now as a means created "in the interests of the United Nations,, 38 to
try those responsible for both war crimes and crimes agairist humanity.3 9 The
Agreement... for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis [hereinafter the "London Agreement"],40 signed by
representatives from the U.S., the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and France,
formed the foundation for conducting the Nuremberg Trials. These trials were the
first actual historical precedent for the internationaltrial and punishment of war
criminals. 4 1 Nearly one year later, the first Nuremberg trial concluded.42 Twelve

30. See Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, art. 227.
31. Id. at art. 228.
32. See Treaty of Saint-Germain-En-Laye, Sept. 10, 1919, art. 173 etseq.
33. See Treaty of Neuilly-Sur-Seine, Nov. 27, 1919, art. 118 et seq.
34. See Treaty of Trianon, June 4, 1920, art. 157 et seq.
35. See Treaty of Sevres, Aug. 10, 1920, art. 226 et seq.
36. See WOETZEL, supra note 22, at 3 1.
37. See JAMEs F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG 113 (1982).

38. London Agreement, infra note 40, at preambular paragraphs.
39. See V.N. Kudriavtsev, The Nuremberg Trial and Problems ofStrengthening the International
Legal Order, in THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 4 (George Ginsburgs & V.N.

Kudriavtsev, eds. 1990). War crimes are "violations of the law and customs of war, and criminal acts
against the civilian population of occupied countries... crimes against peace and conspiracy to wage
aggressive war." See WOETZEL, supra note 22, at 6.
40. See Agreement by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional
Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945 [hereinafter the
"London Agreement"], available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtchart.htm (last
visited Jan. 27, 2002).
41. See WOETZEL, supra note 22, at 15.
42. See The Nuremberg Trials Chronology, at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/
nuremberg/NurembergChronology.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2002).
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defendants, including the Nazi's second-in-command,43 Herman G6ering, were
sentenced to death. 44 The defendants were executed two weeks later. 45 That same
year, international military tribunals were used to try Japanese for war crimes.46
Twenty-four of twenty-five defendants were convicted, including the Japanese
47
Prime Minister General Hideki Tojo, who was condemned to death and hung.
While the London Agreement permitted domestic trials, 48 they were not so
limited. The U.S. tried many foreign defendants under U.S. military commissions
conducted in the defendants' own countries. According to Deputy Defense
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, these foreign military tribunals were very successful:
"[I]n Germany, we prosecuted 1,672 individuals for war crimes before U.S.
military commissions. Convictions were obtained in 1,416 cases. In Japan, we tried
996 suspected war criminals before military commissions... 856 were
convicted. 49
Although the use of international tribunals was nearly dormant for the fifty
ensuing years, the 1990's again saw the convening of international tribunals. 50 This
time they were non-military tribunals, created under the auspices of the United
Nations Security Council, and were used to try defendants accused of genocide in
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.5 The next section describes their creation and use.
C. The InternationalCourt ofJustice and the Rise of the InternationalCriminal
Court

The International Court of Justice is the "principal judicial organ" of the

43. See Herman G6ering the Reichmarshall,at http://auschwitz.dk/Goering.htn (last visited Mar.
30, 2002).
44. The twelve defendants were Herman Wilhelm Goering, Joachim Von Ribbentrop, Wilhelm
Keitel, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Alfred Rosenburg, Hans Frank, Wilhem Frick, Julius Streicher, Fritz
Sauckel, Alfred Jodi, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, and Martin Bormann. See WOETZEL, supra note 22, at 7-12.
45. See id. at 15. Herman Goering committed suicide in his jail cell on October 15, 1946, the day
before the executions. Id.
46. See Key Tribunals, at http'J/www.cnn.com2OOlALAW/12/06Iinv.tribunals.timelinelindex.html
(last visited Jan 13, 2002).
47. Id.
48. While the international military tribunal was created to communally address the atrocities
committed against all nations, by war criminals "whose offenses have no particular geographic location,
whether they be accused individually or in their capacity as members of organizations or groups," both
the London Agreement's preamble and Article 6 allowed for trial by a single nation's courts. See
London Agreement, supra note 40, at art. 1. The London Agreement's preamble provides that parties
who have "been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in atrocities and crimes will be sent
back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and
punished .. . ." Id. at preambular paragraphs. Article 6 provides that the Agreement does not "prejudice
the jurisdiction or powers" of an individual nation to try war criminals in their own courts. Id. at art. 6.
49. See Jim Garamone, Wolfowitz Discusses Military Commissions Trying Terrorists, ARMED
FORCES PRESS SERV., available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec200l/n12132001_200112133.
html (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).
50. See infra text accompanying note 58.
51. See id.
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53
United Nations.52 It was created in 1945 under the Charter of the United Nations,
with the primary aim of resolving disputes between U.N. member states.54
Accordingly, this "principal judicial organ" has no jurisdiction over matters
involving individual criminal responsibility. 55 However, on an ad hoc basis, the
United Nations has created tribunals to deal
with individual responsibility for the
56
crime of genocide, and other war crimes.

In 1993, the United Nations' Security Council established the International
Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 57 That tribunal was established with
the mandate of trying individuals accused of genocide and crimes against
humanity.5 8 The tribunal's primary defendant is the former Yugoslavian president
Slobodan Milosevic, whose trial began in February, 2002. 59 While charged with
both genocide and lesser crimes against humanity, in accordance with the United
Nations' stance on human rights, 60 even were Milosevic convicted on all counts,
the most severe sentence he could receive is life imprisonment. 61 In 1994, the
United Nations Security Council again formed an international tribunal, this time
to try 35 defendants accused of the genocide of Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda.62 The
first defendant convicted in this continuing trial was a Rwandan mayor, Jean-Peal
Akayesu.63 By Security Council mandate, both of these ad hoc tribunals dealt only
with crimes committed in those two areas during "specific periods of time." 64 As
such, the ad hoc tribunals have been specifically empowered to deal with specific
crimes during defined time periods, and are not provided the power to try all such
crimes occurring at any point in time.
In response to the large numbers of horrific war crimes occurring in the recent
past, 65 coupled with the understanding that there is no continuously-serving
international body specifically charged with the jurisdiction over individuals
committing such crimes, there has been a recent push to create an International
52. COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, Questions and Answers on the
International Criminal Court at 1, available at http://www.igc.org/icc/html/pressqandaicc.pdf (last
visited Feb. 18, 2002).
53. See International Court of Justice 1946-1996, at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneral
information/ibbook/Bbookframepage.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2002).
54. See COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 52, at 1.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 2.
57. See Key Tribunals,supra note 46.
58. See id.
59. See Blaine Harden, The Family Milosevic: The Unrepentant,Jan. 20, 2002, availableat http://
www.nytimes.com/2002/01/20/magazine/20MILO.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2002).
60. See UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, supra note I1,
at art. 3.
61. See Helena Cobban, Milosevic on Trial: Big Test for the Hague Court, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jul. 9, 2001, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0709/pl3sl-coop.html (last
visited Mar. 30, 2002).
62. See Key Tribunals,supra note 46.
63. Id.
64. See COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 52, at 2.
65. See id. at I ("In the past 50 years alone, more than 250 conflicts have erupted around the
world; more than 86 million civilians, mostly women and children died in these conflicts; and over 170
million people were stripped of their rights, property and dignity.").
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Criminal Court. 66 The International Criminal Court [hereinafter the "ICC"] has just
recently passed the ratification process.67
The ICC is designed as "a permanent, independent institution capable of
addressing the crimes identified in [its founding document] on an ongoing
basis. .,,6 The ICC, however, is not designed to supplant domestic judicial
bodies. Rather "the Court can exercise its jurisdiction if national courts are
unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute such crimes." 69 The ICC is
specifically designed to hold individuals criminally responsible for acts of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and "aggression. '' 7° Due to an
71
inability to agree on a definition, terrorism was not included among that list.
Because the ICC has just passed the ratification process and its founding members
have failed as of yet to agree on a definition of terrorism, were the United Nations
to convene an international tribunal to address the terrorist acts of September 11 th,
it would likely be convened in one of two forms: either as an ad hoc tribunal under
a Security Council Resolution, or as an international trial under the ICC following
the creation of a working definition of terrorism.

66. The framework for the ICC, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court [hereinafter
the "Rome Statute"], was created during the United Nations Diplomatic Conference held in Rome
during July, 1998, and adopted on July 17, 1998. 139 nations have signed the Rome Statute, including
the United States, which signed the Rome Statute on December 31, 2000. See COALITION FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 52, at 2.
67. According to its provisions, the Rome Statute will enter into force, thus creating the ICC, after
its 60th ratification. See id. at 2. On May 15, 2002, Greece became the 67th State to ratify the Rome
Statute. See Rome Statute Signature and Ratification Chart, at http://www.igc.org/icc/rome/
html/ratify.html (last visited May 15, 2002).
68. See COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 52, at 2.
69. Id.
70. The crimes are thus defined:
Genocide covers those specifically listed prohibited acts (e.g. killing, causing serious
harm) committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or
religious group.
Crimes against humanity cover those specifically listed prohibited acts when committed
as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population.
Such acts include murder, extermination, rape, sexual slavery, the enforced
disappearance of persons and the crime of apartheid, among others.
Genocide and crimes against humanity are punishable irrespective of whether they are
committed in time of "peace" or of war.
War crimes cover grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other serious
violations of the laws of war, committed on a large scale in international as well as
internal armed conflicts. The inclusion of internal conflicts is consistent with customary
international law and reflects the reality that in the past 50 years, the most serious
violations of human rights have occurred, not in international conflicts, but within States.
The crime of aggression will be dealt with by the Court when the Assembly of States
Parties has agreed on the definition, elements and conditions under which the Court will
exercise jurisdiction; this cannot happen until a review conference has been held, seven
years after entry into force of the treaty.
Id. at 3.
71. See id. at 4.
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III. U.S. MILITARY TRIBUNALS
A. A BriefHistory of US. Military Tribunal Usage
U.S. history is punctuated by several military tribunals.72 It is believed that the
first such use may have come as early as 1780, 73 when Major John Andre,
Adjutant-General to the British Army, was tried as a spy before a "Board of
General Officers" and was hung. 74 The first official U.S. military tribunals are
traced to 1847, during the U.S.-Mexican War, where General Winfield Scott
ordered that U.S. forces committing violations of the law of war be punished by
military tribunal.75 One notable occurrence is the 1865 military tribunal used to
sentence four individuals to death for the conspiracy resulting in the assassination
of President Abraham Lincoln .7 6
In 1942, in what is arguably the most famous military tribunal use, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered military tribunals to try eight German saboteurs
caught sneaking ashore in New York and Florida.77 In Ex parte Quirin, a habeas
corpus proceeding brought appurtenant to that case, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that military tribunals may be used to try "unlawful combatants., 7' The
significance of that determination is discussed below.
B. US. Military Tribunals as Applied in Ex ParteQuirin
"I want one thing clearly understood... I won't hand them over to any
UnitedStates Marshalarmed with a writ of habeas corpus.79
The story behind Ex parte Quirin is a wild tale of international intrigue.80
Each of the eight German-born saboteurs had spent time living and working in the
U.S. 8t Each returned to Germany between 1933 and 1941,82 under a plan which
offered any German citizen a free one-way ticket home.83 Each was subsequently
recruited and trained under Operation Pastorius, 84 and given the goal of targeting
85
both war-important sites and creating generalized terror in the U.S.

72. See, e.g. Key Tribunals, supranote 46.
73. See id.
74. See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 n.9 (1942).
75. See, Key Tribunals, supra note 46.
76. See Lawrence L. Knutson, Response to Terror,L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at A9.
77. See Key Tribunals,supranote 46.
78. See infra text accompanying note 98.
79. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, as quoted in a memo to Attorney General Francis Biddle. See
Gary Cohen, The Keystone Kommandos, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 2002, at 53.
80. For an engaging account of the events, see id.
81. See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 20 (1942).
82. See id.
83. See Cohen, supra note 79, at 47.
84. Operation Pastorius was named after Franz Daniel Pastorius, the leader of the first group of
Germans to land in Germantown, Pennsylvania. See Cohen, supra note 79, at 47.
85. The target sites included factories involved in the aluminum industry, hydro-electric plants,
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The eight saboteurs arrived by U-boat between June 13 and 17, 1942,6
landing in New York and Florida.87 The saboteurs, fortunately, never achieved
their destructive goals: within two weeks, the F.B.I. had captured them all. 8 8 On
July 2, 1942, President Roosevelt appointed a Military Commission, directing it to
try the saboteurs for violations of the Articles of War. 89 The same day, the
President declared that:
all persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with the
United States or who give obedience to or act under the direction of any such
nation, and who during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United States...
through coastal or boundary defenses, and are charged with committing or
attempting or preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or
violations of the law of war, shall be subject to the law of war and to the
jurisdiction of military tribunals; and that such persons shall not be privileged to
seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any
such remedy
or proceeding sought on their behalf, in the courts of the United
90
States.

The military tribunal began July 8, 1942, 91in room 5235 of the Department of
Justice.92 The eight saboteurs were tried before a tribunal of seven, which consisted
of four Major Generals and three Brigadier Generals. 93 The defense rested nineteen
days later. 94 Defense counsel then filed a writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme
Court, arguing that the President's order was "invalid and unconstitutional,96' 95 and
that civilian courts, not military courts, were the proper forum for this trial.
The Supreme Court, meeting in special session, denied those arguments,97
stating that:
an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the
purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, [is among several]
familiar examples of belligerents who are generally deemed not to be entitled to
the status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders
against the law of war subject to
98
trial and punishment by military tribunals.
The Court continued, "[u]nlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture
and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military
waterways, railroads, bridges, and Jewish-owned department stores. See id. at 46.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 22.
See 7 C.F.R. § 5101 (1942), quoted in Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 22-23.
See Cohen, supra note 79, at 55.
See id.
See id. at 54.
See id. at 58.
See id. at 55.
See id.
See id. at 59.
See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31.
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tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful. "99
With the legality of the proceedings assured, President Roosevelt sentenced
six of the eight saboteurs to death by electrocution. I °° The sentence was carried out
the next day.' 0 ' The six were buried in a pauper's cemetery, in the District of
Columbia,l 2 their graves marked only with numbers 276 through 281.1°3 The other4
years, the other for lifeY
two saboteurs received prison sentences; one for thirty
10 5
Six years later, the two were deported to Germany.
C. PresidentBush's Military Tribunal'0 6 Plan
"From the territory of Afghanistan, the Al-Qaeda organization continues to
train and support agents of terror who attack innocent people throughout the
world and7 target United States nationals and interests in the United States and
10
abroad."'
"[Tiens of thousands of trained terrorists are still at large. These enemies
view the entire world as a battlefield, and we must pursue them wherever they
are.11108
The power and authority underlying President Bush's ability to both issue his

Military Order, "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism,"' 10 9 and to convene military tribunals, stems initially from
his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and from
the powers thus vested by Articles 21 and 36 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice." 0 Additional authority comes from section 3 of the Manual for Courts-

99. Id.
100. See Cohen, supranote 79, at 59.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. This paper will refer to historical military tribunals, as well as the proceedings established
following the mandate included in President Bush's Military Order, as "military tribunals." See supra
note 4.
107. See Letter Dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of
America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2001/946 (2001), available at http://www.un.int/usa/s-2001-946.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).
108. See President Delivers State of the Union Address, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/01/20020129-1 1.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).
109. See Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, [hereinafter "Military Order"], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2001).
110. See U.S. CONST., art. 11,§ 2 ("The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States."); UCMJ, art. 21 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2001)) ("The provisions of
this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost
courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by
statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military
tribunals."); UCMJ, art. 36 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2001)) ("pretrial, trial, and post-trial
procedures, including modes of proof, for cases arising under [chapter 101, triable in courts-martial,
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Martial,"' and federal case law. 1 2 President Bush did not consult Congress when
drafting his Military Order. 1 3 However, Congress did authorize President Bush to
use military force against al Qaeda militants." 4
The President's Military Order states that due to the "magnitude of potential
deaths, injuries and property destruction"'" 5 that may result from terrorist attacks,
"and the probability that such attacks will occur.., an extraordinary emergency
exists for national defense purposes, that this emergency constitutes an urgent and
compelling interest, and that issuance of this order is necessary to meet the
emergency."" 16 In his Military Order, President Bush authorized the use of military
tribunals against international terrorists, stating that they are "to be detained, and,
when tried, to be tried' for violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws
by military tribunals." 17
The scope of the Military Order's term "international terrorist" is wide: it
encompasses al Qaeda members, any individual who has "engaged in, aided or
abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism" or acts that have
threatened injury to United States "citizens, national security, foreign policy, or
economy," as well as any individual who has knowingly harbored an international
terrorist.' ' Under the later-adopted Patriot Act,' 9 the definition of engaging in
military commissions and other military tribunals, and procedures for courts of inquiry, may be
prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the
principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the
United States district courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with [chapter 10]."). See
generally, Robert J.Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President's ConstitutionalAuthority to Conduct
OperationsAgainst Terrorist Organizationsand the Nations that Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 487 (2002); Robert F. Turner, The War on Terrorismand the Modern Relevance of
the CongressionalPower to "Declare War," 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 519 (2002). But see Diane F.
Orentlicher & Robert Kogod Goldman, When Justice Goes To War: Prosecuting Terrorists Before
Military Commissions, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 653 (2002); George P. Fletcher, On Justice and
War: Contradictionsin the ProposedMilitary Tribunals,25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 635 (2002).
111. JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MIL. JUST., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES I-I at §
3 (2000) [hereinafter "Manual for Courts-Martial"] (stating that the agencies through which military
jurisdiction is exercised includes courts-martial), available at http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/
mcm2000.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2002).
112. See e.g., Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,28-29 (1942) ("An important incident to the conduct of
war is the adoption of measures by the military command not only to repel and defeat the enemy, but to
seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who... have violated the law of war.").
113. See Jess Bravin, Deputy to Ashcroft and Senators Clash on Tribunal Policy, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 29, 2001, at A4.
114. "[Tlhe President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks
that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons." See Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Those
Responsible for the Recent Attacks Against the United States § 2, Public Law 107-40, 115 Stat. 224

(2001).
115. Military Order, supra note 109, at § (1)(g).
116. Id.
117. Id. at§ (1)(e).
118. Military Order, supra note 109, at § (2)(a)(I)(iii). The Military Order does not provide for the
trial of U.S. citizens. See id. at § (2)(a). The Supreme Court, however, does not limit military tribunal
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"terrorist activity" includes any foreigner who uses "dangerous devices" or
knowingly or unknowingly raises money for any terrorist group. 12 While not
Military Order does allow for the
applicable to U.S. citizens, President Bush's
2
military trial of U.S. permanent residents.' '
In his Military Order, President Bush, for reasons of "danger to the safety of
the United States and the nature of international terrorism,"' 12 2 found it "not
practicable" to apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence as recognized
in criminal courts.12 3 According to Phillip Lacovara, former Deputy Solicitor
General, "[p]eople charged with violations of the laws of war are not entitled to the
charged with crimes, as long as the
same level of guarantees as civilians
24
proceedings are fundamentally fair."1

Accordingly, President Bush's military tribunals have their own rules of
procedure. These procedural rules markedly differ from "traditional" procedural
military tribunals
rules as applied in civilian courts. 125 Among these differences:
127
126
may be closed proceedings, even to the accused himself, there are no juries,
defendants are judged instead by a group consisting of between three and seven
members,12 8 where each member is a commissioned officer of the United States
military; 129 U.S. military tribunals may be held extraterritorially, e.g. in foreign

countries or upon U.S. naval ships; 130 defendants have no right to counsel while
being interrogated,13 ' and will not have the benefit of receiving exculpatory
evidence in possession of the prosecution, as they would if prosecuted in a non-

use to non-citizens: in Ex parte Milligan, the Court held that U.S. citizens may be tried by military
tribunals, but only if civilian courts are "actually closed." See Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 127 (1866).
See also Tribunals BreakSharply from Civilian Courts, supranote 10.
119. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 [hereinafter the "Patriot Act"], available at http://www.eff.org/
Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorismmilitias/20011025_hr3162 usapatriot bill.html (last visited Jan. 27,
2002).
120. See Matthew Purdy, Legal Powers Are Expanded in Bush Plan, N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERV.,
Nov. 26,2001.
121. See generally Military Order, supra note 109. See also supra note 118.
122. See Military Order, supra note 109, at § (1)(f).
123. Id. at § (1)(f).
124. See Purdy, supra note 120.
125. Compare The Avalon Project: Uniform Rules of Procedure,Military Tribunals, Nuernberg,
Revised to 8 January 1948, at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/Avalon.imt.rules5.htm (last visited Feb. 14,
2002), with Military Order, supra note 109, Dep't of Defense Fact Sheet, supra note 5, at 2-3, and
DEP'T OF DEFENSE, Military Commission Order No. 1 [hereinafter "Order No. I"], available at
http://www.defenselink.miVnews/Mar2002/d2002032 lord.pdf (last visited March 21, 2002).
126. See Tribunals Break Sharply from Civilian Courts, supra note 10; Order No. 1, supra note
125, at § 6(B)(3) (stating that the decision to close a proceeding or portion thereof may include a
decision to exclude the accused).
127. See Tribunals Break Sharplyfrom Civilian Courts, supra note 10.
128. See Order No. 1,supra note 125, at § 4(A)(2).
129. See id., at §4(A)(3).
130. See Tribunals Break Sharply from Civilian Courts, supra note 10; Order No. 1, supra note
125, at § 6(B)(4).
131. Serge Schmemann, Prisoners,Surely. But POWs?, N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERV., Jan. 27, 2002.
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tribunal setting; 32 and guilt need only "have probative value to a reasonable
person,"' 133 it need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, guilt may
be established by as little as a two-thirds vote of its judges. 134 Under Bush's
military tribunal plan, the sentences meted out may be severe, up to and including
life imprisonment or even death. 135 The Department of Defense's Military
Commission Order No. 1, which established the tribunals' actual procedural rules,
136
provides that a death sentence may be imposed only upon a unanimous verdict.
While Bush's original plan made no provision for terrorists to appeal the
tribunal's decision, 37 his released plan included the provision that guilty verdicts
may be appealed to the Secretary of Defense and to the President.' 3' There is,
however, no provision for appeal to any U.S. court. 13 9 The analysis underlying
support of this position is based on the fact that the detainees are being held
outside of the sovereign territory of the U.S., see Section IV(C), below. Habeas
corpus review is similarly stymied. Because the right to federal habeas corpus
review only applies if the trials are conducted on U.S. sovereign territory, 40 the
fact that most of the al Qaeda militants are imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
will effectively preclude federal review if the detainees are tried
extraterritorially. 14
Amnesty International has raised concerns over the procedure outlined in
Bush's Military Order. Among the concerns the organization raises are that the
Military Order is discriminatory, because it affords foreign nationals "a lower
standard of justice than U.S. nationals," that there is no separation between the
executive branch's role and that of the judiciary because it "gives unfettered and
unchallengeable discretionary power to the executive to decide whom will be
prosecuted and under what rules," that the Military Order "bypasses the normal
principles of law and rules of evidence in the trials of people charged with criminal

132. See Purdy, supranote 120.
133. See id.
134. See id. See also Military Order, supra note 109, at § (4)(a).
135. See Military Order, supra note 109, at § (4)(a). It is widely known that President Bush, former
governor of Texas, a state which has executed 257 prisoners since 1976, is a proponent of the death
penalty. See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, Number of Executions By State Since 1976, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicreg.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2002); Bush Takes Case for Military
Tribunalsto Spain's PM, Dow JONES INT'L NEws, Nov. 28, 2001.
136. See Order No. 1, supra note 125, at § 6(F). For the corresponding rule applying to military
courts-martial, see Manual for Courts-Martial, supranote 111, at Rule 1006(d)(4)(A).
137. The Military Order states that "the individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or
maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the
individual's behalf, in (i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any
foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal." Military Order, supra note 109, at §7(b)(2). See also
Jess Bravin, Deputy to Ashcroft And Senators Clash On Tribunal Policy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2001, at
A4.
138. See id. See also Order No. 1, supra note 125, at § 6(-1)(5)-(6).
139. See Military Order, supra note 109, at §7(b)(2).
140. See generally Coalition of Clergy v. George Walker Bush, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 (C.D.
Cal. 2002).
141. See infra text accompanying notes 162-171.
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offenses in the U.S. courts," and that there was no right to appeal. 142 The
applicability of U.S. constitutional and international legal protections to the instant
situation are discussed below.
IV. THE APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS TO AL QAEDA MILITANTS

A. Why Aren't al Qaeda Militants ProtectedAs Prisonersof War Under the
Geneva Convention?
"If a US. Serviceman were captured by Talibanforces, we - and the US. would be fighting to ensure that he be entitled to protection as a prisoner of
war .... Capturedcombatants should
have this presumptionand any doubt should
143
be decidedby a competent tribunal."'
Historically, the U.S. viewed terrorists as "common criminals, to be tried in
civil courts."' 14 4 Now, the White House considers the captured al Qaeda members,

housed at Camp X-Ray, 145 neither common criminals nor prisoners of war, but
rather unlawful combatants. 146 According to Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of
Defense, "the detainees are not being labeled as prisoners of war because they did
not engage in warfare according to the precepts of the Geneva Convention-they
hide weapons, do not wear uniforms and try to blur the line between combatant
and noncombatant." 147
Making such a distinction materially affects the detainees' rights. Because
they are not prisoners of war, the detainees are not afforded the same procedural
and evidentiary rights that a prisoner of war receives. 148 Again turning to the words
of Secretary Rumsfeld, "[t]echnically, unlawful combatants do not have any rights
under the Geneva convention [sic]. We have indicated that we do plan to, for the
most part, treat them in a manner that is reasonably consistent with the Geneva
142. See AMNESTY INT'L, USA: PresidentialOrder on Military Tribunals Threatens Fundamental
Principles of Justice, available at http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/AMR511652001 (last visited
Feb. 18, 2002).
143. Darcy Christen, spokesperson for the Red Cross' Geneva headquarters, quoted in Chip
Cummins and Laurie P. Cohen, Legal Limbo of US. Afghan-War PrisonersTouches Off a Storm of
CriticismOverseas, WALL ST. J., Jan, 22, 2002, at A22.
144. Schmemann, supranote 131.
145. Camp X-Ray is the name given to the detention center recently built at the U.S. naval base in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Guantanamo Bay naval base is perhaps best known for its role during the
mid-1990s, when it was used to sequester "thousands of Cuban and Haitian refugees." See Cummins &
Cohen, supra note 143.
146. TribunalsBreak Sharplyfrom Civilian Courts, supra note 10.
147. See Jim Garamone, Mistreatment Allegations 'Just Plain False,' AM. FORCES PRESS SERV.,
Jan. 22, 2002, available at http://www.defenselink.miI/news/Jan2002/ n01222002_200201223.html
(last visited Jan. 25, 2002).
148. See Tim Collie, Tribunals Would Be Models For Future Terrorist Trials, S. FLA. SUN
SENTINEL, Jan. 12, 2002, at IA. See also Convention (No. III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisonersof
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter the "Geneva Convention"], available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2002).
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conventions to the extent they are appropriate."' 149 Under that extraordinarily
ambiguous statement, Secretary Rumsfeld apparently, while nodding to the
Geneva Convention, has apparently left wide open the possibility of radical
departures 50from conventional protections afforded prisoners of war facing military
tribunals.1
Secretary Rumsfeld's argument that al Qaeda members are not prisoners of
war is supported by the text of the Geneva Convention. Certainly, a prisoner of war
must necessarily come from a military group.' 5' Under the Geneva Convention, the
armed forces of a signatory State are automatically protected. 152 However, when
captured prisoners hale from "other militias" or "other volunteer corps," they must
meet several criteria to qualify for protection. 53 Among the criteria is the
requirement that they report to a commanding authority, have a recognized military
insignia, openly carry their arms, and conduct their operations "in accordance with
the laws and customs of war."'' 54 According to Ruth Wedgewood, a former federal
prosecutor and current professor of law and international diplomacy at Johns
Hopkins University, al Qaeda does not meet that criteria.' 55 "AI-Qaida defines
itself as a group solely to make jihad, to make war and to use terrorism to do it. It
doesn't have a recognizable charitable function like Hamas or Hezbollah, it doesn't
have recognizable insignias."' i 56 On that basis, the Geneva Convention affords no
protection to the detainees. The next section examines what protection the U.S.
Constitution may afford.
B. Are Al Qaeda Militants Protectedby the US. Constitution?
While the Supreme Court has developed a "rich, complex, and seemingly
incoherent jurisprudence of the non-citizen," 157 resulting in at least five different
standards of review, 58 a general policy has emerged: outside of the immigration

149. See Collie, supra note 148.
150. All rights, however, have not been lost. Under the Military Order, a] Qaeda militants housed at
Camp X-Ray are to be provided with humane treatment, adequate food, water, shelter, clothing, medical
treatment, and are allowed the free exercise of religion. See Military Order, supra note 109, at § (3)(b)(d).
151. See Geneva Convention, supra note 148, at art. 4, § 1.
152. Id.
153. See id. atart.4, § 2.
154. See id. at art. 4, § 2(a)-(d). See also Michael C. Dorf, Findlaw Forum: What is an 'Unlawful'
Combatant, and Why Does it Matter?, available at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/01/columns/
fl.dorf.combatants.01.23/index.htm (last visited Jan 27, 2002). The Geneva Convention's criteria
extends at least as far back as 1899. See Convention With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Jul. 29, 1899, Annex, art. 1, 32 Stat. 1803, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalonl
lawofWar/hague02.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2002).
155. See Collie, supra note 148.
156. Id.
157. Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81
IOWA L. REV. 707, 711 (1996).

158. The standards of review range from strict scrutiny, based on a determination that aliens are a
"discrete and insular minority," see, e.g. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) ("[A]liens as
a class are a prime example of a discrete and insular minority for whom such heightened judicial
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context, non-citizens residing in the U.S. are protected by the Constitution., 59 For
the most part, the detainees are non-citizens. Therefore, the question of whether
constitutional protections extend to al Qaeda detainees must necessarily be decided
upon whether Guantanamo Bay, Cuba's Camp X-Ray is within the U.S.' sovereign
territory. 160 Such analysis has legal precedent: in 1950, the Supreme Court held
that German nationals captured in China at the end of World War II had no right to
nationals were seized
file habeas corpus petitions in any U.S. court, because the
6
and held at all times outside the U.S.' sovereign territory.1 1
In the instant case, the U.S. government argues that no federal court has
authority over al Qaeda militants being held at Camp X-Ray. 62 In a recent brief
filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, 163 government
lawyers argued that Camp X-Ray is not sovereign territory because Cuba retained
sovereignty when it leased the base to the U.S. in 1903.' 64 The Cuban government
solicitude is appropriate"), to nonjusticiability, which considers this issue to fall under the political
questions doctrine, such that aliens' status should be determined by the legislative, not the judicial
branch. See Scaperlanda, supra note 157, at 711. These two poles represent the two broad categories
into which the five standards fall: "one marked by extreme deference to the political branches of
government, and the other, in stark contrast, marked by heightened suspicion of invidious governmental
action." Id. at 712.
159. See e.g. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 754 (1893) ("Aliens from countries at
peace with us, domiciled within our country by its consent, are entitled to all the guaranties for the
protection of their persons and property which are secured to native-born citizens. ...Arbitrary and
despotic power can no more be exercised over them with reference to their persons and property, than
over the persons and property of native-born citizens. They differ only from citizens in that they cannot
vote or hold any public office. As men having our common humanity, they are protected by all the
guaranties of the Constitution."); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-69 (1886) ("The rights of
The
petitioners.. are not less because they are aliens and subjects of the Emperor of China ....
[Its]
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens ....
provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality ....); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-80
(1976) ("The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause
does not lead to the further conclusion that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of
citizenship or, indeed, to the conclusion that all aliens must be placed in a single homogeneous legal
classification. For a host of constitutional and statutory provisions rest on the premise that a legitimate
distinction between citizens and aliens may justify attributes and benefits for one class not accorded to
the other.... In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.").
160. See e.g. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 260 (1990) (holding that "those
cases in which aliens have been determined to enjoy certain constitutional rights establish only that
aliens receive such protections when they have come within the territory of, and have developed
substantial connections with, this country.").
161. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 (1950) ("We have pointed out that the privilege
of litigation has been extended to aliens, whether friendly or enemy, only because permitting their
presence in the country implied protection. No such basis can be invoked here, for these prisoners at no
relevant time were within any territory over which the United States is sovereign, and the scenes of
their offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of
any court of the United States.").
162. See David Rosenzweig, Response to Terror: U.S. Asks Judge to Reject Claim Over Detainee
Prisoners,L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2002, at A5.
163. See id.
164. See id.
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agrees with that assessment. In a statement deriding the U.S.' use of Guantanamo
Bay for detention facilities, Cuba states that "[t]he American Naval Base at
Guantanamo is a facility located in an area of 117.6 square kilometers of the
national territory of Cuba .... 16 5 In Coalition of Clergy v. George Walker Bush,
the United States District Court for the Central District of California agrees with
both Cuba's and the U.S. government's assertion: Camp X-Ray is not within U.S.
sovereign territory.'66
The federal district court's conclusion stems from the language of the lease
agreement itself. 167 According to the Lease Agreement:
While on the one hand the United States recognizes the continuance of the
ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over the above described areas of
land and water, on the other hand the Republic of Cuba consents that during the
period of occupation by the United States of said areas under the terms of this

shall exercise complete jurisdiction and control over
agreement the United States
68
and within said areas.1

Coalition of Clergy is dispositive on this issue, stating that the Lease
Agreement's assignation of "jurisdiction and control" to the U.S. does not arise to
"sovereignty," because the lease itself distinguished between the two.' 69 At least
two other federal court cases have dealt with this issue, and agree with this
determination.1 70 Therefore, while the U.S. retains jurisdiction and control over the
immediate area, Cuba retains sovereignty, as established by international treaty,
and judicially recognized by U.S. courts. Accordingly, because the detainees are
not held in U.S. sovereign territory, constitutional protections are not afforded
them.

171

The determination that Camp X-Ray does not lie within U.S. territory
broaches another question, whether any U.S. court has jurisdiction over the

165. See Declaraci6n del Gobiemo de laRepfiblica de Cuba a laOpini6n Ptblica Nacional e
Internacional, II de enero del 2002 [Statement by the Government of Cuba to the National and
International Public Opinion January 11, 2002], available at http://www.cuba.cu/gobiemo/documentos/
2002/ing/dII0102i.html (last visited Apr. 5,2002).
166. See Coalition of Clergy v. George Walker Bush, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *41 (C.D.
Cal. 2002).
167. See Lease to the United States of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 23,
1903, U.S.-Cuba, T.S. No. 418 [hereinafter the "Lease Agreement"], as modified by Treaty Between
the United States of America and Cuba Defining their Relations, May 29, 1934, art. 111, 48 Stat 1682,
1683.
168. Lease Agreement, supra note 167, at art. III.
169. See Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748, at *38 ("The agreement explicitly
distinguishes the two in providing that Cuba retains 'sovereignty' whereas 'jurisdiction and control' are
exercised by the United States.").
170. See Cuban American Bar Assoc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1425 (1 IthCir. 1995) ("[T]he
district court erred in concluding that Guantanamo Bay was a 'United States territory.' We disagree that
control and jurisdiction is equivalent to sovereignty."); Bird v. Unites States, 923 F.Supp. 338, 342-43
(D. Conn. 1996) (holding that sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay remained with Cuba).
171. This does not address the possibility of extending jurisdiction over the detainees' captors, as
detailed below. See infra section IV(C).
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detainees. Coalition of Clergy v. George Walker Bush addresses that issue when
analyzing whether al Qaeda militants are being illegally detained in Guantanamo
Bay.
C. The Applicability of the Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum: Coalitionof
Clergy v. George Walker Bush
Under our law, the alien in several respects stands on an equal footing with
citizens, but in others has never been conceded legal parity with the citizen.., he
may invoke the writ of habeas corpus to protect his personal liberty; in criminal
proceedings against him, he must be accorded the protections of the Fifth and
172
Sixth Amendments ....
We are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any other country where the
writ is known, has issued it on behalf of an alien enemy who, at no relevant time
and in no stage of his captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction. Nothing
in the text
of the Constitution extends such a right, nor does anything in our
1 73
statutes.
The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, Latin for "you should have the
body to submit to,' ' 1 74 has been applied for and ordered for nearly eight hundred
years. 75 The writ is issued in order to bring a party before the court, "to test the
legality of the detention or imprisonment."'' 76 Use of the writ is protected under the
U.S. Constitution, which states the "privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it.' 1 77 Federal judges are empowered to issue writs of habeas
corpus.178

On January 20, 2002, a group ofjournalists, lawyers, and clergy filed a writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California. Their petition, Coalition of Clergy v. George Walker Bush, alleges that
the detainees are being held "against their will and in violation of the United States
Constitution and the Geneva Convention."' 7 9 The petition seeks the "identification
of the persons involuntarily detained, that each of them be brought physically
before the court for a determination of their statuses"' 80 and the prevention of any
172. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 US 580, 586 & n.9 (1952).
173. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950).
174. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 284 (Pocket Ed. 1996).
175. In 1220, the words habeas corpora appeared on an "order directing an English sheriff to
produce parties to a trespass action before the Court of Common pleas." See Coalition of Clergy v.
George Walker Bush, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
176. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 709 (6h Ed. 1990).
177. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9.
178. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2001).
179. See Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, Coalition of Clergy v. George Walker
Bush, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (No. CV 02-570 AHM), available at
http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov (last visited Feb. 23, 2002).
180. Id. at 5.

2002

PROSECUTING AL QAEDA

transfer of the detainees from Camp X-Ray.'8 In response, the District Court
issued a show cause order, and, expressing "strong doubts that it has
jurisdiction,"'18 2 ordered written briefs addressing several8 3 questions centering on
1
both the petitioners' standing and the court's jurisdiction.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus "shall be in writing signed and
verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his
behalf." ' 4 Under the Whitmore-Massie "next friend" test,185 a third party has
standing to ask a court to issue a writ of habeas corpus, provided that: "(1)... the
petitioner is unable to litigate his own cause due to mental incapacity, lack of
access to court, or other similar disability; and (2) the next friend has some
significant relationship with, and is truly dedicated to the best interests of,
petitioner."'18 6 Quite simply, the Whitmore-Massie test was inapplicable because
the petitioners had no next-friend standing. According to the District Court, the
petitioners lacked a significant relationship, "indeed, any relationship,"' I8 7 with the
detainees. 188 That lack of standing thus precluded the instant court from hearing the
case. 8 9 The granting of a writ of habeas corpus is controlled by 28 U.S.C. §
2241.190 Under Section 2241, a writ of habeas corpus "may be granted by the
Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within
their respective jurisdictions."19'
In Carbo v. United States, the Supreme Court discussed the meaning of the
phrase "within their respective jurisdictions." According to the Supreme Court,
the phrase... acts as an obvious limitation upon the action of individual judges'
because it reflects the conclusion of Congress that it would be "inconvenient,
potentially embarrassing, certainly expensive and on the whole quite unnecessary
to provide every judge anywhere with the authority to issue the [writ)
192 on behalf of
applicants far distantly removed from the courts whereon they sat."'
The court may, however, retain jurisdiction when the "custodian of the
petitioner" is within the district. 93 While 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) provides for

181. See id. at 9.

182. See Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *4.
183. See 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 907 at * 1 ("RESPONDENTS ARE HEREBY ORDERED TO
SHOW CAUSE WHY they should not be subject to the jurisdiction of this Court in a habeas corpus
persons allegedly held by them at the U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.").
184. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2001).
185. See Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *12. See also Massie v. Woodford,
244 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2001).
186. Massie, 244 F.3d at 1194.

187. See Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *22.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
362 U.S.
193.

See id.
See id. at *23.
See 28 U.S.C.S. § 2241 (2001).
See id. at § 2241(a).
See Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *25, quoting Carbo v. United States,
611,617 (1961).
See Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *25.
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nationwide service of process on "officers or employees of the United States,"' 94
the Ninth Circuit holds that this "does not extend habeas corpus jurisdiction to
persons outside the territorial limits of the district court."' 95 Incorporating the
discussion above, 196 the District Court determined that there was "no showing or
allegation that any named respondent is within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Central District of California."' 197 Thus, the District Court concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction, and denied issuing a writ of habeas corpus.9s
While the District Court noted that it lacked jurisdiction over the detainees or
their custodians, that determination does not directly dispose of the case. The
District Court noted that a means of continuing the action is to transfer the case to
another court, one having jurisdiction over the detainees' custodian or anyone else
in the "chain of command."' 199 In order to transfer the instant case to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia, three conditions must be met: "(1) the
transferring court lacks jurisdiction; (2) the transferee court could have exercised
jurisdiction at the time the action was filed; and (3) the transfer is in the interest of
justice.' 20 0 According to federal law as applied in the Ninth Circuit, if another
federal court can exercise jurisdiction, then the law "mandates not dismissal, but
transfer to that court.",20' The analysis here focuses upon that requirement.
The Supreme Court supports the transferring of cases between district courts
when jurisdiction over another "in the chain of command" can be established in the
new court. 202 For example, in Ex parte Hayes, a U.S. Army private stationed in
Germany sought habeas corpus relief, asserting that the Army failed to fulfill his
enlistment commitment and thus his "continued retention by the Army [was] ... in
violation of law and army regulations. 2 3 The Supreme Court noted that while
"the applicant's commanding officer is in Germany, outside the territorial limits of
any district court .... others in the chain of command... are in the District of
Columbia. ' , 20 4 As such, the Supreme Court determined that the Army was subject
to the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia, to where the case was then
transferred.2 °5
In Coalition of Clergy, the District Court for the Central District of California
determined that no jurisdiction could be transferred, because no jurisdiction could
194. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (2001).
195. See Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *25.
196. See supra section IV(B).
197. See Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *26.
198. See id.
199. Exparte Hayes, 414 U.S. 1327, 1328 (1973).
200. Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 907 at *28, quoting Cruz-Aguilera v. INS, 245
F.3d 1070, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2001).
201. See Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *27; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2001)
("Whenever a civil action is filed in a court.., and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction,
the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action. . . to any other such court in which
the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed .....
202. Exparte Hayes, 414 U.S. at 1328.
203. Exparte Hayes, supra note 202, at 1327.
204. See id. at 1328.
205. See id. at 1329.
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be established in that court. As determined above, the petitioners lacked nextfriend status.20 6 Additionally, because the detainees are being held outside the
sovereign territory of the U.S., no transfer could be executed because no District
Court does, or could, have jurisdiction over the detainees. 2°7 The District Court
based that determination on the Supreme Court's holding in Johnson v.
Eisentrager. 208
In Eisentrager, the U.S. Army captured twenty-one German nationals in
China after Germany's surrender to the Allied forces. 20 9 The prisoners were
accused of spying for Japan by providing intelligence on American troop
movements. 2 They were tried and convicted by a military commission created by
the U.S. Commanding General in Nanking, China.21' In that case, the authority for
convening the Military Commission came from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
acting through the Commanding General of the U.S. Forces, China Theatre. 2 12 The
military commission was convened in China, under the express consent of the
Chinese government,213 yet involved no international participants.21 4 The prisoners
were convicted, their sentences were reviewed by 21military
authorities, and they
5
were repatriated to Germany for service of sentence.
Subsequent to that decision, an appeal was brought in federal district court. In
circumstances similar to the Coalition of Clergy case, the direct custodians of the
prisoners could not be served due to lack of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court agreed that while the "prisoners are in immediate physical custody of an
officer or officers not parties to the proceeding, respondents named in the petition
have lawful authority to effect that release. 2 16 The case proceeded against the
Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff of the Army, and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S.2 17 Among the allegations were complaints that the
conviction and imprisonment violated "the Geneva Convention's provisions
governing the treatment of prisoners of war." 218 The District Court issued a rule to
show cause, and dismissed the case for lack ofjurisdiction.2 19
The District Court's ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, which concluded that "any person deprived of his liberty anywhere under
any purported authority of the United States is entitled to the writ if he can show
that extension to his case of any constitutional rights or limitations would show his

206. See supra text accompanying note 187.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *27.
See id. at *29.
See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765-66 (1950).
See id. at 766.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 766-67.
Johnson v. Eisentrager, supra note 209, at 767.

218. Id.

219. See id.
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imprisonment illegal., 220 That statutory jurisdiction must be held "as part of the
judicial power of the United States," 221 and "where deprivation of liberty by an
official act occurs outside the territorial jurisdiction of any District Court, the
petition will lie in the District Court which has territorial jurisdiction over officials
who have directive power over the immediate jailer., 222 Thus, under the Court of
Appeals analysis, an extraterritorial violation is indistinguishable from a territorial
violation, provided that jurisdiction can be established over anyone in the chain of
command.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals argument that "[the
answers stem directly from fundamentals [and] cannot be found by causal
reference to statutes or cases., 223 Instead, the Supreme Court, while acknowledging
that no statute directly addressed the issues, held that the answer does not stem
from abstract fundamentals, rather, it comes from the Constitution
itself. Indeed,
224
"[n]othing in the text of the Constitution extends such a right.,
Discussing what rights the Constitution does afford, the Supreme Court
reasoned that the Constitution does not abolish distinctions between resident
enemy aliens and nonresident enemy aliens.225 That is, there appears to be a sliding
scale of protections afforded aliens, such protections enlarging as the alien
"increases his identity with our society., 22 6 According to the Supreme Court,
"[m]ere lawful presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe
conduct and gives [the alien] certain rights; they become more extensive and
secure when he makes [a] preliminary declaration of intention to become a citizen,
and they expand to those of full citizenship upon naturalization. 227
These constitutional protections, however, do not extend to aliens outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. 228 The Supreme Court noted that the founding
fathers were the authors of the Bill of Rights, they wrote three Acts 229 which, by
denying enemy aliens "the constitutional immunities of citizens, it seems not then
to have been supposed that a nation's obligations to its foes could ever be put on a
parity with those to its defenders. 230 Continuing that historical analysis, the
220. Id. (emphasis added).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 768.
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. Id. at 770.
227. Id.
228. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, supra note 209, at 770. See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 369 (1886) (holding that the Fourth Amendment's provisions are universal in their application, to
all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States).
229. See An Act concerning Aliens, Jun. 25, 1798, 1 Stat. 570; An Act respecting Alien Enemies,
Jul. 6, 1798, 1 Stat. 577; and An Act in addition to the act, entitled "An act for the punishment of
certain crimes against the United States," Jul. 14, 1798, 1 Stat. 596.
230. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 775. Founding father James Madison drew a distinction between
enemy and non-enemy aliens: "With respect to alien enemies, no doubt has been intimated as to the
federal authority over them; the Constitution having expressly delegated to Congress the power to
declare war against any nation, and of course to treat it and all its members as enemies." See id. at 775
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Supreme Court noted that the executive branch's power over enemy aliens,
"undelayed and unhampered by litigation, has been deemed throughout our history,
[to be] essential to war-time security."'231 In Eisentrager, the Supreme Court
determined that the prisoners were enemy aliens, had neither been to nor resided in
the U.S., were both captured and held outside U.S. territory, were tried and
convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the U.S. for violations of the
laws of war committed outside the U.S., and were imprisoned outside the U.S. at
all times.2 2 The Supreme Court thus overturned the Court of Appeals' holding
which had found jurisdiction.233 Instead, the Supreme Court denied the writ of
habeas corpus, in a holding which stated:
We are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any other country where the
writ is known, has issued it on behalf of an alien enemy who, at no relevant time
and in no stage of his captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction. Nothing
of the Constitution extends such a right, nor does anything in our
in the text
234
statutes.
In Coalition of Clergy, the District Court determined that the Eisentrager
holding was controlling. The District Court concluded that no court, including the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, could have jurisdiction
over the detainees because:
[tlhey are aliens; they were enemy combatants; they were captured in combat;
they were abroad when captured; they are abroad now; since their capture, they
have been under the control of only the military; they have not stepped foot on
entitling them to
American soil; and there are no legal or judicial precedents
235
pursue a writ of habeas corpus in an American civil court.
The District Court therefore dismissed the suit with prejudice.236
The above analysis establishes that according to U.S. law, the detention and
military trial of the al Qaeda detainees is proper. However, while "proper,"
America's foreign policy interests may still be best served by trying al Qaeda
internationally. The next section analyzes that argument.
V. THE ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING AND DISFAVORING PROSECUTING AL QAEDA
UNDER INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS

The spectrum of arguments supporting and disfavoring prosecuting al Qaeda
under international tribunals fall into three broad categories: the desire for
retribution, security concerns, and fairness and human rights issues. The arguments

n.6, quoting Madison's Report, 4 Elliot's Deb. 546, 554 (1800).
231. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 774.
232. See id. at 777.
233. See id. at 790.
234. Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *31.
235. See id. at *34.
236. See Coalition of Clergy, supra note 234, at *41.
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for international prosecution tend to fall under the latter category, while the
arguments for domestic military tribunals generally fall under the first two.
A. The Arguments Supportingthe Prosecutionof al Qaeda Under International
Tribunals
1.

The International Community has Provided Only Qualified Support of
U.S. Actions

Foreign nations were quick to support the U.S.'s initial anti-terrorism
response following the events of September 1 th. According to a U.S. State
Department report, 136 countries offered military support, 46 multilateral
organizations "declared their support," and 142 countries worked with the U.S. by
freezing financial assets.237 Saudi Arabia and the Middle Eastern states were
"supportive" and "ready to cooperate., 23' This foreign cooperation, however, did
not extend to the unequivocal support for using military tribunals to prosecute al
Qaeda members. That hesitancy may be explained by Article 2 of the European
Convention of Human Rights.
Under the European Convention of Human Rights, no European country may
extradite to a country where the death penalty will be used.23 9 Accordingly, the 43nation Council of Europe "urged European governments to ensure the death
penalty would not be sought before permitting any suspects to be extradited to the
United States., 240 Apparently acceding to that request, Spain refused to extradite
suspected al Qaeda members to the U.S. unless assurances would be made that
their cases would be tried in civilian courts, 241 or ina setting where the death
penalty would not be used.242 As succinctly stated by Luis Jordana, an international
criminal lawyer, "harsher measures can end up being counterproductive. 243
Were the tribunals conducted as an ad hoc tribunal of the type created by the
United Nations Security Council in the 1990s, prosecuting the detainees in such a
237. See COALITION INFO. CENTERS, The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days, available
at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/6947.htn (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).
238. Id.
239. Under Article 2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, "1. Everyone
has the right to life. 2. No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed." See COUNCIL OF
THE EU, Charterof FundamentalRights of the European Union, art. 2, Doc. No. 1023 (2001), available
at http://ue.eu.int/df/docs/en/EN_2001_1023.pdf. (last visited Jan. 23, 2002). See also Keith Johnson &
Carlta Vitzthum, EuropeansMake Case Against Use of Military Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2001,
at A12.
240. See AP, InternationalConcern Over US DetaineesAt GuantanamoBay, WASH. POST, Jan. 24,
2002, at AI7.
241. See Matthew Purdy, Legal Powers Are Expanded in Bush Plan, N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERV.,
Nov. 26,2001.
242. See Bush to Seek Spain's Backingfor Holding Military Tribunals, DESERET NEWS, Nov. 26,
2001, at A8.
243. Luis Jordana is a lawyer for Barcelona-based Cuatrecasas. See Keith Johaon and Carlta
Vitzthum, Europeans Make Case Against Use of Military Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2001, at
A12.
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forum may eliminate that hesitation and concern. Due to the particular constraints
imposed upon tribunals formed by the United Nations Security Council, the death
penalty would be unavailable. 244 Because at least some al Qaeda militants have
been detained in foreign countries, eliminating that bar to extradition may thus
mean that more al Qaeda militants are prosecuted and held accountable for their
crimes. However, such prosecution would necessarily fall under a non-capital
sentencing scheme.
2.

The U.S.' Steps Towards Investigating Suspected al Qaeda Have Caused
a Weakening of Traditional Constitutional Protections

"Amnesty Internationalbelieves that the Military Order threatens to severely
undermine, rather than reinforce, confidence in the administration ofjustice and
maintenance of the rule of law. The organization considers that in proceedings
undertaken
pursuant to this order, justice will neither be done, nor seen to be
24 5
done."
"[Ihfthe president can suspend246
one constitutionalprinciple today, the danger
is he can suspend others tomorrow."
While the al Qaeda detainees are not afforded the protections of the U.S.
Constitution, the weakening of traditional constitutional rights is a subject of much
concern. According to Nadine Strossen, president of the American Civil Liberties
Union, President Bush "bypasses Congress and the people by issuing executive
orders that essentially violate separation of powers and the checks and balances
system we have in this country., 247 This weakening of traditional constitutional
privileges and protections has taken on many forms.
In a Justice Department memo penned during the late fall of 2001, the
Honorable Judge Michael J. Creppy, the U.S.' chief immigration judge, imposed a
rule requiring that immigration hearings be conducted in secret. 248 Under that rule,
immigration courts were required "to close the hearings to the public, and to avoid
discussing the case or otherwise disclosing any information about the case. 249
While ostensibly made to protect the security of the involved parties, both
prosecution and defense, such proceedings have typically been open. While it may
be simplistic to state that procedural openness promotes constitutionality, the
closed nature of the proceedings eliminates one of the normally-present factors
enforcing the propriety of the system; that is, public observance of the judicial
process.
244. See supra text accompanying note 61.
245. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 142.
246. Timothy Lynch, Director of the criminal justice project of the Cato Institute, quoted in
William Glaberson, Liberal and Conservative Groups to Challenge Bush on Expansion of Powers, N.Y.
TIMES NEWS SERV., Nov. 30, 2001.
247. Karen E. Crummy, War takes toll on liberty - Feds wielding 'extraordinary'powers,BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 25, 2001.

248. See William Glaberson, Groups Criticize Recent Order on Secret Court Hearings for
Immigrants,N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERV., Dec. 7, 2001.
249. Id.
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Several other positions taken at both the federal and local level may impinge
the constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. The federal
government has decided to conduct interviews of 5,000 Middle Eastern men who
have entered the U.S. during the last two years.250 In New York City, police
searched their records for old petty crime warrants issued to those having Middle
Eastern-sounding names. 25' Over 100 people were found and interviewed, "with
the warrants used to encourage full cooperation. 252 Investigators have even
searched records on over 200 college campuses, seeking information on Middle
Eastern students, their studies, and their addresses. 253 Investigators made
unannounced visits "asking about anything from their views on Osama bin Laden
to their educational plans. '254 While the first group may have reason to be stopped
because warrants exist, and while the questions posed to the second group may fall
under "investigatory stop" procedures, 255 the pretextural reasons underlying the
stops should cause one to pause and consider the propriety of such actions. While
clear and convincing reasons may exist for such intrusion in the instant case,
caution should be exercised when large-scale detention and questioning stems from
hunches based upon simplistic connections like the sound of ones' name.
Several Bush Administration moves have signaled further reductions in
privileges afforded both the al Qaeda detainees and other terrorist defendants.
According to Marine Brigadier General Mike Lenhert, head of the task force in
charge of the detention facility, the detainees have been prevented from having
lawyers present during the interrogations taking place at Camp X-Ray.256
Additionally, even if counsel were afforded, a recent decision by the U.S. Justice
Department permits the listening in on conversations between lawyers and jailed
defendants. 257 This "special administrative measure" 258 "permits the monitoring of
attorney-client communications for these detainees only if the Attorney
General ...makes the additional finding that reasonable suspicion exists to believe
that a particular detainee may use communications with attorneys to further or
facilitate acts of terrorism. 259 Safeguards, however, have been provided. Among
250. See Purdy, supra note 120.
251. See id.
252. Id.
253. See id.
254. Id.
255. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 n.16 (1968) (holding that not all personal
intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons; only when the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen has a
,seizure' occurred).
256. See Tony Winton, Guards at Guantanamo Say Apparent Command Structure GrowingAmong
Prisoners,AP, Jan. 27, 2002, availableat http://dailynewslosangeles.com/socal/terrorist/0l 02/27/terror
09.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2002).
257. See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2001). See also David E. Sanger, Bush Defends Secret Tribunals in
Terrorist Cases,N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERV., Nov. 30, 2001; Jess Bravin, Deputy to Ashcroft and Senators
Clashon TribunalPolicy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2001, at A4.
258. See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(a).
259. Dinh, infra note 301, at 404. See also 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) ("In any case where the Attorney
General specifically so orders, based on information from the head of a federal law enforcement or
intelligence agency that reasonable suspicion exists to believe that a particular inmate may use
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the requirements: there must be written advanced notice that communication will
be monitored; there can be no access between the monitoring team and any
prosecution effort; absent "imminent violence or terrorism," a court order is
required; and no privileged information will be retained.260 While this decision was
ostensibly made to "prevent prisoners from directing terrorist operations from
prison by using their lawyers to convey instructions to at-large confederates, 26'
the destruction of the attorney-client privilege is a serious violation of the legal
right to counsel, and as such should not be disposed of lightly. Additionally, were
counsel afforded the al Qaeda detainees, the extraterritorial nature of their
detention provides no surety that any U.S. law applies to them. In that case, there
may be no bar to listening in on attorney-client communications.
While this weakening of traditional constitutional privileges and protections
has taken on many forms, they have but a single overriding effect. The Bush
Administration is providing little room for captured al Qaeda militants to mount a
defense: procedurally, their rights are stymied; their access to counsel befuddled,
and their right to privileged communication with counsel eviscerated.
3.

Prosecuting the Detainees Internationally Preserves the U.S.' Human
Rights Stance

The worldwide promotion of human rights is in keeping with America's most
deeply held values. It is also strongly in our interests. Freedom fights terrorism,
instability and conflict. Time and again, experience has shown that countries which
demonstrate high degrees of respect for human rights also are the most secure and
the most successful. Indeed, respect for human rights is essential to lasting peace
and sustained economic growth, goals which Americans share with people all over
the world.262
Over the last few months, I have heard the worry that the war on terrorism
will sideline America's interest in human rights. This is far from true. In fact, the
protection of human rights is even more important now than ever. The U.S.
Government is deeply committed to the promotion of universal human rights and
the development of pluralistic, accountable governments.263
communications with attorneys or their agents to further or facilitate acts of terrorism, the Director,
Bureau of Prisons, shall, in addition to the special administrative measures imposed under paragraph (a)
of this section, provide appropriate procedures for the monitoring or review of communications
between that inmate and attorneys or attorneys' agents who are traditionally covered by the attorneyclient privilege, for the purpose of deterring future acts that could result in death or serious bodily injury
to persons, or substantial damage to property that would entail the risk of death or serious bodily injury
to persons.").
260. Dinh, infra note 301, at 404-05.
261. See Jess Bravin, Deputy to Ashcroft and Senators Clash on Tribunal Policy, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 29, 2001, at A4.
262. U.S. Sec'y of State Colin Powell, Remarks to the Press (Mar. 4, 2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/8635.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2002).
263. Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Lome Craner, Remarks
to the Press (Mar. 4, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/8635.htm (last visited
Mar. 4, 2002).
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One benefit of trying terrorists in international military tribunals is the
preservation of the U.S.' ability to censure other nations for human-rights abuses;
as William Safire puts it, the preservation of the "moral high ground." 264 This
position will likely become untenable if military tribunals are used to violate basic
human and legal rights. Understandably, the importance of this argument depends
upon one's view of the need to protect human rights on the international scene,
whether the U.S. has any ability to truly influence international human rights, and
whether such interest outweighs the natural desire for retribution in the wake of the
events of September 11 th. The view here is that it does.
For many years, the U.S. State Department has held that moral high ground
by fighting against foreign nations' use of military tribunals and secret courts.265 In
the 2000 edition of its annual human rights report, the State Department criticized
several foreign countries for using the very type of tribunals proposed by President
Bush. 2 In that report, the State Department criticized Egypt's use of military
courts to try terrorist defendants, stating that the military courts have "deprived
hundreds of civilian defendants of their constitutional right to be tried by a civilian
judge. 267 The report also criticized the military courts' lack of independence:
the military courts do not ensure civilian defendants due process before an
independent tribunal. While military judges are lawyers, they are also military
officers appointed by the Minister of Defense and subject to military discipline.
They are neither as independent
nor as qualified as civilian judges in applying the
26 8
civilian Penal Code.
The State Department's criticism is at least partially applicable to President
Bush's military tribunals, as here there is no provision for civilian judges, and no
judicial independence from the military. As its detractors have pointed out, "it is
hard to see how the State Department will be able to preserve this language
[critical of other
nations' use of such tribunals] without opening itself to a charge
26 9
of hypocrisy.

Several foreign nations have voiced concerns over the treatment of the
detainees. Malaysia has publicly voiced that they consider the treatment of the al
Qaeda members at Camp X-Ray to be "inhumane. 270 Germany has "expressed
human rights concerns and said Washington was jeopardizing support for the war
on terrorism. 27' In Great Britain, protests in Parliament and the press have led the
British Prime Minister Tony Blair to state that his government "would prefer to
264. See Satire, supra note 2.
265. See Neil King Jr., Bush's Plan to Use Tribunal Will Hurt US. in Human-Rights Arena, Some
Say, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2001.
266. See id.
267. U.S. STATE DEP'T, Egypt: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2000, available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/nea/784.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2002).
268. Egypt: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices2000, supra note 267.
269. See King, supra note 265, quoting Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch.
270. See AP, InternationalConcern Over US DetaineesAt Guantanamo Bay, DOW JONES ASIAN
EQUITIES REPORT, Jan. 24, 2002.

271. Id.
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have [the] three British detainees returned home to stand trial." 2,,72 Britain's Foreign
Secretary Jack Straw agrees, stating that it is "far preferable" for British suspects
"to come to the United Kingdom and face justice here. 273
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld has been forced to counter the notion of
inhumane treatment, stating "[l]et there be no doubt the treatment of the detainees
in Guantanamo Bay is proper, it's humane, it's appropriate and it is fully consistent
with international conventions." 274 Those provisions include, "8-by-8-by-7.5-foot
holding units... warm showers, toilets, water, clean clothes, blankets, regular and
culturally appropriate meals, prayer mats and the right to practice their religion,
modem medical attention, exercise, writing materials and visits by the
International Committee of the Red Cross. ' 275 According to Secretary Rumsfeld,
"the United States is treating them-all detainees-consistently with the principles
of the Geneva Convention.' 276
4.

Prosecuting the Detainees Internationally May Preserve the U.S.' Ability
to Protect U.S. Citizens Detained Abroad

"[Tihere is a real question about whether this doesn't expose US. citizens to
greater risk of secret trials overseas... It will be very hardfor the US.277to argue
that defendants in all countriesshould be treatedas they are in the US."
Another concern is that the existence of this alternate judicial system itself
may impact the U.S.' ability to protect U.S. citizens arrested and tried abroad. 278
That is, applying here what amounts to a bifurcated legal system may eliminate
protections currently afforded U.S. citizens abroad. The State Department's
criticism of such military tribunals in countries like Russia, China, Egypt, Peru and
Columbia, while not causing legal reform, has provided "leverage" in assisting
Americans facing such trials in foreign lands. 279 U.S. citizen Lori Berenson is
currently appealing a 20-year sentence handed down by a Peruvian court for
collaborating with leftist rebels in a plot to attack Peru's Congress. 280 Berenson
was convicted by military tribunal in 1996.281 Were the U.S. to back her arguments
that her rights were "violated in a sham trial that relied on shoddy evidence," 292 it
is likely those arguments would create little leverage as the U.S. itself has put forth
procedures for conducting similar trials.

272. See AP,Britain Asks for Return of Terror Suspect as Europe and Malaysia Voice Concerns,
Jan. 24,2002.
273. Id.
274. See Jim Garamone, supra note 147.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Elisa Massimino, Washington director for the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, quoted
in King, supranote 265.
278. Id.
279. See King, supra note 265.
280. See The World, L.A. TIMES., Jan. 23, 2002, at AS.
28 1. See id,
282. Jd.
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Domestic Pressures Militate Against the Use of Domestic Military
Tribunals

Some cracks may be developing in high-level U.S. support for prosecuting al
Qaeda members at Camp X-Ray. The U.S. State Department has recommended
that President Bush consider reclassifying the al Qaeda militants as prisoners of
war. 28 3 In a remarkable turn of events, Secretary of State Colin Powell asked
President Bush to reverse his stance on the status of the al Qaeda members.28 4
Powell argued that the Geneva Convention "does apply to both al-Qaida and the
Taliban... however [the] fighters could be determined not to be prisoners of
war... but only on a case-by-case basis following individual hearings before a
military board.

28 5

However, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales has flatly

rejected such argument, stating that "the arguments for reconsideration and
reversal are unpersuasive. '2 6 Secretary of State Powell later retracted his
statement, stating "all of us in the administration are united in the view that they
are not deserving of prisoner of war status. 287 He did, however, state that a final
determination was yet to be made:
There is a question that we are examining, and it is a difficult question, and that is
the legal application of the Geneva Convention. This is a new kind of conflict. It
is a new world, but at the same time, we want to make sure that everybody
understands we are a nation of law, abiding by our international obligations. And
so we are examining very carefully and have been for a number of days now, the
exact applicability
or lack of applicability to the Geneva Convention to the
288
detainees.
Thus, the current political view leaves the detainees' status indeterminate, and
the political forces remain divided even at the highest levels. This author submits
that such discord points to a fundamental rift in the current Administration,
between those who find that the human rights value outweighs the desire for
retribution, and those who do not.

283. See Kelly Wallace & Andrea Koppell, Bush Advisors Debate Detainees Status, CNN, Jan. 26,
2002, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/01/26/ret.powell.detainees/index.html (last visited Jan. 27,

2002).
284. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Powell Asks Bush to Reverse Stand on War Captives, N.Y. TIMES
NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 27, 2002.

285. Seelye, supra note 284
286. Id.
287. See Colin L. Powell, Statement on President Bush's Budget Request for FY 2003, available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rmV2002/7806pf.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).
288. Id.
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B. The Arguments DisfavoringProsecutingal Qaeda Under International
Tribunals
1.

The Death Penalty

Military tribunals have a long history of imposing the death penalty.2 89 In the
instant situation, the emotional desire to impose the death penalty as a means of
retribution is obvious. However, were the detainees to be prosecuted under ad hoc
international tribunals of the type formed by the United Nations Security Counsel
in the mid-1990s, the death penalty would not be a sentencing option. 290 The
reasons underlying that restriction also apply to prosecution by the ICC. 29'
Historically, however, the death penalty was used in the international military
tribunals formed after World War 11.292 Following that precedent, the death penalty
therefore becomes an option only if the detainees are tried under a military
tribunal. International military tribunals are unlikely to be formed because foreign
nations were not specifically targeted in the attacks, even though al Qaeda
militants have been arrested internationally. Additionally, were the forming of
international military tribunals raised, it can be surmised that the U.S. would not
participate because the death penalty would not be a likely sentencing option.
Thus, the death penalty only becomes a realistic option if the al Qaeda militants are
prosecuted by "domestic" military tribunals.293
2.

Ensuring a High Conviction Rate

The possibility that relinquishing control of the detainees to an international
military tribunal may result in low conviction rates, may provide support for the
domestic military trial of al Qaeda militants. Following World War I, the
difficulties that surrounded the Allied attempts to try Germans for war crimes led
to the Supreme Court of the Reich at Leipzig becoming authorized to conduct
military trials.2 94 Of forty-five cases submitted, twelve individuals were tried, and
six convicted.295
While the low conviction rate may have been due to the empowering of a
German court to try Germans, this low conviction rate left the Allied powers
unsatisfied. The end result was that the Allies decided to conduct the trials
themselves under Articles 228 through 230 of the Versailles Treaty. 296 The

conviction rates resulting from these post World War II domestic military tribunals
289. See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
290. See supra text accompanying note 244.
291. See id.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
293. The term domestic as used in this latter argument encompasses both military tribunals
conducted upon U.S. sovereign territory, and extraterritorial locations like Camp X-Ray.
294. See supratext accompanying note 37; see also WOETZEL, supra note 22, at 32.
295. See WOETZEL, supra note 22, at 32.

296. Id.
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bespeak the benefit of their use. According to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
297
Wolfowitz, convictions were found inroughly eighty-five percent of cases.
3.

The Protection of America, and the American Psyche

Another argument supporting the use of domestic military tribunals is that
tribunals "are extensions of the military campaign, 298 and as such, may prevent
future attacks by either imprisoning terrorism leaders, or by the attendant fear of
prosecution or of the death penalty. Some argue that this extension of the military
campaign will preserve the American psyche:
Farming out our judicial interests for the 'global good' would set the terrible
precedent that we do not have the sovereign right as a nation to capture and try
people who have murdered or plan to murder our innocent citizens. Whatever
damage military tribunals do to our intemational reputation, we risk far greater
damage to our national psyche if non-citizen terrorists are allowed to exploit our
system and our national pain in prolonged and costly courtroom dramas.
In counterargument, a nation of law chooses to live by that rule. Once such a
nation crosses the threshold into possessing a mindset which selectively provides
for that rule of law, the very definition of a nation ruled by law becomes
weakened. A slippery slope may develop, one in which it becomes difficult to
determine when the rule of law applies, and when it doesn't. We have already seen
the waffling that has occurred over whether the international definition of a
prisoner of war applies to al Qaeda. While the definition may not strictly apply, the
penumbra of debate surrounding the issue suggests validity in the public's notion
that it clearly should apply.
4.

The Protection of Classified Information and Court Personnel

Prosecuting terrorists in any forum may bring danger to involved parties. One
argument is that the security inherent to a military tribunal mitigates any such
worry: "ordinary criminal trials would subject court personnel, jurors, and other
civilians to the threat of terrorist reprisals; the military is better suited to coping
with these dangers. '000 Additionally, prosecuting the detainees in front of a
military tribunal will protect classified information or informants involved in that
prosecution effort, as "[clommissions enable the government to protect classified
and other sensitive national-security information that would have to be disclosed
publicly before an Article III court." 30 1 Also, the U.S. may have a fundamental
interest in protecting sources, methods of interdiction, observation and the like,
297. See supra text accompanying note 49.
298. Douglas Kmiec, Dean of Catholic University Law School, quoted in Laura Ingraham, Military
Tribunals Provide StreamlinedJustice, USA TODAY, Nov. 26, 2001.

299. See Ingraham, supra note 298.
300. Viet D. Dinh, Foreword: Freedom and Security After September 11, 25
POL'Y 399, 405 (2002).
301. Id.
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which would be on public display were such trials moved into an international
venue.
VI. CONCLUSION

"These individuals were brought out of their county in shackles, drugged,
gagged and blindfolded, and are being held in open-air cages
30 2 in Cuba...
Someone should be assertingtheir rights under internationallaw."
These are trying times. Both logically and emotionally, the reasons behind the
desire to conduct military tribunals are understandable-many, many lives were
lost as a result of the tragic events surrounding September 1 lth. However, by
conducting such trials, the U.S. may be ceding the moral high ground, and
materially limiting its future foreign policy stance and the ability to curtail foreign
human rights abuses.
The tribunals empowered under President Bush's Military Order are the exact
types of trials that the U.S. openly condemns in the international community.
Under President Bush's military tribunal plan, there is no right to counsel during
interrogation, defendants may be convicted based upon a "probative value" not a
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, unanimous verdicts are not required, and
the sentences meted out may be severe, up to and including life imprisonment or
even death. Conducting trials as approved by the Military Order and under
procedures established by Order No. 1 will preclude the U.S. from arguing against
the use of such trials by other nations. The U.S. should preserve the moral high
ground by moving these trials into the international arena.

302. Erwin Chemerinsky, quoted in AP, Court Petition Challenges U.S. Detention of Terror
Suspects, available at http://www.cnn.com/2OO2ILAW/01/21/atlacks.detention.ap/index.html (last
visited Jan. 23, 2002).

A RETURN TO LOCKERBIE AND THE
MONTREAL CONVENTION IN THE WAKE OF
THE SEPTEMBER 11TH TERRORIST ATTACKS:
RAMIFICATIONS OF PAST SECURITY COUNCIL AND
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ACTION
JonathanA. Frank*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Nearly thirteen years after the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland in December, 1988,' the international community again faces the
challenge of confronting the international legal ramifications surrounding the
extradition and prosecution of alleged international state-sponsored terrorists. As
has been explored in a number of previous works on the subject, United Nations
Security Council actions in response to the Lockerbie bombing created significant
tension between the Security Council and the International Court of Justice
("ICJ"). 2 These tension-producing actions were a response to Libya's attempted
invocation of various articles of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, otherwise known as the Montreal
Convention of 1971.3

* Juris Doctor expected May 2003, University of Denver College of Law. A.M. (Latin American
Studies) Stanford University, 1998. B.A. Carleton College (Spanish Literature, Latin American Studies
Concentration).
1.See generally Lockerbie Trial Briefing Site, available at http://www.ltb.org.uk/ (last visited
March 15, 2002) (a site maintained by the University of Glasgow which provides a number of links
related to the Lockerbie bombing as well as news and official documentation regarding the subsequent
trial process).
2. See generally Omer Y. Elagab, The Hague as the Seat of the Lockerbie Trial: Some
Constraints, 34 INT'L LAW. 289, 298 (2000); Gerald P. McGinley, The IC.J "sDecision in the
Lockerbie Cases, 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 577 (1992); Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Relationship
Between the InternationalCourt of Justice and the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case,
88 AM. J. INT'L. L. 643 (1994); Deborah D'Angelo, The "Check" on InternationalPeace and Security
Maintenance: The InternationalCourt of Justice andJudicialReeview of Security Council Resolutions,
23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 561 (2000); Eric Zubel, The Lockerbie Controversy: Tension
Between the InternationalCourt of Justice and the Security Council, 5 ANN. SURV. INT'L. & COMP. L.
259 (1999).
3. See Convention for the Suppression of Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage),
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565 [hereinafter Montreal Convention]. See generally http://www.undcp.org/
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Generally speaking, Libya's claims were grounded in the Montreal
Convention's prescription for extradition processes of individuals accused of
committing acts of aviation-related terrorism, 4 as well as for adjudication in the ICJ
in the case of disputes between party states arising from the Montreal Convention.5
The Security Council invoked its Chapter VII powers of the United Nations
Charter at the same time as Libya instituted proceedings in the ICJ with respect to
the above and in reference to disputes with the United Kingdom and the United
States.6 Implemented at the urging of the United Kingdom and the United States,
Security Council Resolutions 748 (1992), 883 (1993) and their progeny, built upon
Resolution 731 (1992) and effectively bound Libya to Resolutions 748 and 883's
term. These resolutions had the effect of rendering any ruling of the International
Court of Justice 7and any further Libyan action subject to the mandates of the
Security Council.

terrorism.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2002); http://www.asil.org/resource/crimi.htm#Terrorism (last
visited Apr. 4, 2002); http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/terrorismrterrorism3a.htm (providing links to general
United Nations materials on terrorism, in addition to international treaties, United Nations General
Assembly and Security Council Resolutions, including the text of the twelve United Nations treaties on
the prevention of terrorism: the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board
Aircraft ("Tokyo Convention", 1963); the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft ("Hague Convention", 1970); the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation ("Montreal Convention", 1971); the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons (1973); the International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages ("Hostages Convention", 1979); the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material ("Nuclear Materials Convention", 1980); the Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation,
supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation (1988); the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (1988); the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Fixed Platforms Located
on the Continental Shelf (1988); Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of
Detection (1991); the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (United
Nations General Assembly Resolution, 1997); the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism (1999)).
4. "It is noteworthy that in Libya's opinion the Montreal Convention applied to 'state' as well as
'ordinary' terrorism." NINA B. JORGENSEN, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES 251 (2000).
5. See Montreal Convention, supra note 3, arts. 8 and 9.
6. See id. at art. 14. See also U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51, available at http://www.un.org/
aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm (last visited March 25, 2002). Article 39 of Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter reads: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
restore international peace and security." For a comprehensive study of the United Nations Security
Council Chapter VII powers, see DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY (1999).
7. See JORGENSEN, supra note 4, at 251. See also Peter H.F. Bekker, Questions ofInterpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incidents at Lockerbie
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) and (Libyan Arab Jamahirya v. United States),
PreliminaryObjections, Judgments, 92 AM. J. INT'L. L. 503, 506 (1998) (stating that the International
Court of Justice, by majority, declared that Libya's claim within the Court was rendered "without
object," and therefore moot, in light of Security Council Resolutions 748 and 883); DAngelo, supra
note 2, at 586 (citing to Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising From the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie ( Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114 (Apr. 14), at 145, 180
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This paper will attempt to elucidate upon the United Nations role with respect
to international action taken in response to the tragic terrorist attacks upon the
United States on September 11 th. Furthermore, this paper will attempt to provide
some insight regarding the question of whether states complicit in acts of
international terrorism should have the opportunity to rely on international
conventions as a course of responsive action in the international legal arena; prior
to Security Council or unilateral State political action initiated under the Security
Council's Chapter VII authority.8
II.

LOCKERBIE:

A BRIEF

HISTORY OF UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT

In the aftermath of the Lockerbie bombing, the United Nations played a
significant role in facilitating the extradition of the accused Libyan terrorists for
trial in a neutral state at the behest of the United States and the United Kingdom. 9
During the nearly ten-year negotiation process leading up to the extradition of the
accused terrorists from Libya, the United Nations Security Council, by way of
Resolutions 731, 748, 883 and 1192 (1998), acted aposterioriin a positive manner
with regards to only Libya and not with regards to other states known to harbor,
financially assist, or otherwise support terrorists.' 0 Rather, the Security Council
deferred to the United Nations Charter and General Assembly Resolutions 49/60
(1995) and 51/210 (1997) in its comparatively inert or passive historical "urgings"
to other member and non-member States."

(Bedjaoui, J., dissenting)) [hereinafter the Lockerbie case]; McGinley, supra note 2, at 578; Zubel,
supra note 2, at 269.
8. Thank you to Dr. Omer Y. Elagab, whose paper "The Hague as the Seat of the Lockerbie
Trial: Some Constraints," provided me with both a departure point and a wealth of informative analysis
which have proved key to the ideas behind the authoring of this article. The question to which I am
referring is put forth by Dr. Elagab as follows: "[t]he question to be addressed, however, is whether
there are exceptional circumstances in which the option of prosecution should be denied to the state that
is complicitous in acts of terrorism." See Elagab, supra note 2, at 298. (Additionally, Dr. Elagab points
out that this was an issue that counsel for both the United States and the United Kingdom broached in
their respective remarks in International Court of Justice Oral Hearings with regard to the Lockerbie
Case).
9. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1373 (2001) available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/res1373e.pdf. See also U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doe SC17158, Press
Release, United Nations, Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide-Ranging Anti-Terrorism
Resolution; Calls for Suppressing Financing, Improving International Cooperation (Sept. 28, 2001),
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2002); S.C.
Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/Res/731 (1992), available at http://www.un.org/documents/
sc/res/1992/s92r731e.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2002); S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/Res/748
(1992), availableat http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1992/s92r748e.pdf (last visited Mar. I, 2002);
S.C. Res. 883, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doe. S/Res/883 (1993), available at http://www.un.org/docs/
scres/1993/883e.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2002); S.C. Res. 1192, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/Res/I 192
(1998), available at http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1998/sresl 192.htm (last visited Mar. 1,2002).
10. See Michael P. Scharf, Terrorism on Trial: The Lockerbie CriminalProceedings, 6 ILSA J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 355, 356 (2000). See also Elagab, supra note 2, at 291-94 (Dr. Elagab points out that
the Security Council demanded that the government of Libya comply with Resolutions 731, 748 and
883, making it clear that Libya was the sole subject of these Resolutions.).
II. See S.C. Res. 748, supra note 9, at 1, para. 4; see also U.N. CHARTER, supra note 6, art. 2,
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The distinction between general directives of the Security Council aimed at
combating international terrorism and specific action taken (e.g., the imposition of
sanctions or authorization of the use of force) in response to individual acts of
international terrorism, such as Lockerbie and the September 11 th attacks, is an
important one insofar as attempting to discern a pattern of Security Council
behavior and decision-making in response to international terrorist attacks.
Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748 served to preempt Libya's lawful and
timely claim for provisional measures that would have allowed for ICJ proceedings
on the question of extradition in that case without the imposition upon Libya of
United Nations Security Council sanctions. 2 Resolutions 883 and 1192 served
to
3
further strengthen and solidify the terms set forth in Resolutions 731 and 748.1
Libya's argument to the ICJ, grounded in the Montreal Convention, plainly
contended that Libya was not bound to extradite her own nationals in the absence
of a bilateral extradition treaty with either the United States or the United
Kingdom.' 4 The adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 731,
748, 883 and 1192 illustrated the shortcomings of the Montreal Convention in
dealing with the extradition of state-sponsored terrorists insofar as the principle of
aut dedere aut judicare.'5 The Montreal Convention simply does not address
situations in which a state is complicitous in a terrorist action.' 6 Furthermore,
these Resolutions arguably established a precedent that the Security Council would
act when necessary, and to the limits of its power, especially when such politically
influential states as the United Kingdom and the United States are involved, to
bypass the tenets of the Montreal Convention in situations where a State refuses to
extradite her own ostensibly state-sponsored terrorist nationals7 for trial under the
laws of the State in which the act of terrorism was carried out.1
In the intervening period between the Lockerbie bombing and the eventual
extradition of the accused Libyan terrorists to a neutral third-party country, Libya
refused all demands from both the United States and the United Kingdom for
extradition of the alleged terrorist pair who were also found to be Libyan
nationals. 8 In the absence of a bilateral extradition treaty between either Libya

para. 4 (establishing a duty on behalf of all states to not assist or participate in terrorist activities); G.A.
Res. 60, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. AIRES/49/60 (1994), available at http://www.un.org/
documents/ga/res/49/a49r060.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2002); G.A. Res. 210, U.N. GAOR, 51" Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210 (1996), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ ga/res/51/a5Ir2I0.htm
(last visited Mar. 1, 2002) (delineating the United Nations General Assembly position on measures to
eliminate international terrorism).
12. See Elagab, supra note 2, at 305; see also D'Angelo, supra note 2, at 583-91.
13. See S.C. Res. 731 (1992), S.C. Res. 748 (1992), S.C. Res. 883 (1993) and S.C. Res. 1192
(1998), supranote 9.
14. See generallyMontreal Convention, supra note 3.
15. See Elagab, supra note 2, at 296 (stating that the principle of aut dedere autjudicare means
"either surrender or prosecute"); see also Elagab, supra note 2, at 306.
16. See generallyMontreal Convention, supranote 3.
17. See generally S.C. Res. 731, supra note 9, at 1; S.C. Res. 748 supra note 9, at 1; S.C. Res. 883
supra note 9, at 1; S.C. Res. 1192 supra note 9, at 1.
18. Compare Zubel, supra note 2, at 260 (commenting that both of the accused, Abdel Basset Ali
lal-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah were Libyan intelligence agents), and S.C. Res. 731 supra
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and the United States, or Libya and the United Kingdom, Libya sought to rely on
the articles of the Montreal Convention pertaining to extradition as the basis of its
argument.' 9 Although there is generally not considered to be any international
customary law pertaining to acts of international terrorism, the Montreal
Convention was, and to an extent still is, one of the primary governing
20
Conventions of extradition of accused individuals for acts of aerial terrorism.
According to Article 7 of the Montreal Convention, in a situation in which an
accused State is in possession of a terrorist accused of acting abroad, the requested
State(s) must either extradite that individual to the requesting State(s), or "[slubmit
the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution" in accordance
with the appropriate laws of that state.2 1 Furthermore, Article 8 of the Montreal
Convention provides that signatory States may consider the Convention itself the
legal basis for extradition in the absence of a bilateral extradition treaty between
the requesting and the requested states.22 As there existed no extradition treaties
between either the United States and Libya or the United Kingdom and Libya at
the time of the bombings, it follows that Libya had no obligation to extradite its
own nationals under the Montreal Convention. 23 Apart from the Montreal
Convention, which does not in and of itself establish a principle of international
customary law, there exists no international law requiring a state to extradite. 4
Under well-established principles of international law, no recourse exists on
behalf of the claiming state(s) for failure of the requested State to extradite unless
such recourse is authorized by the United Nations Security Council against a
United Nations member State.25
The Convention is, however, silent on the issue of extradition of a national
from his own state, where that state itself has been shown to have sponsored one of
their national's alleged terrorist activities. 26 In this sense, the shortcomings of the
Montreal Convention are necessarily resolved by United Nations Security Council
action with the goal of combating threats against the maintenance of international
peace and security in accordance with the United Nations Charter.27 The extensive
investigation surrounding the Lockerbie case led authorities to the conclusion that
the terrorists responsible for the bombing were Libyan intelligence agents who had
been instructed to blow up Pan Am Flight 103 by individuals directly linked to the

note 9, para. 6 at I (mentioning "investigations which implicate officials of the Libyan Government").
19. See Montreal Convention, supra note 3, art 5.
20. See generally id.at 1-5; see also Elagab supra note 2, at 301; GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF
EXTRADITION LAW 8 (1991).

21. Montreal Convention, supra note 3, art. 7.
22. Id.art.8.
23. Elagab, supra note 2, at 296, 300 (Elagab comments that extradition is a "a sovereign decision
of the requested State, which is never under an obligation to carry it out." In this respect, the Montreal
Convention does conform to the customary international law as it stood when the Convention was
drafted and put in force).
24. See Elagab supra note 2, at 300-01; see also GILBERT supra note 15, at 8.
25. See Elagab supra note 2, at 301.
26. Montreal Convention, supra note 3.
27. See U.N. Charter, supra note 6, arts.
39-5 1.

2002

A RETURN TO LOCKERBIE AND THE MONTREAL CONVENTION

537

Libyan government. 28 The United States and the United Kingdom realized this
deficiency of the Montreal Convention in terms of forcing the extradition of a
state-sponsored terrorist from his own country of citizenship, and pursued other
avenues in an attempt to compel Libya to extradite the accused terrorists, namely
through the levying of sanctions via United Nations Security Council Resolutions
passed under Chapter VII authority.29
Approximately two months after Security Council Resolution 731 was passed,
the first such Resolution urging Libya to extradite the alleged terrorists, Libya filed
suit in the ICJ seeking provisional measures to effectively delay or prohibit the
implementation of sanctions by the United Nations until the matter of Libya's
argument per the Montreal Convention was decided. 30 The reasoning behind the
United States and the United Kingdom's strategy to seek a remedy through the
Security Council was arguably founded in part on the premise established by
Article 25 of the United Nations Charter, which reads: "The Members of the
United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council
in accordance with the Present Charter." 31 In effect, the Resolutions passed by the
Security Council, in accordance with Article 25 of the United Nations Charter,
preempted any injunctive action by the International Court of Justice as Libya is a
permanent member of the United Nations and therefore bound to adhere to United
Nations Security Council Resolutions. 32 The ICJ ultimately decided that Security
Council Resolution 748 was determinative on the issues presented in Libya's
arguments, and that Libya therefore was obliged, per Article 25 of the Charter, to
comply with that resolution.33 Additionally, the ICJ held that the Court would not
further entertain Libya's arguments premised on the Montreal Convention.34
The language of Security Council Resolutions directed towards Libya, which
followed Resolution 731, became increasingly intense on the issue of extraditing
their nationals accused of committing the terrorist acts which led to the downing of
Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie. Resolution 748, adopted on March 31, 1992,
28. See Zubel, supra note 2, at 260 (commenting that both of the accused, Abdel Basset Ali lalMegrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah were Libyan intelligence agents), see also S.C. Res. 731 supra
note 9, para. 6, at I (mentioning "investigations which implicate officials of the Libyan Government").
29. See generally S.C. Res. 73 1, supra note 9, at 1; S.C. Res. 748, supra note 9, at 1; S.C. Res.
883, supra note 9, at 1; S.C. Res. 1192, supra note 9, at 1.
30. See Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. 3, 15 (Apr. 14)
[hereinafter Request for Indication of Provisional Measures]. Judges voting in favor of the decision
included: Vice President Oda Acting President, President Sir Robert Jennings, Judge Lachs, Judge Ago,
Judge Schwebel, Judge Ni, Judge Evensen, Judge Tarassov, Judge Guillaume, Judge Shahabuddeen,
and Judge Aguilar Mawdsley. Judges voting against the decision included: Judge Bedjaoui, Judge
Weeramantry, Judge Ranjeva, Judge Ajibola, and Judge as hoc EI-Kosheri., 1992 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Apr. 14)
(separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen). See also Case Conceming Questions of Interpretation and
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 115 (Feb. 27) (preliminary objections).
31. See U.N. CHARTER art. 25; see also D'Angelo supra note 2, at 567-77.
32. See Elagab, supra note 2, at 305; see also D'Angelo supra note 2, at 583-91.
33. See generally Request for Indication of Provisional Measures, supra note 30; Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. U.S., supra note 30.
34. 1998 I.C.J. 9, 105 (Feb. 27).
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levied sanctions against Libya in consideration of that country's failure to accede
to the repeated requests of the alleged terrorists' extradition by both the United
States and the United Kingdom.35 Security Council Resolutions 883 and 1192
further attempted to pressure the Libyan government by demanding compliance
with the previous two Resolutions and strengthening the sanctions against that
country. 36 With the possibility of seeking recourse in the ICJ gone, international
pressure increasing, and United Nations sanctions taking their toll, Libya
eventually capitulated to a long-debated plan to have the alleged terrorists
extradited to the Netherlands to be tried by a Scottish Court.3 7
III.

LOCKERBIE SEPARATE OPINIONS AND DISSENTS:

Disagreement on the Competing Roles of the UnitedNations Security Council and
the InternationalCourt of Justice
The question now raised by Libya's challenge to the validity of resolution 748
(1992) is whether a decision of the Security Council may override the legal rights
of States, and, if so, whether there are any limitations on the power of the Council
to characterize a situation as one justifying the making of a decision entailing such
consequences. Are there any limits to the Council's powers of appreciation? In
the equilibrium of forces underpinning the structure of the United Nations within
the evolving international order, is there any conceivable point beyond which a
legal issue may properly arise as to the Competence of the Security Council to
produce such overriding results? If there are any limits, what are those limits and
what body, if other than the Security Council, is competent to say what those limits
are?
If the answers to these delicate and complex questions are all in the negative,
the position is potentially curious. It would not, on that account, be necessarily
unsustainable in law; and how far the Court can enter the field is another
matter.... 38

At the provisional measures 39 stage of the "Case Concerning Questions of
Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the
35. S.C. Res. 748, supra note 9, para. 6, at I (indicating that Libya's failure to comply with

demands for extradition constituted a "threat to international peace and security").
36. See S.C. Res. 883 supra note 9, at 1;S.C. Res. 1192 supra note 9, at I; see also U.N.
CHARTER art.7, para. 1-2.
37. See Scharf supra note 2, at 357-58 (outlining the specific arrangements involved in the
extradition of the then alleged Libyan terrorists to stand trial in the Netherlands before a Scottish panel
ofjudges).
38. See Request for Indication of Provisional Measures, supra note 30, at 28 (separate opinion of
Judge Shahabuddeen).
39. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 41, para. 1-2, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicsdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm (stating "I. The Court
shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures
which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party. 2. Pending the final decision,
notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the parties
and to the Security Council.")
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Aerial Incident at Lockerbie," eleven ICJ justices voted in favor of the Court's
decision to deny Libya's request for provisional measures, and five ICJ justices
voted against the majority decision.40 Libya's request for provisional measures
were based on that State's contention that the United Kingdom was violating
Articles 5(2), 5(3), 7, 8(2) and 11 of the Montreal Convention, acting to abridge
Libya's rights, and that the United Kingdom was under an international legal
obligation to refrain from doing so. 4 1 In its decision with regard to Libya's
request, the ICJ based its denial of provisional measures in part on the passage of
Security Council Resolution 748, in which the Security Council effectively
invoked it's Chapter VII powers and bound Libya to that Resolution, leaving the
majority of the4 2ICJ of the opinion that Libya's request for provisional measures
was then moot.

While by no means a focus of the work at hand, the issues presented to the
ICJ by Libya's application for provisional measures in light of concurrent Security
Council action was nothing novel. 43 The Lockerbie case has now long served as a
source for commentary regarding the function of the ICJ with respect to the
Security Council, as well as being a source of speculation regarding Security
Council ultra vires actions.44 The Lockerbie case has also been a source of
the ICJ. 45
argument for judicial review of Security Council Resolutions by
40. See Request for Indication of Provisional Measures., supra note 30.
41. See id. at 6-7. See also Montreal Convention, supra note 3, arts. 5, 7, 8 and 11.
42. See generally S.C. Res. 748, supra note 9. See also Request for Provisional Measures, supra
note 30, at 15 (stating as one of the reasons in the Order for the Court's denial of Libya's request for
provisional measures, "[w]hereas, furthermore, an indication of the measures requested by Libya would
be likely to impair the rights which appear prima facie to be enjoyed by the United Kingdom by virtue
of Security Resolution 748 (1992)). See also S.C. Res. 748, supranote 9, para. 5 (The Security Council
invokes it's Chapter VII powers by stating "(d]etermining in this context that the failure of the Libyan
Government to demonstrate, by concrete actions its renunciation of terrorism and in particular its
continued failure to respond filly and effectively to the requests in resolution 731 (1992), constitute a
threat to international peace and security...").
43. Request for Indication of Provisional Measures, supra note 30, at 20 (declaration of Judge Ni).
44. See generally Jose E. Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 36 (1996)
(stating that a finding of ultra vires action by the Security Council on the part of the International Court
of Justice could have fundamentally changed the UN system of governance); Geoffrey R. Watson,
Constitutionalism,JudicialReview, and The World Court, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. I, 2 (1993); Marcella
David, Passport to Justice: Internationalizingthe Political Question Doctrine for Application in the
World Court, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 81, 90-91 (1999) (stating that ultra vires Security Council action was
not at issue in the Lockerbie case, because the International Court of Justice assumed a valid obligation
[to the applicable Security Council Resolutions] on the states involved); Richard B. Lillich, The Role of
the UN Security Council in Protecting Human Rights in Crisis Situations: Un Humanitarian
Intervention in the Post Cold War World, 3 TUL. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 1, 12 (1995); D'Angelo, supra
note 2, at 586.
45. See generally Takane Sugihara, The Judicial Function of the InternationalCourt of Justice
with Respect to Disputes Involving Highly PoliticalIssues, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE,
ITS FUTURE ROLE AFTER FIFTY YEARS 125 (A.S. Muller, D. Raid and J.M. Thurinszky eds., 1997);
Malcolm N. Shaw, The Security Council and the International Court of Justice: Judicial Drift and
JudicialFunction, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, ITS FUTURE ROLE AFTER FIFTY YEARS
125 (A.S. Muller, D. Raid and J.M. Thur-Anszky eds., 1997); Alain Pellet, Address at the Proceedings of
the INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE/UNITAR Colloquium to Celebrate the 50th Anniversary
of the Court (April 1996), in INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 234-53
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Building upon other contentious ICJ cases, such as the Hostages case4 6 and the
Nicaragua case 47, the opinions of the ICJ in the Lockerbie case, specifically
Libya's request for the indication of provisional measures, 48 provide important
insight into the problematic political-judicial dynamic between the Court and the
Security Council. 49 As evidenced by the circumstances surrounding the Lockerbie
case, both the ICJ and the Security Council can be confronted by the same
situation. However, because of this political-judicial dynamic, the two organs can
come to conflicting decisions - decisions that, despite their political or judicial
foundations, each have distinct judicial and political affects upon the countries
involved.50
Given the geopolitical context in which Libya made its request for the
indication of provisional measures to the ICJ, the question thus becomes which
organ should have the power to make the ultimate decisions regarding the rights of
sovereign states where the prevention or punishment of state-sponsored
international terrorism is at issue. To that end, this section is not meant by any
means as a defense to States which sponsor, endorse or espouse international
terrorist activities or tactics - all of which the author strongly believes to be
heinous and deplorable criminal acts. Those individuals or States found guilty of
which, deserve the harshest penalties allowed under applicable law. Rather, this
section is meant to pose the political-legal question of what lengths can a Security
Council member State, or States, go in order to legally invoke Security Council
Chapter VII powers without encroaching upon the sovereign rights of the State
accused of sponsoring acts of international terrorism.
As illustrated by the Lockerbie case, when situations of alleged statesponsored terrorism are involved and the Security Council invokes its Chapter VII
powers, the possibility for conflict between the Security Council and the ICJ
becomes troublesome. As was stated in the Court's ruling in the Nicaraguacase:

(Connie Peck and Roy S. Lee eds., 1997); Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Address at the Proceedings of the
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE/UNITAR Colloquium to Celebrate the 5 0 h Anniversary of

the Court (April 1996),

in INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT

254-66

(Connie Peck and Roy S. Lee eds., 1997); Ken Roberts, Second-Guessing the Security Council: The
InternationalCourt of Justice and Its Powers of JudicialReview, 7 PACE INT'L L. REV. 281 (1995);
John Quigley, The United Nations Security Council: PrometheanProtector or Helpless Hostage, 35
TEX. INT'L L.J. 129 (2000); Alvarez, supra note 44; Mcginley, supra note 2; D'Angelo, supra note 2;
Watson, supra note 44; Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 2.
46. See generally United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3 (May 24) [hereinafter the Hostages case].
47. See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) (Merits), 1986 1.C.J. 14
(June 27) [hereinafter the NicaraguaCase].
48. See generally Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, supranote 33.
49. See Shaw, supra note 45, at 243 (citing the Courts decision in the Nicaraguacase, supra note
47 at 435, Shaw includes the following quote: "the Council has functions of a political nature assigned
to it, whereas the Court exercises purely judicial functions. Both organs can therefore perform their
separate but complementary functions with respect to the same events.").
50. See Sugihara, supra note 45, at 126; Shaw, supranote 45, at 232-36. See also Alvarez, supra
note 44, at 10 (stating that some have criticized Security Council actions as amounting to "'quasi
judicial "'actions).
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[u]ntil the Security Council makes a determination under Article 39, a dispute
remains to be dealt with by the methods of peaceful settlement provided under
Article 33, including judicial settlement; and even after a determination under
Article 39, there is no necessary inconsistency between Security Council action
and adjudication by the Court. From a juridical standpoint, the decisions
of the
51
Court and the actions of the Security Council are entirely separate.
While Security Council resolutions and decisions of the ICJ pertaining to the
same issue may not be mutually exclusive, it has been hypothesized that Security
action may actually infringe upon the rights of a sovereign state. As illustrated by
the Lockerbie case, the Council invoked it's Chapter VII powers in Resolution 748.
From one perspective, thus blocked Libya from obtaining the imposition of
provisional measures against the United Kingdom in the International Court of
Justice pursuant to the Montreal Convention. 52 This perspective appears as a
recurring theme throughout the Separate Opinions and Dissents of the five judges
who voted against the International Court's Order with regard to Libya's request
for the indication of provisional measures. 53 A survey of several of these separate
opinions and dissents serve as an appropriate framework from which to discern
competing arguments and begin to form some hypotheses with regard to the future
invocation of Chapter VII powers by the Security Council in order to combat statesponsored international terrorism.
Judge Lachs' separate opinion, the first and shortest opinion to be appended
to the Court's Order, perhaps speaks most clearly to the multifaceted questions
being broached by this article. In calling for harmonious action between the two
entities of the United Nations which "[hlave the delivery of binding decisions
explicitly included in their powers under the Charter," Judge Lachs comments that
"[i]t [the International Court of Justice] is its [international law's] principle
guardian. Now, it has become clear that the dividing line between political and
legal disputes is blurred, as law54becomes ever more frequently an integral element
of international controversies.
While couched in very diplomatic wording calling for cooperation between
the Security Council and the International Court of Justice, Judge Lach's most
important commentary is that concerning the dichotomy between that which is

51. See supranote 45, at 125 (citing to the Nicaragua case). See also U.N. Charter, art. 39 supra
note 6; U.N. Charter, art. 33 supra note 6 (Article 33 of the UN Charter reads as follows: "I. The
parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of
their own choice. 2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle
their dispute by such means.").
52. See S.C. Res. 748, supra note 9. See also Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures,
supranote 30, 3-16.
53. See Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, supra note 30, at 26-112
(separate/dissenting opinions of Judges Bedjaoui, Weeramantry, Ranjeva, Ajibola and Judge ad hoc ElKosheri).
54. See Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, supra note 30, at 26-28 (separate
opinion of Judge Lachs).
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political (the role of the Security Council) and that which is legal (the role of the
International Court of Justice).
In terms of the Lockerbie case, and issues of state-sponsored terrorism
generally, the distinction is of paramount importance. As the more states are
labeled "sponsors of terrorism," the more these two competing roles will clash. As
opposed to merely seeking to punish individual perpetrators of terrorist acts, it has
become apparent post-September 11 th that States and their respective regimes
accused of sponsoring terrorism will also be likely targets of action resulting from
initiatives taken under Security Council Chapter VII powers. Building upon the
quotation included at the beginning of this section, how will the Security Council
deal with accused States' legal challenges brought under any number of treaties to
which both the accused State and the accuser State are parties? Will that in turn
provide for actions contrary to those sanctioned by the Security Council under
Chapter VII?
Judge Bedjaoui's dissenting opinion55 also maintains a focus on the politicallegal dichotomy between the roles of the Security Council and the International
Court of Justice, referring to a creation of a "'[g]rey area' in which powers may
overlap and a jurisdictional conflict comes into being. ''56 Judge Bedjaoui eludes to
one of the underlying dilemmas in this so-called "grey area" when he includes
quotes from the dissenting opinion of Judge Gros in the case of the Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa):
'[c]ertain 'limitations on the powers of the Security Council are necessary because
of the all too great ease with which any acutely controversial international
situation can be represented as involving a latent threat to peace and security, even
where it is really too remote genuinely to constitute one. Without these
limitations, the functions of the Security Council could be used for purposes never
originally intended ... [There was] no threat to peace and security other than such
as might be artificially created as a pretext for the realization of ulterior
purposes.'57
The question is thus reiterated: to what lengths can member state(s) of the
Security Council go to politically pursue an issue of international concern (as
opposed to a genuine threat to international peace and security which would give
the Security Council leave to invoke its Chapter VII powers), despite legal avenues
in place provided for in treaties to which the states at hand are both parties?
Additionally, to what lengths can accused States pursue legal action in the
International Court of Justice before the Security Council in essence ties that

55. See generally Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, supra note 30, at 33-49
(dissenting opinion of Judge Bedjaoui).
56. Id. at 35.
57. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(Southwest Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (S. Afr. v. Namib), 1971
ICJ 16 (June 21) (dissenting opinion of Judge Bedjaoui; dissenting opinion of Judge Gros, quoted in
Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, supra note 30).
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State's hands with binding action under Chapter VII authority?
In response to recent events of global state-sponsored terrorism, the author's
answer should come as no surprise. As Judge Bedjaoui states in his dissent:
[t]he most that can be said is that if the person that committed the offense acted as
the organ of a State, the [Montreal] Convention could prove to be, not
inapplicable, but rather ineffectual to the extent that the state that would opt not
for extraditing but for prosecuting
the suspects itself, which, obviously, would not
58
be a satisfactory solution.
The Montreal Convention is indeed an ineffective means of dealing with
state-sponsored terrorism generally, not to mention the extradition of statesponsored terrorists from their homeland. As stated in the Security Council's most
recent resolutions on the subject, terrorism, in all forms, poses a threat to
international peace and security - a threat of such extreme proportions, which if
proven, should be combated in the political sphere by the international community
with whatever means necessary. 59 The Security Council, if not the international
community at large, has opted for Chapter VII-authorized political solutions over
more time-consuming legal alternatives 60°
IV. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REACTIONS TO THE TERRORIST ACTS OF
SEPTEMBER 1 ITH

The day after the September 11 th attacks, the United Nations Security
Council passed Resolution 1368 (2001).61 While Resolution 1368 espoused an
appropriate level of outrage in response to the terrorist events that transpired the
day before, it in essence constitutes a more strongly worded restatement of
Resolution 1269 (1999), which stopped short of referring to international acts of
terrorism as a threat to international peace and security. 62 Seventeen days after the
September 11th terrorist attacks against the United States, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 1373 (200 1).63 An analysis of Resolution 1373 reveals that it
provides for the freezing of assets linked to terrorists, terrorist organizations, or
states supporting the activities of terrorists. 64 This built-in sanction against
terrorist organizations and the states or entities that provide them with support
seemingly represents a building upon the sanctions lodged against Libya after the
Lockerbie bombing.
Incorporating Security Council Resolutions 1269 and
Resolution 1368 in name and substance, article 1, paragraph (d) of Resolution
58. Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, supra note 30 at 37 (dissenting opinion of
Judge Bedjaoui).
59. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56' Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377 (2001), para. 3; See also
S.C. Res. 1377, U.N. SCOR, 56'h Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377 (2001), para. 7.
60. See S.C. Res., supra note 59.
61. See S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56"h Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001).
62. See S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. SCOR, 54"' Sess., U.N. Doe. S/RES/1269 (1999).
63. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 59, at 1-5.
64. Id. at 2 (note use of the positive term "shall" as opposed to more ambiguous term
characteristic of other United Nations' documentation regarding terrorism).
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1373 speaks directly to the international dilemma of state sponsored terrorism:
Acting under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, Decides that all
States shall... Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their
territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources...
available.., for the commission of terrorist acts...65
Additionally, article 3, paragraph (c) and (d) call upon all States to
"[c]ooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and
agreements.. ." and to "[i]ncrease cooperation and fully implement the relevant
international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and Security Council
Resolutions 1269 (1999) and 1368 (200l).y ' 66 As stated above, Resolutions 1373,
1377 (2001), 1378 (2001), 1383 (2001), 1386 (2001) and 1390 (2001), Security
Council Resolutions 1269 and 1368 perpetuate the contradictory dichotomy
between the calling upon states to cooperate in and implement international antiterrorist conventions while simultaneously expressing the Security Council's
"readiness to take all steps necessary to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its
responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations...
Read in conjunction with Security Council Resolutions 731, 748, 883 and
1192, there is a discernable philosophical pattern regarding how the Security
Council intends to treat state-sponsored terrorist incidents. 6 This evolving pattern
of both philosophy and proposed action (viewed together with Security Council
steps taken in response to the Lockerbie bombing) may indeed signify a
crystallization process of international customary law regarding international
responses to state-sponsored terrorism in general, and necessarily the extradition of
nationals from a state proven to be a sponsor of that national's terrorist activities.
It is also apparent that with it's acknowledgement of state-sponsored terrorism in
Resolution 1373, the Security Council may no longer view the reliance upon, or
formulation of a requested state's defense based upon, the provisions set forth in
the Montreal Convention as applicable to extradition proceedings where a national
of a terrorist-sponsoring state is sought to be extradited for alleged terrorist
activities.
V. CONCLUSION

United Nations Security Council Resolutions 731, 748, 883 and 1192 set a
precedent for the avoidance of having to negotiate the jurisdictional quagmire
posited by the Montreal Convention. Rather, via Article 24 of the United Nations
Charter, the Security Council can formulate resolutions that take precedence over
well-established multilateral treaties. This fact leaves United Nations Member
65. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 59, at 2.
66. Id. at art.3.
67. See generally S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 62; S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 61.
68. See generally supra note 9, at 1-5; S.C. Res. 731, supra note 9, at 1; S.C. Res. 748 supranote
9, at 1; S.C. Res. 883 supra note 9, at 1; S.C. Res. 1192 supra note 9, at I.
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States with little or no recourse in the International Court of Justice, as exemplified
by the plight of Libya in the wake of the Lockerbie bombing. 69 Security Council
Resolution 1373 and its progeny further enforce the precedent established by
Security Council Resolutions 731, 748, 883 and 1192. Resolution 1373 appears to
deny terrorist-sponsoring states the right to prosecute their accused nationals at
home, despite a call for States to "[i]ncrease cooperation and fully implement the
relevant conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.. .,,.70 In light of the
threats of international terrorism, the continued investigation of the September
11 th attacks and an analysis of future Security Council action will likely be highly
determinative in the possible crystallization of customary international law
regarding international responses to transborder acts of terrorism, inclusive of the
extradition of alleged terrorist nationals seeking refuge in their own terroristsponsoring countries.
The United Nations Security Council, in light of both the bombing at
Lockerbie and the attacks of September 1 th, is in essence doing away with the
need for international anti-terrorism conventions, such as the Montreal
Convention. These anti-terrorist conventions are meant to foster cooperation
between states in matters regarding acts of international state-sponsored terrorism.
The principle of international law that States are not obliged to extradite their own
nationals, aut dedere aut judicare, is seemingly at odds with the current
conventions on terrorism if the requested government in question itself supports
terrorist activities of the nationals accused. Under the guise of combating and
preventing international acts of terror, the precedent being set by the United
Nations Security Council is that a State can levy sanctions, use military force, or
merely enter an accused country and take the individuals sought in connection with
terrorist acts; thus bypassing the conventions already in place as well as the
principle of state sovereignty with regard to the extradition of accused international
terrorists. Yet, when an accused terrorist-sponsoring State seeks legal relief in the
International Court of Justice as prescribed by treaties to which all states are
parties, there is no obligation to adhere to the treaty in light of binding Security
Council action taken under Chapter VII authority.
Adopted in the intervening period between the Lockerbie bombing and the
terrorist events of September 11, 2001 in the United States, Security Council
Resolution 1269 has served as the foundation for the Security Council's most
recent actions taken in response to international terrorism. 71 Resolution 1269
establishes a dichotomy - which begins to customarily appear in subsequent
Security Council resolutions regarding international terrorism - between the role of
the Security Council as the champion and protector of the principles of the United
Nations Charter and the body's role as an encouraging facilitator among member
States in the implementation of international conventions.
Accordingly, Resolution 1269 states in part that the Security Council is

69. See U.N. CHARTER, supranote 6, art. 24.
70. See generally S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 59.
71. S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 67.
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"[d]etermined to contribute, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
to the efforts to combat terrorism in all its forms. . ." Yet in a preceding clause, the
Security Council supports "[t]he efforts to promote universal participation in and
implementation of the existing international anti-terrorist conventions, as well as
to adopt new international instruments to counter the terrorist threat...,7 If these
two roles of the Security Council are in fact mutually-exclusive, it stands to reason
that international law fostered by the Security Council, if not the international
community in its entirety, is both conflicted and confounded. This confusion
regarding the implementation of action by the Security Council, namely whether
the Security Council will act in an arguably ultra vires capacity or in accordance
with standing international anti-terrorism conventions, has affected both the
political and legal aspects of the extradition of alleged international terrorists.
In the wake of the September 1 th terrorist attacks in the United States, the
United Nations Security Council built upon Resolutions 731, 748, 883, 1192 and
1269 by adopting Resolutions 1368 , 1373 , 1377 , 1378 , 1383 , 1386 , and
Resolution 1390 . Security Council Resolution 1373 calls for the implementation
of positive and definitive action regarding the prevention of terrorism and the
punishment of any individual, entity, or state which has a hand in assisting,
financing, or committing an act of terrorism. 74 In light of Resolution 1269,
Security Council Resolution 1373, albeit indirectly, further calls into question the
ability of the Montreal Convention to govern the extradition of international statesponsored terrorists. It does so by simultaneously and confusingly referring to the
principles of the United Nations Charter while calling upon states to implement
treaties applicable to acts of international terrorism.75

72. S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 67, at para- 5.
73. Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide-Ranging Anti-Terrorism Resolution; Calls for
Suppressing Financing, Improving International Cooperation, supranote 1, at 2;
74. See id.
75. Id. at 2-5.

NORTHERN IRELAND:
THE PARAMILITARIES, TERRORISM, AND SEPTEMBER
11TH
Zachary E. McCabe*
[P]erhaps just once in a fairly bleak international situation, ... when many Irish-

Americans and people of 60 other countries were killed in the dreadful explosions
in the USA, and there are 6.5 million people on the cusp of starvation in
Afghanistan. Perhaps against that bleak scenario, against the deterioration of the
situation in the Middle East, maybe hope and history is reigning in Ireland, and
there's a little signal to everyone that there is a way to go forward if there's a
political will to do so.
INTRODUCTION

On Good Friday, April 10, 1998, the Peace Process in Northern Ireland took a
giant step forward. On that day, representatives of almost every political party in
Northern Ireland came to a general agreement on how to proceed in the interest of
peace. Officially called the Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations,
this agreement is known as "The Good Friday Agreement. ' '2 Despite the progress
reached, important issues remain unresolved and violence continues to plague
Northern Ireland, primarily at the hands of paramilitary organizations. The Peace
Process has suffered major setbacks resulting in the disbanding of the power3
sharing arrangement that was the cornerstone of the Good Friday Agreement.
Three and one-half years later, on September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four
American commercial airliners, plunging two into the World Trade Center towers
in New York City, one into the Pentagon in Washington D.C., and the fourth in

*Juris Doctorate expected May 2003, University of Denver College of Law. The author thanks his
parents and brother for their inspiration and support. This article is dedicated to those who work for
peace and the victims of terrorism, in particular the members of the New York City Police Department
who gave their lives on September 11, 2001.
1. Adams: Hope and History in lrelana CNN.com (Oct. 24, 2001), at httpJ/www.cnn.com/
2001/WORLD/europe/10/24/adams.cnna/index.html (last visited April 8, 2003).
2. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998, available at
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/agreement.htm (last visited April 8, 2003) [hereinafter "The
Good Friday Agreement"].
3. Warren Hoge, Britain Reasserts Ulster Rule, Suspending Elected Assembly, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.

15, 2002, at A3.
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rural Pennsylvania. Near 3,000 people died in these attacks. Since the attacks,
the United States began a global "war on terrorism."5 Along with diplomatic and
financial efforts, the United States began a military campaign in Afghanistan to
find Osama Bin Laden, the leader of the terrorist organization al Qaeda, which the
United States believed was responsible for the attacks. The United States also
sought to punish those who harbored him. The global perspective on terrorism,
and in particular the United States' approach towards terrorism changed since
September I1th. The United States asked for, and received, worldwide
condemnation of the attacks and support for its war on terrorism. The United
States likewise took a significantly more aggressive stance on terrorist attacks
occurring on the soil of other countries.
This article addresses the effects of September 11 th on the Peace Process and
the paramilitaries of Northern Ireland and comes to the conclusion that the impact,
is relatively small. Part I describes the history of the conflict in Northern Ireland
and briefly addresses the history of the Peace Process. Part II of this article
identifies the major paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland. Part III
addresses the definition of terrorism while Part IV addresses whether the Northern
Irish paramilitaries are terrorists. As points of comparison, part V discusses the
effect of September 11th on other conflicts in the world. Part VI addresses the
effect of September 11th on the Northern Irish paramilitaries and the Peace
Process. Finally, some conclusions are reached concerning the Peace Process and
consequences of the recent terrorist attacks on American soil.
PART I: THE HISTORY OF CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Any treatment of the "Troubles",7 in Northern Ireland is difficult to
comprehend without first addressing the history of Ireland and Northern Ireland
dating back to at least the twelfth century. However, for the purposes of this
discussion, the author begins with the partition of Ireland in 1921.
A.

PARTITION

After 750 years of English-Irish conflict on the island of Ireland and six years

4. Thomas J. Lueck, City Compiles List of Dead And Missing From Sept. 11, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
20, 2002, at B1.
5. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 22, 107th Cong. (2001) (declaring that the United States is "entitled to
respond [to the attacks] under international law" and referring to a "war" against terrorism); President
George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of the Congress and the American People (Sept. 20,
200 1)[hereinafter "Address on U.S. Response"] ("On September 1ph, enemies of freedom committed
an act of war against our country."); Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001).
6. Reuters, America's Allies Rally to Arafat's Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, available at
http://www.nytimes.com (last visited January 28, 2003).
7. The "Troubles" in Northern Ireland are "generally understood to refer to a murderous dispute
which for the past quarter century only, has come to involve the English and the Irish in sectarian
quarrel in the north-eastern part of Ireland commonly, but erroneously referred to as 'Ulster."' TIM PAT
COOGAN, THE TROUBLES: IRELAND'S ORDEAL 1966-1996 AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE 1 (1996).
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after the 1916 Easter uprising,8 representatives of the British government and Irish
Nationalist rebels signed the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, which provided
for the partition of Ireland. 9 The British Empire released the southern twenty-six
counties of Ireland to become the Irish Free State.' 0 Six counties in the
northernmost part of the island remained part of the British Empire." The British
government renamed this area "Northern Ireland" and installed a local subsidiary
government.12 The settlement reached in the Government of Ireland Act led to a
civil war within the Irish Free State pitting those who accepted the settlement
against those who saw the settlement as a betrayal of the Irish cause.' 3 Eventually
settlement forces were victorious. However, even until 1998, the Irish
Constitution
4
included clauses claiming the area of Northern Ireland as its own.'
Not coinciding with any traditional boundaries, Northern Ireland was the
largest area in which a majority of the people wished to remain part of the British
Empire.15 This was, in fact, the purpose of partition.' 6 Northern Ireland was also
drawn to have two Protestants for every Catholic while the Irish Free State
remained predominately Catholic. 7 Protestants tended to be Loyalist, desiring to
remain in the British Empire, while Catholics tended to be Republicans, desiring a
unified island under an Irish flag. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) emerged in
1918 and launched armed campaigns in Northern Ireland in the 1920s, 1940s and
1950s.' 8 In response to these campaigns, the Northern Irish government
8. See generally, ROBERT KEE, THE GREEN FLAG: A HISTORY OF IRISH NATIONALISM 548-572
(1972).
9. John Darby, Conflict in Northern Ireland: A Background Essay, in FACETS OF THE CONFLICT
IN NORTHERN IRELAND (Seamus Dunn ed., 1995). Many mark the beginning of English-Irish conflict
as 1170 when Henry the II sent settlers to Ireland. Id.
10. Mari Fitzduff & Liam O'Hagan, The Northern IrelandTroubles: INCORE BackgroundPaper,
available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelenaincorepaper.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2003).
11. Darby, supra note 9, at 4.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. IR. CONST., arts. n & III. As a condition of The Good Friday Agreement, the Irish Free
State's claim to Northern Ireland was removed from its constitution. The Good Friday Agreement,
supra note 2.
15. See generally Darby, supra note 9 (comparing a concise history of the origin of Northern
Ireland's unique political and religious composition to other parts of Ireland).
16. See Dennis Kennedy, Academic Viewpoint Dashfor Agreement: Temporary Accommodation
or Lasting Settlement?, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1440, 1442 (1999).
17. See John Hume, Prospectsfor Peace in Northern Ireland, 38 ST. LouIs U. L. J. 967, 968
(1994).
18. Darby, supranote 9, at 4. As one author has stated:
The I.R.A. emerged in 1918 as a development from the Irish Volunteers (a paramilitary
force founded in 1913 as a counter-weight to the Ulster Volunter [sic] opponents of the
Home Rule Bill) but with an ancestry traceable to the Fenian traditions of the previous
century, as perpetuated by the Irish Republican Brotherhood (a secret paramilitary group,
members of which provided much of the I.R.A.'s leadership).
See Clive Walker, Political Violence and Democracy in NorthernIreland, 551 MOD. L. REV. 605, 608,
see also Ronald A. Christaldi, Comment, The Shamrock and the Crown: A HistoricalAnalysis of the
FrameworkDocument and Prospectsfor Peace in Ireland, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 123, 148 (Fall
1995) (citing the above quotation and adding that "The Irish Republican Army (IRA) is a militant sister
organization of the Sinn Fein.").
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established a police force and police reserve, both of which were almost entirely
Protestant. 19
The Northern Irish government manipulated election district
boundaries to keep Unionists and Protestants in power and also introduced
systematic economic discrimination against Catholics.2 °
B. The Troubles
Over the past thirty years the conflict in Northern Ireland came to be called
the "Troubles.'
The starting point of the "Troubles" was the civil rights
campaign of Northern Irish Catholics in the late 1960s.22 This movement began
with the formation of The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association in 1967.23
The Association's campaign, inspired by the American civil rights movement,
sought an end to discrimination against Catholics in the allocation of jobs,
rescission of permanent emergency legislation, and a stop to electoral abuses.24
The Association utilized protests, marches, "sit-ins," and the media to advance its
cause. 25 These tactics proved too much for the Northern Irish administration to
handle and, in 1960, the British government sent military troops to restore order.26
The return of the British military stimulated the revival of the Republican
movement. 27 The Provisional IRA, descendant of the IRA of 1918, formed and
waged war against the British army, utilizing mostly terrorist tactics. 28
Increasingly, the conflict moved beyond clashes between Catholics and Protestants
and took the form of "violence between the Provisional IRA and the British Army,
with occasionally bloody interventions by loyalist paramilitary groups., 29 Rather
than religion, the conflict became one of identity, British or Irish. ° In 1972, the
violence reached a peak when 468 people died.3' Since then, the violence has
gradually declined to an annual
average below 100.32 This level of conflict
33
continued through the 1990s.

19. Darby, supra note 9, at 4.
20. Id.
21. See COOGAN supra note 7.
22. Fitzduff& O'Hagan, supranote 10.
23. Darby, supra note 9, at 4.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. The term 'Provisional IRA' distinguishes the modem-day IRA from a splinter group
known as the 'Official IRA,' which split from the Provisionals in 1969 and have since played an
extremely limited role in Northern Ireland Alexander C. Linn, Reconciliationof the Penitent: Sectarian
Violence, PrisonerRelease, and Justice under the Good Friday Peace Accord, 26 J. LEGis. 163, 168
n.61 (2000).
29. Linn, supranote 28.
30. JOHN DARBY, SCORPIONS IN A BOTTLE: CONFLICTING CULTURES IN NORTHERN IRELAND 135

(1997) (citing Social Attitudes Survey, compiled by K. Trew (1996)).
31. Darby, supranote 9, at 4.
32. Id.
33. Darby, supra note 9, at 4.
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C. The PeaceProcess and the Good FridayAgreement
The current Northern Ireland Peace Process originated in the 1985 AngloIrish Agreement between England and Ireland.34 This agreement recognized that
Northern Ireland's constitutional status within Great Britain could not change
without the consent of a majority of its citizens. 35 In December of 1993, Ireland
and England released the Downing Street Declaration, which recognized that "it is
for the people of Ireland alone ... to exercise their right for self determination. 36

After intense negotiations facilitated by former United States Senator, George
Mitchell, the major political parties of Northern Ireland entered into The
Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, also known as "The Good
Friday Agreement. 37 Among the most significant participants was Sinn Fein, the
political wing of the IRA, 38 and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), which represents
the views of Unionists (those Northern Irish who wish to remain part of the British
Empire). The parties to the Agreement admitted Sinn Fein after the IRA pledged
and observed a "complete cessation of military activities" dating back to 1994. 39
At the time, the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), the largest paramilitary
organization representing Unionist's views also observed a cease-fire. The Good
Friday Agreement "recognizes the 'opportunity for a new beginning' and the need
for 'reconciliation, tolerance and mutual trust."' 40 The Agreement also recognized,
among other things:
"
*

Northern Ireland's constitutional status is dependant on the consent
of the majority of its citizens;
Northern Ireland's current position is as part of the United Kingdom;

*

Should a majority of people in Northern Ireland wish to bring about
a united Ireland, they can vote for it and both governments are
obliged to legislate for it;

*

The Irish Constitution is to be amended so that its territorial claim
over Northern Ireland is redefined to take account of consent;

"

A substantial range of human rights legislation will be introduced;

*

A Northern Ireland Victim's Commission will be established;

•

The parties "reaffirm their commitment to the total disarmament of
all paramilitary organizations;"

*

A "normalization" of security, "consistent with the level of threat," is

34. Id.
35. Roger Mac Ginty, The Irish Peace Process- BackgroundBriefing by Roger Mac Ginty, 1998,
available at http:l/cain.ulstac.uklevents/peace/bac.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2002).

36. Joint
Declaration
on
Peace,
Dec.
15,
1993,
available
at
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/dsd 151293.htm (last visited April 8, 2003).
37. The Good Friday Agreement, supra note 2.
38. Christaldi, supra note 18.
39. Irish Republican Army (IRA) Cease-fire Statement, Aug. 31, 1994, available at
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ira3l894.htm (last visited April 8, 2003).
40. See id. See also Mac Ginty, supra note 35.
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to take place;
"

A Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland is to be established.
And there is to be a review of the criminal justice system;

"

There will be an accelerated program of prisoner releases;

"

A new British-Irish Agreement is to be signed to replace the 1985
Anglo-Irish Agreement.41

On May 22, 1998, the Good Friday Agreement was put to a vote before the
people of Northern Ireland and Ireland in simultaneous referenda.42
The
agreement won overwhelming endorsement. 3 On June 25, 1998, elections to the
new Northern Ireland Assembly were held. 44 Whether the organizations impacted
by the Good Friday Agreement would adhere to the principles and requirements
within remained an outstanding question. Most important among the organizations
whose cooperation was essential were those with the greatest ability to tear the
Peace Process apart, the paramilitary organizations of Northern Ireland.
PART II: THE PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

The paramilitaries operating in Northern Ireland are typically armed,
politically motivated organizations. 5 They can be divided into two camps:
Republican, who wish Northern Ireland to join the Republic of Ireland; 46 and
Loyalists, who wish Northern Ireland to remain part of Great Britain.4 7 Though
these categories are not exclusive, this division also exists along religious lines:
Republicans tend to be Catholic and Loyalists tend to be Protestant. The main
Republican paramilitaries are the Provisional IRA (Provisional IRA or IRA), the
"Real" IRA (rRA), the Continuity IRA (CIRA) and, the Irish National Liberation
Army (INLA). 48
The main Loyalist paramilitaries are the Ulster Defense
Association (UDA) the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the Loyalist Volunteer
Force (LVF), and the Red Hand Defenders (RHD).49 The most significant
paramilitaries are the IRA and the UDA and the conflict is typically described as
one between the IRA and Northern Irish police forces, the British army, or the
UDA. The most contentious and difficult issue involving the paramilitaries has
been decommissioning, the disarmament of these armed groups. To facilitate
decommissioning, the Irish and English governments created the Independent
41. This summary of The Good Friday Agreement's provisions is from Mac Ginty, supra note 35.
42. Agence France-Presse, IRA Political Wing Says Decommissioning Arms "Dead-EndIssue,"

May 25, 2001.
43. The votes in favor of The Good Friday Agreement were 71.12% in Northem Ireland and
94.39% in the Irish Republic. Id.
44. Martin Melaugh, The Irish Peace Process - Brief Note on Decommissioning, 2001, at

http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/decommission.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2002).
45. See generally CAIN Web Service, at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/azorgan/htm (last
visited Jun. 30, 2002).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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International Commission on Decommissioning in 1997.50 The decommissioning
effort has had mixed success.
A. The Republicans

i. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA)
The main Republican paramilitary group involved in the Northern Ireland
conflict is the Provisional IRA. 5 1 Today's Provisional IRA traces its origins to the
IRA of 1918.52 The Provisional IRA is specifically a result of a split within the
53
Desiring to
IRA in 1969 resulting in the "Official IRA" and the "Provisionals.
move toward a political rather than military solution to the conflict, the "Official"
54
Since then, the term "IRA" is
IRA declared a cease-fire in the summer of 1972.
used primarily to refer to the "Provisional IRA."" The political wing of the IRA is
Sinn Fein; however, the leadership of the two organizations is separate and not
always of one voice.56 The IRA has engaged in violent attacks on the police
service and British soldiers in Northern Ireland as well as on the civilian
57
The IRA was responsible for
population in the Northern Ireland and England.
58
As part of
the deaths of 1,755 people between July 1969 and December 1993.
the Peace Process, the IRA has today observed its most recent cease-fire since July
59
On October 23,
20, 1997 and it currently supports the Good Friday Agreement.
to retire
of
decommissioning
2001, the IRA announced that it had begun a process
6°
today is
and
its arms. IRA membership peaked at around 1,500 in the mid 1970s
number
a
smaller
with
estimated to be composed of approximately 500 members

50. Agreement between the Governments of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom
establishing the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning [hereinafter Independent
International Commission on Decommission Agreement], Aug. 26, 1997, CAIN Web Service, at
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk (last visited April 8, 2003).
51. CAIN, supra note 45.

52. Walker, supra note 18.
53. CAIN, supra note 45.
54. Id.
55. Id.

56. As Clive Walker and Russell L. Weaver stated:
Sinn Fein leadership cannot be assumed to have direct control over the IRA leadership or
vice versa. Although the two groups clearly coordinate with and support each other,
tension existing between the short-term political and military plans of the Republican
movement often results in friction. Furthermore, history reflects fundamental splits
between those who wished to advance the Republican cause by predominantly military
means and those who chose predominantly political means.
Clive Walker & Russell L. Weaver, A Peace Deal for Northern Ireland? The Downing Street
Declarationof 1993, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 817, 838, quoted in Christaldi, supranote 18 at 148.

57. CAIN, supra note 45.
58. MALCOM SUTTON, BEAR IN MIND THESE DEAD... AN INDEX OF DEATHS FROM THE CONFLICT
IN IRELAND 1969-1993 (1994).

59. CAIN, supra note 45.
60. Warren Hoge, I.R.A. Relents; Is Dismantling Its Arms Cache, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2001, at
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of "active" members.61 It is estimated that the IRA's arsenal consists of several
hundred firearms, including revolvers, assault rifles, and machine guns; a dozen
anti-aircraft missiles and rocket launchers; flame throwers; several hundred
detonators; and three tons of Semtex (a commercial explosive). 62
ii. The Real Irish Republican Army (rIRA)
The "Real" IRA (rIRA) was formed in November 1997 from dissident
members of the Provisional IRA.63 These former members of the IRA were
opposed to the Peace Process and the political leadership of Sinn Fdin.64 The rlRA
admitted responsibility for the Omagh bombing on August 15, 1998.65 With 29
people killed and hundreds injured, this bombing was one of the deadliest single
incidents during the present conflict. 66 On August 18, 1998, the rIRA announced a
suspension of its activities; however, the organization may be responsible for
subsequent attacks in Northern Ireland and in England.67 Membership is currently
estimated in the dozens. 68 The rIRA most likely has access to a few dozen rifles,
machine guns, and pistols; a small amount of Semtex; and a small number of
detonators. 69 Recently, imprisoned leaders of the rIRA announced that the
paramilitary group has fallen apart and is "at an end."7 °
iii. The Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
The Continuity IRA (CIRA) came to prominence in 1996 when it claimed
responsibility for a number of attacks and attempted attacks in Northern Ireland.7 1
It is estimated that the CIRA is made up of people who were previously members
of other Republican groups - particularly the IRA - dissatisfied with the IRA
cease-fire and Peace Process.72 The CIRA has not declared a cease-fire and is
opposed to the Good Friday Agreement.73 The CIRA is thought to be responsible
for car bomb explosions, attempted bombings of hotels and government buildings,
hoax bombs, and an anti-tank rocket attack at the British Secret Intelligence
Service (MI5) headquarters in London.74 There are an estimated dozen members
in the CIRA. 75 The CIRA most likely has access to a few dozen rifles, machine
61. CAIN, supra note 45.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. IRA

Dissident

Group

Falls

Apart,

CBSNEWS.com,

Oct.

19,

2002,

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/10/19/world/main527527.shtml (last visited April 8, 2003).
71. CAIN, supra note 45.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. CAIN, supra note 45.
75. Id.

at
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guns, and pistols; a small amount of Semtex; and a few dozen detonators.
iv. The Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)
Established in 1975, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) is considered
to be the military wing of the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP).77 The INLA
advocates for the creation of a revolutionary socialist republic. 78 The INLA has
killed approximately 125 people during the conflict of which 45 were members of
security forces. 79 The INLA called a cease-fire on August 22, 1998.80 The INLA
consists of an estimated two-dozen active members with a network of supporters in
a small stock of
Ireland and continental Europe. 8 1 The INLA is thought to have
82
rifles, handguns, and grenades, as well as commercial explosive.
B. The Loyalists
i. The Ulster Defense Association (UDA)
The Ulster Defense Association is the largest Loyalist paramilitary group in
Northern Ireland.83 The UDA formed in September 1971 from a number of
Loyalist vigilante groups. 84 Since 1973, the UDA has also used the cover name
Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) to claim the responsibility for the killing of
Catholics. 8 5 During the 1990's, the UFF killed Catholics and Republicans
including moderate Republican politicians.8 6 The UDA joined with other Loyalist
paramilitary groups in calling a cease-fire on October 13, 1994. g7 Consequently,
the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), the political arm of the UDA, earned a place at
the multi-party talks.8 8 The UDA initially supported, with some reservations, the
UDP in its support for the Good Friday Agreement; however, elements in the UDA
and the UFF continued to carry out acts of violence. 89 On October 12, 2001, both
organizations were "specified," meaning that the British government considered
their cease-fires to be at an end. 90 The UDA has since dissolved the UDP and

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
SUTTON, supra note 58.

80. CAIN, supra note 45.

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Jd.
89. CAIN, supra note 45.
90. Loyalists Warn Against IRA Bias, CNN.com, Oct. 13, 2001, at http:/lwww.cnn.com/2001/
WORLD/europe/I 0/13/ireland.trimble (last visited April 8, 2003).
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returned to acts of violence. 9' At its peak, the estimated membership of the UDA
was 40,000; however, the current strength of the UDA is estimated around several
hundred, with a few dozen being active in the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF). 92 It
is likely that the UDA has a few hundred rifles, Uzi machineguns, and handguns,
as well as an amount of Powergel (a commercial plastic explosive).93
ii. The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) is a Loyalist paramilitary group formed in
1966. 94 The UVF is responsible for scores of assassinations in Northern Ireland,
mostly of innocent Catholics, which have taken place over a period of almost 30
years. 95 It is believed to be responsible for the greatest loss of life in a single day
when it planted bombs in Dublin and Monaghan on May 17, 1974 killing 33
people.96 The UVF had its highest membership in the early 1970's with
approximately 1,500 members.9 7 Today, it is estimated that the UVF has several
hundred members and is believed to have access to AK-47 rifles, pistols, revolvers,
and a small number of rocket launchers. 98
iii. The Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)
It is believed the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) formed in 1996 from
defected members of the UVF. 99 The LVF is responsible for a number of killings
in January 1998.100 During this time, it allowed the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)
to use the LVF name while the UFF was nominally adhering to a cease-fire.'"'
The LVF is estimated to have dozens of members. 10 2 The LVF is believed to have
a small number of rifles, machineguns, handguns, and a small amount of
Powergel.103 The LVF is one of two paramilitary organizations that has handed
over some weapons for
destruction to the Independent International Commission
04
on Decommissioning. 1

91. Warren Hoge, Ulster's Protestant Leader in Party Showdown Today, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,
2001, at A4.
92. CAIN, supra note 45.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. The other paramilitary to hand over weapons is the IRA. CAIN, supra note 45. The
Independent International Commission on Decommissioning was established in 1997 by Ireland and
Great Britain to further the decommissioning and peace processes. See Independent International
Commission on Decommission Agreement, supra note 50.
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iv. The Red Hand Defenders (RHD)
The name Red Hand Defenders was first used in 1998.105 Initially, the group
was believed by experts to be made up of dissident members of other Loyalist
paramilitary groups opposed to the Good Friday Agreement; however, there is also
speculation that the RHD is a cover-name used by members of other Loyalist
paramilitaries under which these organizations could carry out attacks and
nominally take credit for observing a ceasefire. 10 6 The RHD has taken credit for
the killing of a Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) officer as10 7well as numerous blast
bomb attacks on Catholic families across Northern Ireland.
The paramilitary organizations of Northern Ireland have engaged in violence
for over thirty years yet there is a general reluctance among many segments of
Northern Irish society to label them as "terrorists." In fact, the very term
"paramilitary" carries with it the implication that these organizations are legitimate
armed groups and not terrorists. To take an objective look at whether these groups
are in fact terrorists it is necessary to first define terrorism.
PART III: TERRORISM

The definition of terrorism is elusive. Perhaps purposefully, the Good Friday
Agreement only makes one reference to "terrorists."'' 08 The term "terrorism" has
its origins in the French government's "reign of terror" during the French
Revolution. 0 9 The majority of the defmitions of terrorism have common themes
including the use of violent acts and fear as a means of directly intimidating,
coercing, or overthrowing a government, coordinated by a tightly controlled
leadership structure." 0 "At its core, terrorism has three effects: An immediate
effect of killing or injuring those who are deemed a prohibited target; an
intermediate effect of intimidating the larger population therefore influencing their
political behavior; and an aggregate effect of undermining overall public order.""'
"[D]espite 15 U.N. conventions and two draft conventions dealing with various

105. CAIN, supra note 45.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. That reference is included in the following clause: "The participants also believe that those
structures and arrangements must be capable of maintaining law and order including responding
effectively to crime and to any terrorist threat and to public order problems." The Good Friday
Agreement, supra note 2, at 2.
109. Emanuel Gross, Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism: The Balance Between the Right of a
Nation to Defend Itself and the Protection of Human Rights, 6 UCLA I. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 89,
97 (Spring/Summer 2001), citing David B. Kopel & Joseph Olson, Preventing a Reign of Terror: Civil
Liberties Implicationsof Terrorism Legislation, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 247, 251 (1996).
110. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 1, 401 (9th ed. 1992). See also Gross, supra note
109.
111. Seth Merl, Note, Internet Communication Standards for the 21' Century: International
Terrorism Must Force the U.S. to Adopt "Carnivore" and the New ElectronicSurveillance Standards,
27 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 245, 249 (2001), citing W. Michael Reisman, InternationalLegal Responses to
Terrorism, 22 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 3, 10, 60 (1999).
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aspects of terrorism-including hijacking, bombing, piracy, assassination, hostagetaking, and biological, chemical and nuclear warfare-the international community
has yet to settle on a single definition of 'terrorists' or 'terrorism.""'12 One reason
for the lack of consensus on the definition of terrorism is that "[o]ver the years...
Westem powers have often tried to limit the definition of 'terrorism' in
international conventions to individual or small- group conduct, while other
nations and human rights organizations pushed to include state-sponsored violence
perpetrated by police, military or other paramilitary groups.""l 3 Despite the lack of
by the international community
agreement on a definition, terrorism is condemned
4
and is a criminal offense in most states."
In terms of the domestic law of nations, the United Kingdom, Northern
Ireland's ultimate sovereign, defines "terrorism" as "the use of violence for
political ends and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public
or any section of the public in fear."'" 15 In response to the September 11th attacks,
the United States enacted The U.S.A. PATRIOT ACT," 6 which 'defines
"international terrorism" as:
activities that (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State,.. .(B) appear to
be intended- (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect
7 the conduct of
a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. "
In any discussion of terrorism, several concepts in international law intimately
related to terrorism must also be addressed. They include national liberation
movements (NLMs), self-determination, and self-defense.
A. NationalLiberation Movements (NLMs)
One complication in coming to a consensus on a definition of terrorism is the
tension between developing and developed states regarding the actions of National

112. William C. Smith, Legal Arsenal, International Law can be an Important Element in the
United States' Campaign against Terrorism, 87 DEC A.B.A. 43, 44 (Dec. 2001), quoting M. Cherif
Bassiouni, co-director of the International Criminal Justice and Weapons Control Center at DePaul
University in Chicago.
113. Id.
114. G.A. Res. 54/110, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (2 Feb. 2000), U.N. Doc.
A/Res/54/1 10; G.A. Res. 40/61, 40 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 53), 1985, at 301, U.N. Doc. A/40/53;
European ParliamentResolution on Acts of Terrorism in the European Community, (16 Nov 1977);
Organization of American States Resolution on Acts of Terrorism (30 Jun. 1970), reported in 0.
ELAGAB (ED.), INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS RELATING TO TERRORISM.

115. Prevention of Terrorism (Temp. Provisions) Act, § 20 (1989) (Eng.), in LEXIS Statutes and
Statutory Instruments of England and Wales database; Section 14(1) of the English Prevention of
Terrorism (Temporary Provision) Act, 1984, and Section 20(1) of the English Prevention of Terrorism
(Temporary Provision) Act, 1989.
116. The U.S.A. PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001).
117. Id.
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Liberation Movements (NLMs)." 8 Though seldom defined, NLM's are, "groups
fighting for their own 'national liberation.'"1 9 Developing states generally believe
that the definition of terrorism should exclude the "acts of national liberation
movements."' 2 ° In particular, "[m]odern Arab states,... have been careful to
distinguish outlaw terrorists from 'legitimate' national liberation movements - an
implicit reference to Palestinian conflicts with Israel over the creation of some
independent state."' 2' On the other hand, developed and Western states generally
argue "legitimacy of the cause [can]not legitimize the use of certain forms of
violence."'' 22 Their argument is generally that, "certain acts are so brutal that
States are prohibited from engaging in them even during wartime; so too, these
States [assert], there should be limits to the violence engaged in by groups and
individuals."'' 23 The United Nations has recognized NLMs as active participants in
certain areas. For example, the U.N. Security Council permitted the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) to participate in debates. 24 In fact, "the possibility
of observer status in the UN and related organs
for NLMs appears to have been
'2
affirmatively settled in international practice."' 1
B. Self-determination

Self-determination is also seldom defined. International law generally
requires states to refrain from threat or use of force against another state. 126 On the
other hand, international law does not forbid rebellion and there is growing
acceptance of self-determination as a legal right. 2 7 International law also "does
not cover as such the self-determination situation where a people resorts to force
against the colonial power," leaving such issues to the domestic law of the colonial
state as a purely internal matter. 128 In the 1970s, the General Assembly of the
United Nations began adopting resolutions, "reaffirming the legitimacy of the
struggle of people for liberation from colonial domination and alien subjugation,
'by all available means including armed struggle."" 129 As in NLMs, there is a split
118. See JOSEPH J. LAMBERT, TERRORISM AND HOSTAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-A
COMMENTARY ON THE HOSTAGES CONVENTION 1979 37 (1990) (describing debate within the United

Nation's 1972 Ad Hoc committee on International Terrorism). See also Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee on International Terrorism [hereinafter International Terrorism Report], UN GAOR, 28"h
Sess., Supp. 28, para. 3, U.N. Doc A/9028 (1973).
119. See LAMBERT, supra note 118.
120. See id. See also International Terrorism Report, supra note 118, at 122, 37 & 45.
121. Smith, supra note 112.
122. See LAMBERT, supra note 118. See also International Terrorism Report, supra note 119, at
23.
123. See LAMBERT, supra note 118.
124. See MALCOM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 174 (4th ed. 1997). See also 1972 UNYB 70;
1978 UNYB 297.
125. SHAW, supra note 124.
126. Id.; see e.g. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(4).
127. SHAW, supra note 124, at 795-96.
128. Id., at 795.
129. SHAW, supranote 124, at 795; see e.g. resolutions 3070(XXVII), 3103(XXVIII), 3246(XXIX),
3328(XXIV), 3481(XXX), 31/91, 31/92, 32/42 and 32/154. While resolutions of the United Nations
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of opinion between developing and developed states regarding when force is
acceptable as a means of self-determination.130 Developing states typically take
the view that "the use of force by peoples entitled to self-determination [is]
legitimate as self-defense against the very existence of colonialism itself.' 31
Developed states, on the other hand, typically take the position that the use of force
by peoples entitled to self-determination is legitimate "as a response to force
utilized to suppress the right of self-determination."' 132 Using either definition, one
could argue that the situation in Northern Ireland allows Republicans the right to
use force. For example a Republicans would portray their paramilitary's actions as
a legitimate fight against a colonial power. Alternatively they might also argue
that under the developing state's view, the British government is suppressing the
right of the Irish people to self-determination. Despite the growing acceptance of
the right of self-determination "[the] implication is clear: the right to selfbe an important part of the United Nations
determination, which continues to 33
policy, cannot justify acts of terror."'
C. Self-Defense.
The concept of self-defense in international law is primarily a problem of
state-to-state relations that does not directly apply to the paramilitaries within
Northern Ireland except in considering force used by Britain in response to
paramilitary attacks; however, any treatment of terrorism and the response to
terrorism without a discussion of self-defense is incomplete. The traditional
definition of the right of self-defense in customary international law is that force
may only be exercised where there exists "a necessity of self-defense, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.' 34
Additionally, the action taken in pursuance of self-defense must not be
"Indeed, the concepts of necessity and
unreasonable or excessive. 135

General Assembly are not binding on even Member states of the United nations,
[w]hen they are considered with general norms of international law, then acceptance by a
majority vote constitutes evidence of the opinions of governments in the widest forum
for the expression of such opinions... In general each individual resolution must be
assessed in the light of all the circumstances and also by reference to other evidence of
the opinions of states on the point in issue.
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (5h ed. 1998). See also The Case
Concerning Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 99-100 (opinio juris may, through with all due caution, be deduced from, inter alia, the
attitude of States towards certain General Assembly resolutions.). Opino juris is the attitudinal
requirement that a state believe an activity is legally obligatory for it to become part of customary
international law. SHAW,supra note 125, at 66-67.
130. SHAW, supra note 124, at 796.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Rosalyn Higgins, The General International Law of Terrorism in TERRORISM AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (R. Higgins & M. Flory, eds. 1997).
134. R.Y. Jennings, "The Carolineand McLeod Cases," 32 ASIL 82 (1938); MALCOM N. SHAW,
supranote 124 at 787.
135. SHAW, supra note 124, at 787.
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36
proportionality are at the heart of self-defence [sp] in international law."1

Perhaps the lack of clarity in defining terrorism results from the ambiguities
in determining what is a legitimate objective. Whether an organization is a
terrorist organization or legitimate, yet unconventional, army depends on one's
point of view or biases; however, any definition has several themes in common: (1)
The use of force or threat thereof, (2) against innocents or non-combatants, (3) to
coerce or intimidate, (4) persons or a government, (5) to action or inaction.
Having attempted to define terrorism, this article will now address the
question of whether the paramilitaries of Northern Ireland are terrorists.
PART IV: ARE THE PARAMILITARIES TERRORISTS?

The very term "paramilitary" carries with it the implication that these
organizations are legitimate armed groups and not terrorists. The "paramilitary"
label is generally accepted within Northern Irish society. Some argue that the
Northern Irish paramilitaries are not terrorists and are more akin to freedom
fighters struggling for national liberation. Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein, in
particular, has refused to label as terrorist those people "who fought when they
considered they had no other choice."'137 Again, how one defines an armed group
depends on what bias he brings to his analysis. Adams, for example, might call
certain Loyalist paramilitaries "terrorists," while at the same time a Loyalist would
firmly believe that the IRA is composed entirely of terrorists.
As a point of discussion, U.S. courts have had difficulty coming to grips with
terrorism and Northern Ireland, particularly prior to September 1 th. For example
in Quinn v. Robinson, 38 a case concerning an extradition request from Great
Britain for a member of the IRA wanted for conspiring to cause explosions in
London and the murder of a police constable, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the United States would be obligated to give safe harbor or passage to
anyone who participates in any acts, however heinous, if the acts: were done for
purely political purposes; occurred within the territorial limits of the civil war or
uprising; were committed by persons who reside there (or, as in this case, had
some significant tie to the territory); and, had been used before, "by revolutionaries
to bring about change in the composition or structure of the government in their
own country."' 139 This decision is cited as supporting the position that any atrocity
' 40
qualifies as a political act if it is done for "purely political purposes."'
136. See id. See also Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 130, at 94 & 103; The Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 41.
137. See A Draft Chronology of the Conflict - 2001, CAIN Web Service, at
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelemchron/chO1.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
138. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 806 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882, 107 S.Ct. 271, 93
L.Ed.2d 247 (1986).
But see Matter of Extradition of Atta, 706 F.Supp. 1032 (E.D.N.Y.
1989)(declining to follow the rationale of Quinn v. Robinson).
139. Matter of Extradition of Atta, 706 F.Supp. 1032, quoting Quinn, 783 F.2d at 806.
140. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 806. The court's rationale is set forth in Judge Reinhardt's opinion as
follows:
It is understandable that Americans are offended by the tactics used by many of those
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A. National LiberationMovements (NLMs)
It is the opinion of the Nationalist community that Republican paramilitaries
are legitimate armed groups fighting for the complete liberation of the Irish nation.
Thus, they would argue, they fall squarely within the definition of a National
Liberation Movement. Indeed, the Republican paramilitaries hold in common
many attributes characteristic of other National Liberation Movements.14 1 On the
other hand, Loyalists supporters might point out that the Republican paramilitaries
engage in acts of brutality unacceptable in any society regardless of the political
goal. They would label the Republican paramilitaries as outlaw groups with goals
beyond the scope of the consensus of Northern Irish.
B. Self-Determination
Self-determination is also a highly relevant issue in Northern Ireland. The
Republicans and Nationalists of Northern Ireland form a distinct group based on
their political views. In addition, for the most part, they form a distinct religious
group as the majority of Northern Irish Republicans are Catholics and most
Loyalists are Protestants. Finally, Ireland was once a colony and Northern Ireland
is considered by some to still be the last colony of the British Empire. In response,
Loyalists would again argue that the Republican paramilitaries' means are outside
the accepted norms of international law.
C. Self-Defense
Great Britain's response to paramilitary attacks has both been accepted and
criticized. In general, the world community accepted Britain's decision to deploy
troops to Northern Ireland during the height of the Troubles. Alternatively, the
government of Northern Ireland and Great Britain often were criticized for the
actions of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). In fact, reform of the RUC has
for many years been an important
issue to Republicans and is a major component
42
of the Good Friday Agreement.1

seeking to change their governments. Often these tactics are employed by persons who
do not share our cultural and social values or mores. Sometimes they are employed by
those whose views of the nature, importance, or relevance of individual human life differ
radically from ours. Nevertheless, it is not our place to impose our notions of civilized
strife on people who are seeking to overthrow the regimes in control of their countries in

contexts and circumstances that we have not experienced, and with which we can
identify only with the greatest difficulty. It is the fact that insurgents are seeking to
change their governments that makes the political offense exception applicable, not their
reasons for wishing to do so or the nature of the acts by which they hope to accomplish
that goal.

Id. at 804-05 (internal citation omitted).
141. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) of the 1980's, the prototypical example of a

National Liberation Movement, portrayed itself as a legitimate army fighting an occupying force, as has
the IRA.
142. The Good Friday Agreement, supra note 2.
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D. Moving Outside the Definition of Terrorists
Also important in addressing the paramilitaries as terrorists is to consider
recent developments in the Peace Process that arguably take some paramilitaries
outside the definition of terrorism. Factors that might take some paramilitaries
outside the definition of terrorists include cease-fires and decommissioning. As an
organization decommissions its weapons, it loses its very ability to engage in
violence. Similarly, an organization that consistently observes a cease-fire reduces
the fear it creates among target communities. Both the IRA and LVF have made
efforts to decommission their weapons. 143 As these groups and others voluntarily
surrender their ability to engage in violence, they may move themselves outside
the definition of terrorists.
Some paramilitary organizations chose to take a moderate approach,
demonstrating that they may not be terrorists. Some Republican organizations
have reduced their advocacy of violence to regain territory and are focusing instead
on securing civil and human rights for Republicans and Catholics. For example,
John Hume, leader of the moderate Social Democratic Labor Party (SDLP),
believes that the British have no interest in maintaining a presence in Northern
Ireland nor can benefit from their attendance in the area.144 On the other hand,
Gerry Adams' has argued in the past that Great Britain only serves its own selfish
interests by continuing to occupy Northern Ireland, thus attenuating their right and
need to be in the region.' 45 Over time Adams came to agree with Hume. Adams'
acceptance of Hume's view marked a turning point in the Peace Process and led to
the Downing Street Declaration of 1993, in which the British government declared
it had, "no selfish, strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland."' 46 Thus, it
can be argued that the violent overthrow of the government is no longer the central
focus of major factions in the Republican movement, specifically the IRA. With
the removal of this integral component of the loose definition of terrorism, namely
advocating the overthrow of a government, Republican paramilitaries, particularly
the IRA, might have moved outside the definition of terrorists. Additionally, some
organizations have won over public and world opinion by taking a more moderate
stance. For example, the IRA's decision to call a ceasefire and ultimately to
decommission, has garnered it much support in the world community.
Despite these arguments, most neutral observers would characterize all of the
paramilitaries of Northern Ireland as terrorist organizations. Regardless of their
present character, the past acts of these organizations and their utilization of
violence to coerce their opposition firmly places them within any accepted
definition of terrorism. Every paramilitary organization in Northern Ireland has:

143. CAIN, supra note 45.
144. Kathleen P. Lundy, Lasting Peace in Northern Ireland: An Economic Resolution to a Political
and Religious Conflict, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 699, 706 (2001); see also David
Trimble, The Belfast Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1145, 1150 (1999).
145. Lundy, supranote 144, at 706.

146. Joint Declaration on Peace, Dec. 15 , 1993, available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/
peace/docs/dsd I51293.htm (last visited April 8, 2003); see also Lundy, supra note 144, at 706.
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(1) used force or and violence or the threat thereof, (2) against innocents or noncombatants, (3) to coerce or intimidate, (4) persons or a government, (5) to action
or inaction. Furthermore, their ends are political and all advocate the overthrow of
a government (Republican groups seeking the abdication of British Rule, and
Loyalists groups seeking to coerce the existing power structure to resist
Republican efforts). Finally, it is symptomatic of Northern Irish paramilitary
organization to be under the command of a tightly controlled leadership
structure. 4 7 Fear has been and still is their greatest weapon and despite moves
forward, each paramilitary still either threatens to or actually possesses the ability
to engage in violence.
PART V: CASE COMPARISONS OF THE IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER 11TH

Since September 11, 2001, the world's approach to terrorism has changed
significantly. Of course, Northern Ireland is not the only area of the world to
suffer conflict and terror. As points of comparison, Spain,48 Sri Lanka, and
Israel/Palestine and their experience with terrorism is addressed.
A. Spain
Spain has suffered a significant level of terrorism over the past fifteen years,
primarily at the hands of Basque separatists. Spread between southern France and
northern Spain, the Basque people are distinct people who speak a language unlike
any other in Europe.1 49 Since the death of Generalissimo Franco in 1975, the
Spanish government embarked on a policy of devolution to return more power to
the Catalan and Basque regions. 50 While such increased autonomy was secured
via peaceful avenues, there are still violent factions that use terrorist techniques in
the pursuit of complete secession from Spain.' 5' Since 1968, the Euskadi Ta
Askatasuna (ETA), Basque for "Basque Homeland and Freedom," has waged a
relentless campaign of violence. 152 The ETA's targets include politicians, police,
judges, and soldiers and is responsible for more than 800 deaths since 1968.153

147. However the some paramilitary organizations, particularly the IRA, have recently resorted to a
decentralized "cell" structure to counter the impact of informers. THE CROWNED HARP, available at
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/docs/ellison/ellisonOObx.htm (last visited April 8, 2003).
148. Seth Merl, Note, Internet Communication Standards for the 21' Century: International
Terrorism Must Force the U.S. to Adopt "Carnivore" and the New ElectronicSurveillance Standards,
27 BROOK. J. INT'L. L.

245,

249 (2001); SUZANNE ROBITAILLE ONTIVEROS, GLOBAL TERRORISM

(Pamela R. Byrne & Suzanne R. Ontiveros eds., 1986).
149. Michael J. Kelly, Political Downsizing. The Re-Emergence of Self-Determination, and the
Movement Toward Smaller, EthnicallyHomogenous States, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 209, 231 (1999).
150. Id.
151. Kelley, supra note 149, at231.
152. Paul Sussman, ETA: Feared Separatist Group, CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/
SPECIALS/2001/basque/stories/background.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
153. Id.
See Politician Killed in Spanish Bar, CNN.com, Mar. 21, 2002, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/eurpot/O3/21/spain.shooting/index.html
(last visited March 22,
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Comparisons have been drawn between the situation in Spain and Northern
Ireland and in particular the IRA and the ETA. 154 In fact, the two groups are
reputed to be closely linked.15 In 1998 Gerry Adams, the Sinn Fein party leader,
visited the region to advocate for peace talks in the region. 156 In September of that
year, the ETA, like the IRA in 1994, declared a ceasefire; however, unlike the IRA
ceasefire, the ETA ceasefire lasted only 14 months.
Since September 1 th, Spain, the European Union, and the United States have
all moved against the ETA as a terrorist organization. In late December 2001, the
European Union (EU), whose rotating presidency Spain took over on January 1,
2002, specifically identified the ETA as an organization all EU members could
agree on as being a terrorist organization.1 57 In February 2002, the United States
In
moved to freeze the assets of twenty-one persons with ties to the ETA.'
59
March 2002, the ETA was blamed for the killing of a Socialist party politician.1
Thus, the events of September 11th aided Spain, and the Western world, in
portraying the ETA as a terrorist organization and oppose its movement. What few
advances toward peace that occurred prior to September 11th might be hindered if
Today, the ETA is again being blamed for violent and
not destroyed altogether.
60
lethal attacks. 1

Although the ETA and the IRA are linked and the Irish were involved in
attempting to secure peace in Spain, the two conflicts are nevertheless worlds
apart. Unlike the IRA, the ETA has not made any concessions and continues to
engage in violent behavior. The government of Spain, while making some
concessions to the Basques in terms of self-government and autonomy, refused to
maintain any political dialogue with the ETA's political representatives during the
ETA's 1998 ceasefire. 161 The current Spanish government continues to take a
hard-line stance against the ETA. 62 In contrast, Great Britain, and in particular
Prime Minister Tony Blair, regard dialogue as the only viable avenue toward
peace. 63 Finally, while the Basque region's political demographics remains stable,
the number of Catholics in Ireland is increasing exponentially compared to that of
Protestants. 164

2002); U.S. State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998, Background Information on
Terrorist Groups, available at http://www.state.gov.www/global/terrorismI998Report/appb.htm (last

visited Mar. 22, 2002).
154. Alison Daniels, Similar Conflicts, Different Paths, CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.coml/

SPECIALS/2001/basque/stories/eta.ira.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
155. Sussman, supra note 152; U.S. State Department, supra note 153.
156. Daniels, supranote 154.
157. Id. EUAgrees Common List of Terrorists,THE IRISH TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001.
158. U.S. Cracks down on Basque Separatists, CNN.com, Feb. 26,
http://www.cnn.comt2002/US/02/26/treasury.eta/index.html.

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Daniels, supranote 154.

162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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B. Sri Lanka
The island of Sri Lanka also has a long history of ethnic strife and violence.
The Sinhalese ethnic group make up twenty-four percent of the population of Sri
Lanka. 165 The Tamils are an ethnic minority, making up twelve percent of the
population and are concentrated in the northern portion of the island nation. 166
Which group was first to inhabit the island is disputed. 167 When Sri Lanka was a
British colony, a disproportionate number of top jobs in the British Civil Service
were given to Tamils. 68 When granted independence from Britain in 1948, the
Sinhalese majority gained power and introduced progressive yet discriminatory
practices to redress the imbalance. 169 Frustrated by these policies, the Tamils grew
discontent and, since 1956, communal tension and violence between the Tamils
and the Sinhalese increased. 170 By the mid-1970s, Tamils were calling for a
separate northern state.' 7' It was during this time that the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was formed. 172 In 1983, the LTTE killed thirteen Sri Lankan
soldiers sparking the killing of hundreds of Tamils in the Sri Lankan Capital of
Colombo and a 100,000 more Tamils fled to India. 173 In 1987, India sent
peacekeeping forces to Sri Lanka; however, in 1990, after getting bogged down in
fighting in the north, the Indian peacekeeping forces left. 174 The LTTE was held
responsible for the 1991 assassination of Indian Prime Rajiv Gandhi.' 75 Since
then, there have been intermittent attempts to work out a peaceful agreement, but
all have failed. 176 The ensuing war claimed the lives of an incredible 65,000
Tamils and Sinhalese during the last 20 years alone. 177
The LTTE is a formidable fighting force who use guerrilla tactics as well as
suicide bombings against the Sri Lankan armed forces and political officials.178
With a fighting force of 10,000, the LTTE has also used artillery, 79surface-to-air
missiles and rocket launchers, as well as vicious attacks on civilians.1
There have been several developments in the Sri Lankan/Tamil conflict since
165. Sri Lanka: The Ethnic Divide, BBC News, May 16, 2000 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
hi/english/world/southasia/newsid_514000/514577.stm (last visited April 8, 2003).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Timeline: Sri Lanka, BBC News, Mar. 18, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/
world/southasia/newsid_1879000/1879947.stm (last visited April 8, 2003).
175. Sri Lanka: The Ethnic Divide,supra note 165.
176. Id.
177. Anna Horsburgh Porter, In the Tamil Tiger Heartland, BBC News, Jan. 16, 2002, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/southasia/newsid_1764000/1764749.stm. (last visited April 8,
2003)
178. Tamil Tigers: A Fearsome Force, BBC News Online, May 2, 2000, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/south asia/526407.stm (last visited April 8, 2003).
179. Id.
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September 1 Ith. In December 2001, a pro-peace government was elected in Sri
Lanka that increased hopes of ending the war.' 80 In addition, in December 2001,
as well as in January and February 2002, the LTTE declared and extended
unilateral ceasefires.' 8' The government of Sri Lanka matched these truces.' 82 In
early 2002, in an effort to shed the terrorist label, the LTTE allowed journalists to
inspect their training camps to demonstrate their transition from a terrorist guerrilla
group to a conventional army. 183 In February 2002, the Sri Lankan Prime Minister
negotiated conditions for a permanent cease-fire. 184 The LTTE has agreed to sign
a memorandum of understanding with the Sri Lankan government over the ceasefire, but LTTE negotiators refused to participate in negotiations until a Sri Lanka
lifted a ban on
the LTTE. i8 5 On September 4, 2002 that ban was lifted and peace
86
talks began. 1
These moves toward peace were a result of, or at lease affected by, the events
of September 1 1th and in particular, the "'war on terrorism." The LTTE's
willingness to open its camps to journalists was an attempt to avoid the
repercussions of being labeled a "terrorist" such as military attacks much like those
waged against al Qaeda in Afghanistan. The Sri Lankan government also made
bold moves toward peace by not only matching cease-fires, but also by easing
economic embargoes on rebel-held areas as well as agreeing to negotiate. 87 The
Sri Lankan government could easily have stepped up its campaign against the
LTTE and used the war on terrorism as political cover; however, it chose not to
take that path. Of course, there are numerous factors that may have aided in the
current move toward peace, but they cannot all be addressed adequately in this
article. Yet it seems September 11 th has had a substantial effect on this conflict.
In comparison to the Peace Process of Northern Ireland, the peace initiatives
in Sri Lanka/Tamil are incredibly recent. In the 1980's and 1990's, many began to
realize that the conflict in Northern Ireland was futile. Likewise in Sri
Lanka/Tamil, many scholars and political officials are today reaching similar
conclusions regarding the their conflict. Just as Great Britain and the IRA laid the
foundations for peace, the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE have laid similar
foundations in the aftermath of September 11th.
180. Scott McDonald, Sri Lanka, Tamil Tigers Extend Truce, Jan. 20, 2002, at
http://www.reliefweb.int (last visited January 20, 2002).
181. Tamil Tigers Declare Month Long Cease-fire: Goodwill Measure to Facilitate Peace, Press
Release, Dec. 19, 2001; LTTEExtends UnilateralCease-Fire,Press Release, Jan. 20, 2002.
182. McDonald, supra note 180. This was in sharp contrast to the previous People's Alliance
government, which launched an offensive just hours after the LTTE announced a similar cease-fire in
December 2000. Id.
183. Frances Harrison, Up Close With the Tamil Tigers, BBC News, Jan. 29, 2002, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/southasialnewsid_178900011789503.stm.
184. Priyath Liyanage, Analysis: Sri Lanka's Fragile Cease-fire, BBC News, Feb. 21, 2002 at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/southasia/newsid1834000/1834788.stm.
185. Id.
186. Sri Lanka Lifts Ban on Tamil Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2002, available at
http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2002); Amy Waldman, Talks Open on Sri Lanka to End
19-Year War, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2002, availableat http://www.nytimes.com.
187. McDonald, supra note 180.
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C. Israel/Palestine

The Israeli/Palestinian conflict is a result of promises made, primarily by the
British government in the closing years of World War I as well as the inter-war
period, to both Arabs and Jews that Palestine would eventually become their
homeland.18 8 When these promises were implemented, the United Nations tried to
resolve the competing interests by creating separate Jewish and Palestinian
homelands within a "partitioned Palestine."'18 9 War quickly followed after this
solution proved unworkable. 90 During this time, Israeli forces occupied most of
Palestine.' 9'

Egypt, protecting its Arab brethren, occupied the Gaza Strip.

92

In

193

1967, another war ensued in which Israel gained more territory.
Though great
advances were made in the late 1990's, those efforts were reversed after September
11 th.
Since September I1th, the conflict in Israel/Palestine has deteriorated to
incredible depths.' 94 At the time of this writing, Palestinian suicide bombers attack
on an almost daily basis and the Israeli army makes repeated forays and retreats
into Palestinian areas. 195 Suicide attacks have increased in both their frequency
and their death tolls. 196 For the first time, non-religious Palestinians and Arabs are

participating in suicide attacks. The shift from solely religious zealots carrying out
suicide bombings to the addition of secular bombers may be indicative of the utter
hopelessness felt among the Palestinian people. This addition also reflects the
Palestinian response to the increased militaristic views and policies of the Israeli
government.
The Israeli government has likewise increased its attacks on
Palestinians since September 1 1th by carrying out military operations and
assassinating Palestinian leaders as well as occupying territory within the
Palestinian Authority. In response to the increased levels of violence, peace
initiatives have97been proffered by both the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia and the
United States. 1

Before September 1lth, the Bush administration attempted to stay out of the
Israeli/Palestinian conflict; however, the current level violence has forced the
United States to become involved again.'9 8 Although the events that caused the
current increase in violence may have occurred prior to September 11 th, it had a
188. Michael J. Kelly, Political Downsizing: The Re-Emergence of Self-Determination, and the
Movement Toward Smaller, EthnicallyHomogenous States, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 209, 268 (1999).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. James Bennet, IsraelisBesiege a Defiant Arafat in His Office, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2002, at
Al.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Arab Ministers Agree on Formulafor Supporting Palestinians,N. Y.TIMES, Mar. 25, 2002, at
Al.
198. Joel Brinkley & Todd S. Purdum, Palestinian Goal of Statehood vs. Israeli Aim for CeaseFire,N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2002, at Al.
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The apparent involvement of Muslim
negative effect on the conflict. 199
fundamentalists in the September 1ilth attack may have fueled Israeli, and to a
certain extent other Western nations', fear of Palestinian attacks. The Western
response to the attacks may also provide the Israeli government political cover to
intensify its military campaigns against Palestinians. In any case, the effect of
September l1th on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict deserves a separate, more
detailed treatment than this article can provide.
There are similarities between the conflict in Israel/Palestine and Northern
Ireland. Republican paramilitaries have identified with the Palestinian struggle.
For many years, Yasser Arafat was a popular image on murals in Republican areas
of Belfast. The recent development of secular Palestinians and Arabs engaging in
suicide attacks parallels the shift in Northern Irish Republican thought from one of
Catholic vs. Protestant to one of Irish vs. British. The primary difference between
the Northern Ireland and Israeli conflicts is the length of time each has consumed.
The roots of Ireland's conflict are 800 years old. Furthermore, the Irish conflict
has seen incredible advances not the least of which is the creation of the Irish Free
State. The current Israeli/Palestinian conflict has its origins in the mid-20th
Century and the only significant change in position of the parties has been the
result of massive armed conflict.
With these examples of post September 11th impact on conflicts in mind, this
article now addresses the impact of September 11th on the Peace Process in
Northern Ireland and the paramilitaries in particular.
PART VI: THE IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER 11TH ON THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE
PARAMILITARIES OF NORTHERN IRELAND
A. United States Foreign Policy
Official United States foreign policy has "substantially changed in the
aftermath of the attacks.,, 20 0 The so-called "Bush Doctrine" holds those states
harboring terrorists equally responsible for the terrorist's actions and places an
affirmative duty on states to assist the United States in policing terrorism.20 ' In
this atmosphere, the American government may lose tolerance for the means, and
perhaps even the ends, of paramilitaries still active in Northern Ireland. In the
past, the United States, particularly the Clinton administration, was involved
intimately in the Peace Process. Yet, its distance from the conflict allowed it to
act, for the most part, as an unbiased, neutral observer. September 11th may
change the nature and scope of American involvement in the Peace Process. In a
recent development that highlights the issues surrounding the American war on
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terrorism and its impact on the paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, three suspected
IRA members were arrested in Columbia for allegedly training left-wing FARC
rebels. 20 2 While the U.S. State Department has stated that IRA involvement in
Columbia, if true, would "raise troubling questions," the United States has not
taken more concrete actions against the IRA in response to this situation.20 3 This
situation is all the more complex given the United States' military campaign
against the ruling party in Afghanistan for harboring al Qaeda members. This
raises the question of whether the United State's' response would change if,
instead of the IRA, al Qaeda was training rebels in Columbia.
B. The American Public
With a few notable exceptions, 2° the home soil of the United States was free
of terrorism prior to September 11 th. The magnitude and live coverage of the
September 11th attack made Americans tragically aware that they too are not
immune to acts of terrorism. 20 5 As it may affect the government of the United
States, September 11th may also affect the perceptions and behavior of the
American public toward the Peace Process. The attacks of September 11th
26
"dramatically altered American attitudes and strategies toward terrorism." 0
Today, the American people and government might have greater sympathy for
victims of paramilitary attacks and less tolerance for the perpetrators. The
Republican movement has enjoyed a great deal of support among IrishAmericans. 207 Realizing first-hand the results of terrorism, the support of the
Republican movement among the Irish-American community might dry up.
Again, this is particularly plausible considering Great Britain's overwhelming
support of the United States' anti-terrorism initiatives and military actions.
C. PerceptionofParamilitariesas Terrorists
The perception that Northern Irish paramilitaries are terrorists might grow
more acute post September 11th, as pressure to condemn all terrorism, particularly
among Western states, increases. Great Britain's foremost and unwavering support
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of the war on terrorism may serve to encourage the public to label the Republican
paramilitaries as terrorists because they advocate the complete withdrawal of Great
Britain from Northern Ireland and continue to use violence. For example, the
European Union' created an acceptable list of terrorists. 2 8 That list included the
rlRA and the Ulster Defense Association.20 9
D. Action by the Paramilitaries
Paramilitaries, realizing that their support may disappear should they continue
to use violence, may adjust their own objectives and means to conform to the
reduced tolerance of violence. The September 11th attacks may persuade
paramilitary organizations to refrain from armed conflict to avoid international
condemnation similar to actions of the LTTE in Sri Lanka. The constraints of
international opinion may effectively make it impossible for the IRA and LVF to
ever return to a campaign of violence. Indeed, international awareness of terrorism
may have led the Sinn Fein and IRA leaderships to decommission. However, Gerry
Adams has denied that post-September 11 th pressures had any impact on the IRA's
decision to disarm, stating that the long-term goal of the IRA has been peace and
have withstood British opposition for 25 years. 210
E. No Effect
Alternatively, the attacks and repercussions of the September 1 th attacks
may have little, if any, impact on the Peace Process or the paramilitaries of
Northern Ireland. To keep the discussion in perspective it is important to note the
long history of, as well as the extreme positions taken by, combatants in Northern
Ireland. Since September 11th, both Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries have
continued to engage in violence. 21' On a weekly, if not daily basis, Loyalist and
212
Republican paramilitaries carry out punishment attacks on their own members.
Loyalist paramilitary organizations carried out numerous pipe bomb attacks.21 3
The Red Hand Defenders issued death threats against all Catholic teachers and
other staff working in north Belfast schools as well as Catholic postal workers.214
Protestants mounted fierce protests and acted violently against children and parents
at the Holy Cross primary school in Belfast. 2 '5 Finally, as noted above, suspected
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IRA members, one of which is also the Sinn Fein representative to Cuba, were
arrested216 in Columbia because they were allegedly training left-wing FARC
rebels.
Perhaps paramilitary groups do not see themselves as terrorists and thus
international condenmation of terrorists would have no effect on how they view
themselves.217 The current worldwide condemnation of terrorism would be
irrelevant. As self-recognized NLMs with the inherent right to use force in the
pursuit of self-determination, the Republican paramilitaries may see their use of
force as legitimate and outside the post-September 11th debate. The Loyalist
Paramilitaries may view their actions as a means of legitimate self-defense against
Republican attacks.
There also may be a desensitization effect among Northern Ireland's
combatants. Northern Irish on both sides of the conflict have witnessed thousands
of friends and family die. The Northern Irish have lived under fear and threat of
violence for decades. Accustomed and desensitized to violence, the tragedy of
September 11th may not have as great an impact in Northern Ireland as it does in
the United States or elsewhere.
Most recently, there have been major setbacks in the Peace Process. After
realizing that Sinn Fein members of the Northern Irish Assembly may have been
spying on behalf of the IRA, that the IRA has been training rebels in Columbia,
and that the IRA has no intention of disbanding, Irish Protestants within the
Northern Ireland Assembly resigned their positions, requiring Great Britain to reimpose direct rule.21 8 It is debatable whether this is an effect of September 11th. It
is more likely that this is evidence that the Troubles, begun prior to September
11th, continue today.
CONCLUSION

While the impact of the September l1th attacks on the paramilitary
organizations of Northern Ireland and the Peace Process in general is still
developing, it is probable that September 11th will indeed influence the Northern
Ireland conflict in several significant ways. In terms of the big picture, the United
States' approach will change. The United States no longer has the luxury of
remaining a detached observer. Instead, if it wants to avoid charges of hypocrisy,
the U.S. will most likely be less sympathetic to those organizations still engaging
in violence and more reluctant to include them in future peace endeavors. The
Good Friday negotiations were a success because paramilitary groups were
included in the discussions. Therefore, any decision to excluding violent
organizations would have a negative effect on the Peace Process. In terms of the
day-to-day effect of September 1 th on the paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, the
impact is little. Violence continues. Perhaps this is not surprising considering the
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long history of violence in Northern Ireland. One of the few positive outcomes of
the September 1I th attacks is a hope for increased worldwide vigilance in
stamping out terror. Unfortunately, this level of vigilance has not yet had any
impact on Northern Ireland.
The Peace Process and, in particular, the Good Friday Agreement have set in
motion an irresistible force for peace that cannot be stopped despite recent
violence, setbacks in Northern Ireland, frequent deaths and fighting in the name of
freedom, and the failure of peace initiatives throughout the world. Perhaps "hope
and history is reigning in Ireland., 219 One day, those who work for peace may
point to Northern Ireland as an example of how to obtain it.
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